GOVT. COLLEGE FOR WOMEN SRINAGAR

LIBRARY

Class No. 320.4

Book No. M 17 V

Acc. No. 2162

VICTORS, BEWARE Politics

By the same author

I AMERICANS
DISARMAMENT
DON QUIXOTE
THE GENIUS OF SPAIN
SHELLEY AND CALDERON
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ENGLISHMEN, FRENCHMEN, SPANIARDS
ANARCHY OR HIERARCHY
ELYSIAN FIELDS
THE WORLD'S DESIGN
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
HERNÁN CORTÉS
THE SACRED GIRAFFE
SIR BOB
SPANISH FOLK SONGS
SPAIN
THE HEART OF JADE

VICTORS, BEWARE

by

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA

It is the victors who must search their hearts in their glowing hours and be worthy by their nobility of the immense forces that they wield.

WINSTON CHURCHILL, *Sunday, May 13th*, 1945

JONATHAN CAPE
THIRTY BEDFORD SQUARE
LONDON

FIRST PUBLISHED 1946

JONATHAN CAPE LTD. 30 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON
AND 91 WELLINGTON STREET WEST, TORONTO

32 b.4
M 17 V
2162

THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS

350
M·26·V·

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE CITY OF OXFORD
AT THE ALDEN PRESS
BOUND BY A. W. BAIN & CO. LTD., LONDON

CONTENTS

FOREWORD 7
INTRODUCTION 11

PART ONE

HOME AFFAIRS

SECTION I—WORDS AND MEANINGS 27
I MONARCHIES AND REPUBLICS 27
II ELECTIONS, PLEBISCITES AND CONSTITUTIONS 36
III WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 45
IV WHAT IS FASCISM? 55
V REVOLUTIONS *v.* EVOLUTION 64

SECTION II—COW STATE OR FREE ORDER? 70
I THE CLAIMS OF THE COMMUNITY 70
II THE CLAIMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 77
III LIBERTY 85
IV EQUALITY? 95
V SECURITY 110
VI CONCLUSION 117

PART TWO

WORLD AFFAIRS

SECTION I—FALLACIES *v.* FACTS 121
I FALLACIES ABOUT GREAT AND SMALL NATIONS 121
II FALLACIES ABOUT AGGRESSION 126
III FALLACIES ABOUT (AND AGAINST) INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY FORMS 132
IV FALLACIES ABOUT NEUTRALITY 135

CONTENTS

SECTION II — THREE-ORDER OR FREE ORDER? 143

I THE CHIEF PROBLEM — GERMANY 143
II FIAT EUROPA 152
III A MINIMUM PROGRAMME FOR A FREE ORDER 160
IV WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED 174
V POWERS AND PRINCIPLES 179
VI RUSSIA'S FAITH 190
VII RUSSIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS 197
VIII THE U.S.S.R. AND WORLD AFFAIRS 243
IX THE U.S.S.R. AND DUMBARTON OAKS 258
X WHAT THEN? 275

A POSTSCRIPT ON THE ATOMIC BOMB 294
APPENDIX 297
INDEX 299

FOREWORD

It is not without diffidence that I offer to the Anglo-Saxon public this report on present day home and world affairs. A twofold diffidence. First, because of the subject; for, as shown hereafter, I hold that there is little that we can say with any assurance on collective life at the time we are living it. But even more so because of the keen awareness of my own disqualifications. 'Why!'— any English-speaking reader might well ask — 'how dare you, a Spaniard, exiled from a country which has proved herself unable to govern herself in peace, how dare you offer your views to the Anglo-Saxon nations all of whom are models of political sense?'

The best answer to such a question is not in anything I can say; but in the open-mindedness and, so to speak, intellectual hospitality of the reader. There are, however, a few reasons why, even at so overwhelming a disadvantage, a Spanish observer of world affairs might be pardoned for venturing to put his views forward at this juncture.

In this province of Europe, known as Britain, a Spanish European may be allowed to speak on world and European affairs as a Scotchman in Yorkshire would on British affairs. And once the subject of world and European affairs is tackled, it reveals itself so complex that little can be said about it unless the chief ideas on home affairs are first put on a clear footing. Hence the division adopted hereafter: first, home affairs; then, world affairs.

Home affairs of any nation — at any rate, of our west. But, if in what follows, concrete facts and examples are often chosen from Britain, the reason is twofold: first, because Britain stands closer to the observer; and then, because for centuries Britain has been both in the fore-

front of political evolution and a permanent European power; so that the political evolution of this country is a matter of the utmost importance for all westerners.

For all that follows is based on the belief that the west is essentially liberal; and that the chief task of our day is to rescue liberalism from the dangers which beset it both from within and from without.

The chief dangers are three: worship of power, a shift of stress in favour of material values, and verbal confusion. They dovetail. For power, which knows itself worshipped, takes good care to buy the acquiescence of the masses by means of bread and circuses and by cultivating the ideals and prejudices of its worshippers in a vocabulary pleasing to their ear. It was necessary, therefore, to clear the ground for our inquiry by a number of studies on the words in common use — and misuse.

Having thus restored the true value of our verbal tokens, the next task was to establish afresh a liberal faith. The idea that liberalism must die because its programme has been realized already in modern countries is a naive error. It forgets the golden precept: *the price of liberty is constant vigilance.* Since the days of Erasmus, individual liberty has never been more threatened than now, nor by subtler and more pervading forces.

Passing then to world affairs, and starting from a concrete and hard problem — Germany, and how to prevent a recurrence of the world war — it became necessary to go to the roots of the German disease, which are two: the German character; and the atmosphere of world power in which it lives. And in examining this second factor, how could we leave out that all-important element — the weight of the Soviet Union on world affairs?

But the study of this last subject would have been but a farce and a mockery had we been content to cover

awkward passages with amiable words made of perfumed rubber, adaptable to any meaning. We had to go to the facts, give dates and texts.

The accumulated effect of these texts and dates provides an accurate, objective and coherent picture of Russian politics in the last six years; but it shatters many a dream. This might in its turn lead to a misunderstanding of the author's attitude and intentions. It is therefore indispensable to inflict on the patient reader another page of the first person singular.

I am as indebted to Russia as any European — to the Russia, in particular, which has given to the world Glinka and Mussorgsky, Gogol, Dostoievsky and Berdiaev. Nor do I mean to discriminate between a good and a bad Russia. There is only one, a nation great not only in physical size but in spiritual force and originality — one of the richest elements which go to the making of Europe.

Nor should some of the opinions expressed in the following pages be attributed to a prejudice against communism. Though, as a liberal, I disagree with most of the tenets of communism, I readily admit that it may be for a time the most advisable form of collective life, not only for Russia but for other nations, such as Germany, as well. If my own country were to adopt Marxism, *provided this came about fairly, by way of enlightened discussion and free decision,* I should respect the nation's will, and live in a Marxist — though I refuse to live in a fascist — Spain.

The Agreement whereby the Soviet Union and the Spanish Republic mutually recognized each other was negotiated and signed in Geneva by M. Litvinov with the author of these lines; and when Russia was invited to join the League the Assembly elected me president of its political committee so that, with M. Benes as rapporteur

to the Council, we could pilot the whole business during its somewhat delicate passage through the Parliament of Nations. I have nothing but sympathy, admiration and gratitude for Russia. *Sed magis amica veritas.* And indeed, one of the most painful aspects of present day life is that the political evolution of the world should be held back so thoroughly and so powerfully by the force and in the name of a people endowed with such fine and noble gifts.

The Western Powers are beginning to speak out. The situations created under Russian arms in the ring of States round her frontiers is beginning to disquiet Western opinion. It was not for this, the west feels, that this terrible war was fought. Europe comes out of the second world civil war in hunger, ashes and ruin. Never in her history, not even during the Thirty Years War, has she suffered so much. And the arts of destruction, meanwhile, are daily progressing at such a rate that a third world civil war would spell black death and stark cannibalism for the Continent once graced by all the gifts of the spirit.

Such are the thoughts which have prompted the ensuing pages. May they help the reader to excuse their errors and shortcomings. This, as Montaigne said, is a book of good faith. All the good faith and the goodwill of the world will be necessary in the next few years to save mankind from her worse self.

Oxford
May 1945

Acknowledgments are due to the weeklies 'Message,' 'The Spectator,' 'Time and Tide' *of London, and to the monthly* 'Tomorrow' *of New York, where some of the following chapters have already appeared.*

Events and Texts, unless otherwise stated, from 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives.'

INTRODUCTION

THE SECOND WORLD CIVIL WAR

No single explanation will suffice to define the Second World Civil War. Ultimately, it cannot be properly understood unless its multifarious and even contradictory elements are analysed and recognized in all their complexity. There are obvious risks in such an analysis. If we are to describe our side of the war honestly and accurately, we must have the courage to see its weak points. We must choose between the risks of truth and those of hypocrisy. In what follows we have chosen the risks of truth.

And to begin with, the war, at any rate on the political plane, was fought not between two but between three sides. It was a triangular war. Hitler's cynical attack on Russia flattened out the triangle and drew together Russia and the west into a close alliance. But the Russo-Polish and the Russo-Finnish wars of 1939 and 1940 showed that, though later the ally — and a loyal and heroic ally — of the west, Russia pursues her own policy, as indeed, in the absence of something better, she has every right to do.

The Anglo-German and the Russo-German wars must therefore be analysed separately, merged together though they were on the military plane by Hitler's insane attack against Russia.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Technically, the Anglo-German war began with Hitler's aggression against Poland. In Hitler's mind, this aggression was but a slightly more spirited step on the road which had taken him already to Vienna and to Prague. Upon Hitler's aggression against Poland,

France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. Why? To honour an obligation which they had incurred with regard to Poland. Yet, an even clearer obligation — on the part of France at any rate — had been ignored at Munich. Whence the difference? From public opinion. At the time of Munich, public opinion in France and England was still ready to believe that a compromise with Hitler was possible. When Hitler attacked Poland, public opinion in the west was no longer ready to believe in such a compromise. Hence the war.

But what was it exactly that people had expected to compromise about? Power. There is no other answer. In fact, if Germany had been governed by spirited and ambitious but clean and human pangermanists, instead of allowing herself to fall into the hands of a band of ruffians, let us be precise, if Germany had been governed by Stresemann, backed by the war machine which her generals had set up between 1920 and 1938, there would have been no war and yet the Reich would be well on the way to rule over a well-organized Europe; for France and England, though for different reasons, would have compromised with her, which would have meant a bloodless but an undoubted victory for Germany.

The war was, therefore, to begin with, first a conflict of power which had to be solved by force not through any intransigence on the part of France or England, but owing to an irrational desire for violence on the part of Germany. Before we come to this violence and to its origin, it is as well to emphasize the national aspect of the war which it is now the fashion to deny. No man with a clear and direct knowledge of the combatants can doubt for a moment that the deepest impulse which drove them to fight was patriotism. Such a particular British, Dominion or American soldier might, according to his education, origin, class or political opinion, be consciously fighting for this or for that — but all fought

for king and country, or for the stars and stripes, and everybody knows what that means.

Mr. Winston Churchill called it *survival*. And when he said it, it was literally true. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in those days of the summer of 1940, when the hordes of Hitler were overrunning the whole of France and, drunk with joy, glanced at England across the Channel as their next victim, the life of England was all in Churchill's breath. But as Britain revived, 'survival' took a wider and wider meaning, till it became as wide as the seven seas in which Britain lives. This was therefore one of the strongest of the underlying forces behind the war so far as Britain is concerned, and it is our duty as realists to understand it so.

As for the United States, no man in his senses will deny the urge for power — naval, military, air, economic and financial — behind her war effort. The men who determined the United States to enter the war were all deeply imbued with this national, indeed nationalist sense — no matter what other emotions, such as right, justice and so forth, might be active in them *as well*.

Within the complex system of forces which animated the German nation in this struggle, a national patriotic urge for power was of course also present. It was in fact more active even than on the British side, for Germany was still endeavouring to climb the slopes towards the historical summits which Britain attained more than a century ago after her victory over Napoleon. Wipe out the nazis altogether and pangerman ultra-patriotism remains — the same pangerman ultra-patriotism which drove imperial Germany to the last world war. It is a feeling of historical injustice which speaks to the German's heart and says: 'Why should we, who are as good as the English or the Americans, be less powerful than they?' The Germans, the *Herrenvolk*, cannot bear what, in their eyes, is an unfair situation of inferiority. The answer is

of course that time and again the Germans have proved that, contrary to what they imagine, they are not capable of holding historical responsibilities, for which they have too little political wisdom and too much egoism. But that self-knowledge is beyond and above them, and, in any case, does not alter their state of mind, which leads them to challenge the Anglo-Saxons in order to oust them from their position of world-leadership.

It is sheer hypocrisy to deny or to pretend not to see that the war was, in part, at any rate, a struggle for power. But then, why be squeamish about it? What is wrong with power? Power is clean to the clean, and many millions all over the world wished for years that the western nations were even more powerful than they were. Nor was this struggle for power limited to the Anglo-Saxons and Germany. Russia is also struggling for power, and so was Japan, before it was reduced to fight for dear life. There were in the war many other struggles as well, which we shall endeavour to analyse hereafter, but they all occurred within a canvass of struggle for power between these five big centres of life and their respective satellites.

THE STRUGGLE FOR DECENCY

The fact that Germany brought to this struggle a violence of her own is in a sense adventitious. She might have been less addicted to violence and yet have pursued a power-policy equally stubborn, and thereby, more effective. This violence which first made the war indispensable and then made it on the German side peculiarly odious, was due to several causes. One is a feature inherent in the German character and so well known that no space need be wasted to comment on it. It explains the unnecessary violence observed at the origin and in the course of the last world war. But along with this permanent tendency, a transitory cause was

also at work which gave rise to the unspeakable outburst of brutality known as nazism: the repressed fury of years of humiliation after the last defeat. I am not concerned here with the justice or injustice of the treatment meted out to Germany after the last war. Whether it was just or unjust (being human, it was probably both) the psychological outcome of it was that for about twenty years a vigorous and strong-willed people was held below the level at which it believed it should live, thereby storing up underground dangerous psychological energies whose explosions were to shatter a whole continent.

Here again, it matters little whether the Germans were or were not justified in being furious. The fact is that this wholesale brutality, indeed bestiality into which they have allowed themselves to fall is a danger to mankind. For the nazi system was a diabolical mixture of efficiency and power in its means, and of oppression and evil in its end. Method in madness. A people putting reason to the service of folly, and, with the most admirable technique and discipline, achieving inhuman, odious or merely mad aims which every man or people of common sense must abhor not only on ethical grounds but on grounds of the most matter-of-fact and practical realism. This combination of madness in the end and mastery in the means might have reduced nation after nation and continent after continent to the most abject slavery the world has ever known. Here, no exaggeration is possible, and those who think that the picture of a nazi-dominated world as a hell of slaves in the service of a chosen people of bullies is a bogy live in a fool's paradise.

In defending mankind against this danger, the most powerful, the most universal the world has ever known, the Allies performed an outstanding service. It is therefore irrelevant to intrude other arguments at this point

of the debate. If the tailor's house is burning and the fireman climbs to the window to save his child from the flames, the tailor is not going to shout to the fireman that he owes him the suit he is wearing. Though, therefore, the war was, amongst other things, a struggle for power, over and above this struggle, the Germans transformed it into a duel between two ways of understanding the use of power — the way of the criminal bully and the way — we hope — of the man of common sense. It follows that — whatever we may think about struggle for power at all, and we must come to that later — we could not hesitate and we had to side with those who, in a world of power, could be trusted to wield it with decency.

A STRUGGLE FOR CHRISTIANITY?

Decency. That may sound rather modest to those who emphasized the crusading spirit of the war. It is a most tempting picture: the straight cross against the crooked cross. And in a number of ways it is not untrue. The chief Christian asset which the west defended against Hitler is the sacred character of the individual soul. Spiritual, intellectual and moral freedom and implicit equality for all men no matter their nature or culture is abhorrent to the crooked cross and it is essential to the straight cross. The west stood for all this and strove to deserve to be the crusader of the straight cross. We must not put its claims any higher — yet, modest as they are, they justified the struggle from the Christian point of view.

The western spirit means therefore an open evolution for the world. The nazi would have closed the evolution of mankind, since it would have maimed the soul of the non-German by slavery and unhinged that of the German by unrestricted power. Freedom to seek, to err, to learn, perhaps to find, is what the west has fought for. A mad-house for Germans on top of a dungeon for non-

Germans is what Hitler was striving to build. In this struggle the west stood for a way of life which, though not exclusively Christian, is in line with the natural evolution of Christianity.

Yet when all is said and done and if only for reasons of good taste, it is best to leave the straight cross out of, or better, above the struggle altogether. There is a certain arrogance in claiming to fight for the Lord. Let Him choose His own soldiers — if He need any.

A CLASS STRUGGLE?

We hear and read now and then that the war was a civil war between the Right and the Left. A number of facts lend colour to this view, and in particular the tendency of the possessing classes in many nations to side more or less openly with Hitler in carefully shaded attitudes from appeasement through neutrality to advocacy of Hitlerism and even Fifth Column activities.

From the outset, the workers all over the world felt this reluctance of some at any rate of the well-to-do to align themselves with the other forces against Hitler to be yet another episode of their own life-long struggle for better social conditions. It so happened that the acute phase of this crisis coincided with the anti-fascist alignment organized under the aegis of the Third International by means of the Popular Front tactics for internal affairs and of the International Peace Campaign for external affairs. This alignment, which the Spanish civil war dramatized, was shattered when Stalin and Hitler signed their pact, and was restored again as soon as Hitler betrayed Stalin. Such rapid changes in the attitude of the extreme Left with regard to the Left can be explained by the differences, already noted above, which, on the political plane, distinguish the Anglo-German from the Russo-German war, merged into one on the military plane owing to Hitler's aggression. The

Anglo-German war was a duel between totalitarianism and democracy; the Russo-German war a duel between two totalitarianisms of opposite signs. This is a fundamental point. It is silly to look away. The Anglo-Saxons need not become communists in order to be the staunchest allies of Russia; any more than the Russians need turn monarchists or capitalists in order to be the staunchest allies of the Anglo-Saxons. For good or ill, Hitler's pressure was strong enough to hammer them together. But either we must give up thinking or we must think aright. And therefore it is our duty as thinking men to see the difference between the two political wars within the military war. The west stands for democracy, Russia for communism. And anyone who says that communism is democracy insults the shades of Lenin and Marx and makes Stalin smile in public and laugh in private.

It follows that, owing to Hitler's utter lack of principles which drove him to betray Stalin, democracy and communist totalitarianism had to fight together against nazi totalitarianism. Is this sound? Yes. Because there is a fundamental difference between the two totalitarianisms. Nazism had no principles. Its so-called political philosophy is a tissue of absurdities, a mere arsenal of shibboleths and slogans for nazi leaders, who were the first to laugh at them. The only aim of Nazism was to set up a ruling class of nazis bullying a people of Germans ruling over a world of slaves. Marxism on the other hand is a consistent, scholarly and forceful philosophy, with which one may or may not agree, but which aims at the emancipation of all mankind through the working classes by the abolition of the private ownership of the instruments of production. And in so far as liberal democracy, which England and the United States represent, believes in the gradual discovery of truth through trial and error, it is always possible for it to enter into a

political and military alliance with communism under an imminent threat from a common enemy, without betraying its own tenets.

In so doing both liberal democracy and communism set aside but do not sink their ideological differences. For these differences exist and it would be most unwise to belittle them. There is a kind of intellectual so anxious to be forgiven by the manual workers for his power to think that he sacrifices it willingly on the altars of St. Marx. That way lies muddle-headedness, a bad peace and another war. We are swamped by communist propaganda on the ground that the soldiers of Russia fought like heroes. It is therefore imperative that we should keep our heads; not indeed for fear of communism — let us by all means learn all about it, and from it as well — but for fear of muddle-headedness, irrelevancy and sentimentalism.

Barely delivered by time from one particular brand of romantic nonsense, is mankind ready to fall into another? We are threatened with a wave of hero-worship of the worker, just at the time when machines are removing three-quarters of the load which made him an object of pity first, of intelligent interest later. The hero-worship of the worker, combined with the genuine admiration which the magnificent valour of the Russians deserves, should not lead western public opinion into the mistake of identifying the ultimate and highest cause for which it fought this war with the class struggle preached by Marx on the strength of a social situation which has become as obsolete as the horse-carriage or women's stays. Let us brush aside this honourable red herring and look at things as they are.

A STRUGGLE FOR FREE ORDER — INTERNAL

Class struggle is after all but a symptom of the anarchy of collective life within our nations. But this anarchy

covers every manifestation of life and not merely the relations between employers and workers and between both and the nation. (Combinations of workers' unions and employers' federations interested in the same industrial pie have been known to conspire most skilfully against the public interest.) As the growing intricacy of men's relations grew, the frontier-line between national and international problems became more blurred. We realize nowadays that international peace has its roots in national peace. The war may well have been a struggle to discover free order within any one nation as well as between nations. But here, a warning.

Here is a simple contrast in the vast landscape of the war: Greece, though under a totalitarian regime, at the outbreak of the war fought heroically for the cause of freedom; Denmark, a crowned republic, succumbed to Hitler's mildest push. Finland, a real democracy, fought on the wrong side. These are the things we must look in the face if we are not to be suffocated by humbug. It means that under those words 'totalitarianism', 'dictatorship', we describe historical experiences of the most varied nature. The fact is that in a vast part of the world the infirmities to which the democratic system is exposed have proved fatal to it and to the nations concerned. This area of democratic failure covers the whole of what is somewhat inaccurately known as the Latin world both of Europe and of America. It is bound to be so in all nations whose chief tendency is aesthetic rather than positive. Their makeshifts have often proved worse than their democratic troubles, but then, political makeshifts are not just appliances deliberately adopted. They are events. They happen. They follow and even flow from what came before them. They are life, not art or quackery. The fact that Greece was on the good side of the barricade is therefore a fit reminder of one of the most important factors in the struggle — the search for a

free order in the national field. This free order will not be found — and peace will be unattainable — unless the bigots of the Holy Democratic Church get rid of their shibboleths, see the psychological realities and agree *to reduce the claims of a healthy free order* to the three minimum guarantees every people must satisfy to be admitted into the commonwealth of nations: respect for the human person; freedom of thought; government by consent, periodically renewed by peaceful means.

THE STRUGGLE FOR A FREE ORDER — WORLD

Had these conditions been exacted of Italy when Mussolini reached power, fascism would have died in its infancy. This war is dated by two Chamberlains, two brothers: Austen at the beginning, Neville at the end. Two more honest men, two more desirous to do their best by all concerned, it would be difficult to find. The first threw over the Geneva Protocol and negotiated Locarno. The second saw Locarno torn to shreds and negotiated Munich. Because the first would not give a guarantee to Poland within the foolproof security of the Protocol, the second had to give a guarantee to Poland under no security whatsoever — and died heartbroken.

Between the two Chamberlains, Manchuria and Abyssinia. This war is the outcome of the failure of the great powers to make the League live. What was the League? An embryo of an answer to the problem of world-government set before the leaders of the world by the progress of applied science. It is often asserted that it failed because it had no effective power to enforce its decisions. That is not true, as will be proved hereafter. The League never decided anything at all because it never *was*. The nations met (the U.S.A. did not even 'meet') and mixed their many-coloured nationalisms into a muddy grey which they called League just as a bad painter messes his palette — but there never was a

common spirit, a common patriotism in the League. — League! . . . The very word is like a knell to toll the death of all unanimity! Hitler, a madman but no fool, saw where its weakness lay. It was a troop of ninepins pretending to be a pillar. He knocked down the ninepins one by one.

The lesson is obvious. The outlook is black indeed if the experience of this war does not instil the spirit of a united commonwealth into the nations of the world. They would not receive it in fair weather and must accept it in foul. In one word, both in the national and in the international field, this war must drive into people's minds the basic truth of all collective life: *unity before liberty*, or in other words, liberty is only possible within a pre-established unity. Unity of the world commonwealth so that nations may be free within it. Once the nations of the world have explicitly acknowledged that the interest of the world commonwealth is paramount, peace and order can be assured in freedom for all nations. Once the citizens and classes of the nation have explicitly acknowledged that the interest of the nation is paramount, peace and order can be assured in freedom for all men. So the aim of this war should be to strive for a world free order of national free orders.

The three driving spirits of the war were universal — as universal as its strategy, which was world-wide. Communism: the Soviet Union is universal. Not content with looking forward to a world union of Soviet States, it boldly started straightway in 1917. Any nation which would turn communist would automatically join the Soviet Union. Moscow is as proudly 'Catholic' as the Vatican. Hitler's ambition was world-wide also. He wanted to unify the world in order to need but one chain to enslave it. The west is universal in that, despite its inherent liberal tendency to dispersion and anarchy, and its corresponding feature on the national plane,

nationalism, it draws the logical conclusion from the aeroplane and the wireless-set and seeks to govern as one body politic which henceforth is one. The pressure of events is universal also. Now that the war is over, the overwhelming problems of the peace will require nothing less than a world patriotism, a conscious feeling of the duties of a world statesmanship if our leaders are to possess enough authority to grapple with the huge tasks which await them.

PART ONE

HOME AFFAIRS

Through service to order
Through order to liberty

2162

SECTION I

WORDS AND MEANINGS

CHAPTER I

MONARCHIES AND REPUBLICS

I ASSUME that a community is politically successful when it manages to evolve progressively and peacefully for the benefit of the whole nation, to the satisfaction of all, rich and poor, conservative and radical alike.

Within the bounds of this definition, the majority of the most successful communities in Europe are monarchies: Great Britain, the three Scandinavian countries, Holland — Belgium a border case.

This cannot be due to an inherent superiority of the monarchical system, since some of the most successful communities in Europe are also republics: for instance Switzerland — France a border case.

Nearly all successful communities are in the north of Europe or, to refer for once to European peoples outside Europe, are of north-European stock.

That the above observation refers to stock and not to climate or to latitude, is proved by Eire, which cannot be considered as successful within the meaning of the term as defined above. (There are moreover complex considerations of mutual influence between the English and the Irish which compel us to leave the Irish case altogether out of the argument.)

Unsuccessful communities are nearly all of southern or south-eastern stock.

These unsuccessful communities have nearly all upset their monarchies. This cannot be due to an inherent

inferiority in the monarchical system, since these unsuccessful communities have also upset their republics.

On the whole, in the unsuccessful part of Europe, republics have been even less stable and less creative than monarchies — bad though the monarchies were.

The hackneyed explanation for these facts is that the peoples of the south and east of Europe are backward; and that they stand in need of education. This will not do. Backward is a vague and inadequate word. It means nothing unless it refers to that crude faith which sees history as the pilgrimage of nations along the road of progress — one single progress, always identical to itself in time and space — a progress, moreover, mostly sanitary and statistical. There is no such road. No single standard of progress can be applied to all nations. No nation on earth is ahead of all the others in all aspects of human life. The style of the usual music-hall songs in which the people of England delight would I suppose strike the people of Spain as 'backward'. The average Frenchman looks down on the average American abstract intellect. We possess nowadays somewhat objective yardsticks to measure these things beyond controversy. The standard of low-brow entertainment provided by the B.B.C. and by the American broadcasting systems is far lower than, indeed is in an altogether different world from, that which prevails in the southern countries. And yet, England and the United States are ahead of Spain, France and southern Europe in other walks of life.

Lack of education is very much exaggerated as a fact, and the benefits of education are very much misunderstood. If my personal experience is of any value, I am positive that the middle classes are in Spain at least as well educated as in England, though in different directions of the compass; less classics, more science. As for the vocal working classes, they are much keener and often

better read in Spain than in England. Statistics of illiteracy are misleading, unless they are weighed with statistics of what the people who can read do read. While in England the best newspapers have no rival in the world, the press actually read by the masses is much below the standard of the press read by the masses in the south of Europe; and of the huge bulk of books printed in the north and in the south of Europe quantity and quality keep perhaps better company in the south than in the north. Here, as in all that goes before, the better instinctive and non-educated tastes of the southerner are apparent. The only class which in the south has remained ignorant, or rather illiterate, is the peasantry. But theirs is an ignorance of books, not of life; and they are alert.

Moreover in the south of Europe human beings are not docile absorbers of instruction. There is a high number of strong individualities among the people, and they neither feel the need of schoolmasters nor are inclined passively to accept what schoolmasters have to say. They 'ply their own music'. The southerner being as an individual more creative than the northerner, is therefore less dependent on education for his development. Hence the importance which misinformed visitors from the north, often ignorant of the language of the country they visit, tend to attach to what they call lack of education in the southern countries; for they imagine what would become of their own people if its education were neglected to the extent they see or think it is in the countries they visit.

The fact remains that life in those supposed to be backward countries is pleasanter than in the successful communities of the north, when fits of political insanity do not come to upset it altogether. This is not merely due to climate, for climate is apt to be severe in the south. It is not merely, not even mainly, climate which draws northerners

to the lovely and attractive cities of Greece, Italy or Spain. It is mostly a way of life, which owes its wealth and appeal to the creative qualities of the southern European. 'Backward' and 'uneducated' are ludicrously inadequate terms to apply to such peoples. We must therefore seek elsewhere the reasons for their political failure.

Elsewhere, that is, not in their alleged backwardness. But we need not turn away from the features of their character we have just been observing. For it might well be that the cause of their political failures is the same as that of their success and creativeness in other fields.

As one moves in Europe from north to south and from west to east the human type gradually changes (granted a number of ups and downs, for after all we are dealing with nature) from one ruled mostly by ethical, social and objective impulses to one ruled mostly by aesthetic, individual and subjective impulses. In the west and the north most sentences begin with 'This . . .'; in the south and the east with 'I . . .'. In the north and the west people are mostly interested in things; in the south and the east in persons.

Now, there is an obvious link between the ethical-social-objective type and the republican spirit (*Res*, the thing); just as of course between the aesthetic-individual-subjective type and the monarchist spirit. For republican means 'interested in the res-publica', i.e. in the public *thing*, in the *object* which happens at the time to be considered, and not in the person or persons in the public eye.

People are not republican because their chief of State wears a hat instead of a crown; but because they think of the job in hand rather than of the men about; and are apt therefore to group themselves in the service of

things to be done rather than in the service of men to be followed. And conversely, the monarchist spirit, in its origin at any rate, is, as the very word suggests, the spirit which prefers to follow *one chief*, for that is what *monarch* means, and which therefore puts the chief first and the things to be done, the public thing, the re-public, last.

Nowadays, however, things matter more and more, for life becomes more and more objective and technical. The republican, objective, ethical and economic spirit is therefore bound to succeed better than the subjective-aesthetic in administering modern nations. Hence this paradox: monarchies are only successful with peoples who, under their monarchical forms, harbour a republican spirit. The paradox is less violent if it be borne in mind that, for the same reason, republics are successful only with republican peoples.

Hence also this paradox: monarchies always fail with monarchist peoples; the reason being that among monarchist peoples many are the men who want to be the monarch. For the same reason, republics are also bound to fail with monarchist peoples, and even more so than monarchies. This was observed to be the case in southern Europe in our remarks above.

It follows that in the south and east of Europe monarchies fail because the people (including the monarch) are not republican enough. Their parties become men-parties, i.e. monarchies; socialists, republicans, liberals, etc. soon become so-and-so-ists. The apparent exceptions confirm the rule; Catholics are all monarchists of the Pope and communists are all monarchists of Stalin.

A few examples. Venizelos was not the leader of a Greek party grounded on objective ideas. He was the chieftain of a tribe. That is why his partisans were known as Venizelists and not as liberals, republicans, unionists or some other thing-label. They were known

by a man-label, Venizelists, because the only substantial link between them was their common allegiance to the man Venizelos. Conversely, the socialists of Spain, whom one might expect to commune in the Marxist faith, split into three or four groups known by the name of their leaders, Prietists, Caballerists and the like. Later a Negrinist group emerged, but not till Dr. Negrin had been hoisted to power by extraneous forces. In so splitting into man-factions, the Spanish socialists did but conform to the rule of Spanish politics which had split the monarchist liberals into Romanonists, Prietists (of another Prieto), Canalejists, etc., and the conservatives into Maurists, Silvelists and so forth; while the republicans divided into Azañists, Lerrouxists and several other so-and-so-ists.

What a contrast between all these monarchically minded republicans or monarchists of the south, who turned their political parties into monarchies, and the republican spirit which keeps the British monarchy in excellent health. Britain had a statesman of genius in Mr. Lloyd George; a statesman moreover who had led the country out of dire peril and on to victory. Mr. Lloyd George was not yet sixty when his country, somewhat heartlessly, decided that she had no use for him. There he was, a great leader and no party to lead; while the two great parties of the State were content with chiefs competent enough, but not quite head and shoulders above the rest of their countrymen. Why? Because the general trend of events and ideas in the country sapped the strength of the liberal party and strengthened the conservatives and the socialists. These objective reasons weighed far more than the pure subjective circumstance that the liberal party had an outstanding leader; and so Mr. Lloyd George was left high and dry. Such an event would have been unthinkable in the south of Europe. A forceful political leader

would have gathered together enough Lloyd Georgists to govern the country till his death.[1]

For in the south of Europe things group themselves around outstanding men. Nor does this apply to politics alone. From political parties to churches, from clubs to regiments, from picnics to funerals, all collective events, big or small, all institutions, private or public, live on and by an outstanding individual who dominates them; and who often creates them or saves them from destruction and identifies himself with them to such an extent that once he disappears they pine away and die. This is a psychological requirement and by no means a political vice. It is a peculiar inner shape of the body politic of the southern peoples.

The reason is that the lines of force in the southern communities do not run through things but through men. In the republican or objective peoples the lines of force run through the things themselves — i.e. power, authority, subordination, make up a pattern conceived and lived for the best possible working of the thing in hand — a hospital or a workshop, a university or a golf course. In the monarchist or subjective peoples, the lines of force run through human beings, so that authority, power, subordination, follow a personal pattern of trust, allegiance and delegation.

Moreover, since in the south men are interested in men rather than in things, institutions are left fallow. The individual is chary of being eaten up by the thing. He does not enter into a thing willingly, and hardly ever spontaneously. The vast area of public activities open to private initiative, an area which, in the republican north, is so fertile in private institutions of public import, is left fallow in the monarchist south. Socialism in the south is apt to be a faith which has its bigots, its martyrs,

[1] The case of Mr. Churchill is even more eloquent.

its persecutions and its civil wars. Socialism in the north may take the shape of good business, such as the co-operative movement of England or even more so of Sweden, where without arguments or discussions the standard of living of the working classes is raised here and now by commonsense, hard work and above all personal devotion of a number of competent men to the thing in hand.

Therefore, in the south people are instinctively led to expect the State to do everything. If bulbs for electric lamps are too expensive, there will be campaigns in the press, debates in the House and violent protests to have the price lowered. The price is likely to remain intact. But when the Swedish Co-operative Society found the price of electric bulbs too high, and when a request it made to the manufacturers for a fair price met with no response, the society itself undertook the manufacture of bulbs and so forced down the price. In the south the State would have to do all the work. We meet again, from another approach, with the objective weakness of political parties. Local political institutions are few and without force. Free political institutions for watching the State and its organs are also few and feeble. The government is expected to be not only the chief agent of authority but the chief controller of authority as well. And so both creative and critical initiative are expected from above.

One thing the south does not tolerate: any unnecessary interference with personal individual freedom. The numerous political shortcomings of the southern character lend themselves of course to such an interference, often of the most vexatious and at times of the most cruel character. But it is always most keenly resented and always leads to unbridgeable political feuds. Such is, for instance, the true reason why Spain was never

reconciled to the Franco regime. No government can therefore win the nation in the south which does not respect the freedom of the individual.

The peculiar jealousy and mutual observation which an individualistic character is bound to foster leads also to a certain sensitiveness as to justice. The government must be just. The juster for all the power the citizen is ever ready to grant it. And it must be liberal also in the intellectual sense of the word; for the south is fond of ideas and loves to air them.

All these reasons point to a number of conclusions of practical import. In the south:

1. No political system is likely to be a success;
2. Monarchies will fail, but less so than republics;
3. Governments must be strong and reveal initiative and authority;
4. Governments must be liberal as to the things of the mind, just as between the rights of their several kinds of citizens (classes, provinces and so forth) and respectful of individual dignities and rights.

CHAPTER II

ELECTIONS, PLEBISCITES AND CONSTITUTIONS

'We must consult the will of the people.' Such is the modern panacea. Any attitude other than that of immediate and complete acceptance of this axiom brings forth the ire of the bigots of democracy. But bigots never were an asset to any church; and true faith needs heretics to prosper. So let us rely on the majority of enlightened democrats who can listen to an argument and size it up. It is imperative to examine whether Europe can rise from its ruins by a series of general elections and plebiscites.

To begin with, these ruins are due to a general election — that which on April 11th, 1932 elected Hindenburg President of the German Reich; and to a plebiscite — that which by a majority of 88.2 per cent confirmed Hitler's hold over Germany on August 2nd, 1934. Those who still argue hopefully that all will be well if we rebuild Europe on the basis of a socialist Germany, should study that general election of 1932. The nazis and other 'bad' Germans, 13,417,460 of them, voted for Hitler, of course. But the majority, i.e. 19,359,642, all 'good' Germans, i.e. Catholics, liberals, socialists, communists, internationalists and pacifists, all these 'good' people selected the most representative Catholic, liberal, socialist, communist and pacifist they could find in their country — and that was Hindenburg.

There was nothing wrong with that general election from the democratic point of view. No tampering with the free will of the people; no terror; no pressure on the voters by the Gestapo. Himmler had not yet begun to torture the body, nor Goebbels to deceive the mind, of

Germany. It was an honest to God democratic election. The people of Germany, free to choose, chose Hindenburg and Hitler.

The people, then, can make mistakes. There is no question about that. And capital ones. We have made so much progress on the road of people-worship that this truism: 'the people can make mistakes' sounds like a proposition in need of proof, when it does not sound like stark heresy. 'The King' — wrote Dangeau in his *Memoirs of Louis XIV* — 'is subject to catching cold like his vassals.' Alas, poor king! The people can behave like so many million fools. Alas, poor people! But it was not tactful to say so to the crowned wig of the great century; nor is it to say so to the many-headed monarch of ours.

Mr. Winston Churchill has repeatedly stated that the countries temporarily enslaved by Germany will be free to choose any government they like except fascism. Leaving fascism itself to be discussed at a later stage, the fact remains that Mr. Churchill's position implies:

(1) That liberated peoples might decide freely to choose a fascist government;

(2) That the United Nations would stand no nonsense from them, were that the case.

These two consequences of Mr. Churchill's stand deserve general assent. For instance, the possibility of this or that European country going back to fascism of its own free will is evident; and no less evident that a free Germany would be likely to go back to nazism as soon as the military occupation ceased — if the military occupation were short, because it would not have had time to do enough good; and if long, because the evil effects of foreign occupation as such would probably outdo any good effects of the foreign influence.

For our present purpose, however, it is enough to

record that we have no guarantee that democracies in the full use of their democratic faculties will not most democratically commit suicide.

Hardly less tactful would be the remark that the French, the British and the American democracies have a heavy responsibility in their — and our — trouble.

No one can deny that France was democratically governed between the two world wars. Therefore, it is her people as a whole, i.e. the nation, including 'the people' and no one else, who must shoulder the responsibility of the disaster of 1940. Great Britain was saved from a similar fate by a great man, a handful of pilots and inventors . . . and the Channel. Certainly not by the wisdom of her democracy. And the United States, by her most democratic refusal to listen after the first world civil war to the body of American economists who advised her against her economic folly, contributed more than any other nation in the world, with the one exception of Germany, to making the war inevitable.

Are we arguing against democracy? Of course not. No argument against democracy is valid, since in reality there is no alternative a man in his senses can accept. To point out that democracy has had this or that evil effect is no more to argue against democracy than to point out that exposure to air causes pneumonia is to argue against air. Man must breathe. Peoples must govern themselves. And that is that.

But it was necessary to remind all democrats that a democratically ascertained will of the people is not in itself a guarantee of wisdom, or of justice, or even of practical success in the solution of immediate problems. After all, democracy is not an end in itself. It is only a system of government, and as such it is far from perfect

and needs constant watchfulness and criticism to correct its tendency to go astray.

Democracy, moreover, can only express itself through a network of institutions, traditions and human relations which must differ considerably with time and space. Hardly any of the words used in public life mean the same in the several countries which use them. When the British House of Commons or the American Congress discuss Greece, the Lebanon, Italy or Spain, words such as *liberty*, *democracy*, used in these debates, call forth in the speakers' minds trains of thought and tradition, political habits, images and events, some of which are wholly alien and mentally inaccessible to the countries they are discussing. For example, liberalism and even a certain radicalism in Great Britain are closely connected with low Church evangelism; while for most of the southern peoples, liberalism and radicalism are definitely godless. Or again, while in England a conservative political outlook is more likely to be associated with an easy-going attitude towards the good things of life, and a liberal attitude with puritanism and austerity, it is the other way about in the south of Europe.

This relativity of political concepts and attitudes should temper and moderate the heat of political controversy. The best and wisest way of ensuring the triumph of democracy in the southern climates in which it has not so far struck root, in its political aspects at any rate, despite repeated attempts, is to protect it against its own zealots; to hasten slowly in the cultivation of its tender shoots; and above all to keep always in mind its own peculiar shortcomings.

A sober and objective view of collective life demands a number of admissions. .

The first is that once 'the will of the people' has been ascertained, it may be a disastrous will.

The second is that 'the will of the people' does not mean the same in a country in which old institutions, working through established parties, along traditional methods, have to decide points of no burning or fundamental interest; and in a country in which institutions, not very old or deeply rooted at that, have been ravaged, parties are non-existent, exiled, or have taken to the woods as armed bands, and there is no issue but that of how to grab power from one's neighbour.

The third is that, even if a less abnormal political situation develops in the ex-occupied countries, there are many of them in which elections are traditionally run under methods bearing but little relation to strictly democratic principles. Pressure of all kinds is put on the elector, more often than not, from the rich and the Right, but more frequently than might be imagined, from the popular parties and the Left. A tendency to grab power by the shortest cut is by no means the monopoly of the Right; and tales of electoral pressure have at times come from quarters which might have been expected to feel more deference towards the will of the people.

That objectivity which is the soul of true republican peoples is but rare in the south. Power is power; and all avenues are good which lead to it. Even in most respectable northern democracies, leaders have been known carefully to consider the most favourable time when to catch and snatch the will of the people; and there was a moment in the history of Great Britain when a hang-the-Kaiser cry and a khaki-election were not deemed unworthy expedients to bamboozle the million-headed sovereign.

Nor will it do to argue that the people suffered, the people fought, and therefore the people must decide. It is one of life's deeper tragedies that one is not right by right but by gift. Merits, services, holiness, suffering are

not guarantees of adequate thinking. The man whose house has just been burnt down, whose daughter has just been raped, may be right as to the best course to take in the future to avoid similar disasters; but he may not. And the chances are that, even if he has the wherewithal to think adequately in normal times, his recent sufferings have unhinged his mind. A broken leg does not make a man a good surgeon.

Peoples straight from a strong experience are seldom fit to consider their own interests. The countries just emerging from chaos will need a period of convalescence to recover their own senses before they can express themselves in an adequate way. The State, the city, the family are dispersed and lie helpless in the dust. Fear of the Gestapo has broken all habits of sincerity, mutual trust, courage to speak out. Normal work has ceased. Habits of violence, of dissimulation, of sabotage, which in the days of old were proscribed, have acquired a nobility. 'The chief task' — a Spanish woman wrote towards the end of 1944 describing the situation under the Franco dictatorship — 'is the restoration of the main moral values of our civilization. This moral crisis can be noticed as soon as a word or a look is crossed with one's neighbour. Human relations are destroyed. Even those of us who have lost the very notion of physical comfort, or even the most elementary guarantees of survival, feel anguished above all by this continual experience of the indescribable moral crisis which is now overpowering the world.'

What is the meaning of a general election in the midst of such political and moral chaos?

All this applies with even greater force to the constitutional problem. How, when and by whom is the constitution of the resuscitated country to be defined? Too frequently the answer is: by the people, and at once.

This is both simple and popular. It charms the generous, seduces the lazy and tempts the vain. But a moment's reflection is enough to show how fallacious such an answer is. A constitution is the fundamental law of the nation. It should answer not merely to the ideas, passions and dreams of the generation which dictates it; but also to the nation's past and to the nation's future. It should bear in mind not merely the opinion of the often uninformed and misinformed masses but the views of the historian, keeper of the nation's past, and of the psychologist, watcher of the nation's present. It should be prepared in an atmosphere of order and peace, leisurely studied, allowed to remain on the nation's desk for a long time, and in part at least, tried as an experiment, before being finally declared binding on future generations.

After the fall of Primo de Rivera the Spanish people, coming out of a long dictatorship, gave themselves in 1931 an unworkable constitution, precisely under the obsession of, and in reaction against, the dictatorship. Instead of an instrument objectively answering to the requirements of their psychology and of their political circumstances, they legislated with a bias and an animus against the executive, any executive, venting thus on future executives their unspent passion against the past one. What was the result? The executive was deprived of adequate means for preventing disorder; disorder occurred; it discredited the Republic, frightened and strengthened the reactionary right and finally killed the regime.

It is therefore on behalf of democracy that convinced democrats and liberals must beware of rushing constitutions through hastily convened and emotionally elected assemblies. A somewhat mechanical and statistical general election immediately after liberation is in most

cases apt to mean nothing at all. It may even lead to situations hatched by sheer force, by fraud or by both, answering neither to the best interests nor to the true sense and will of the nations concerned. Despite appearances to the contrary, *de facto* situations may be much more in harmony with the true interests and sense of the nation than political systems formally more democratic, but hastily hatched.

The risks of these *de facto* situations are certainly serious for democracy also. In order to be accepted as political forms compatible with European standards, they should fulfil a number of conditions:

They should have a clean past. In particular, their record should be unimpeachable from the point of view of internal tyranny. No party, no opinion, no religion, no race should have to complain of persecution, concentration camps, shootings at their hands. No system evolved from such a past could be a basis for an evolution towards complete representative democracy.

These *de facto* situations should explicitly recognize themselves as temporary, and fix themselves a time-limit in which to evolve fully representative democratic institutions.

They should govern under a temporary constitutional law binding all public servants, including the chief of State, to recognized principles and rules. This could in most cases be done by declaring in force certain laws enacted under former free regimes.

This should apply particularly

(*a*) to the auditing of public expenses, the administration of public funds and public accountancy. It is hardly necessary to point out that this condition is of the utmost importance to check tyranny; for oppression costs money;

(*b*) to laws and rules guaranteeing the freedom of all citizens to come and go, to meet and work

together or separately for all activities other than public disorder or civil war;

(*c*) to laws effectively ensuring freedom of the press, of worship, and in general what is implied by freedom of opinion;

(*d*) to laws effectively ensuring the free and objective working of the law courts.

There may be other conditions that a more detailed examination of the problem would suggest. But these, at any rate, should be a bare minimum without which *de facto* regimes or situations could not be expected to evolve healthily towards that fuller democracy which all Europe must adopt in one form or another.

If, on the other hand, a set of conditions such as these is satisfied, these *de facto* regimes should be allowed enough political leisure — say five years — to evolve quietly towards democratic constitutions. These constitutions would then be likely to remain as stable features of the wider European constitution most of us hope for.

CHAPTER III

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

WHAT is democracy? What is fascism? Is it not high time we paused to think about it? We are using words, every day more of them, every day vaguer, flinging them about *right* and *left* — again two over-worked words — yet hardly sure of any but their emotional, i.e. their purely personal and unconveyable meaning.

What is in a word? — will be asked again. The answer is: a world of things, not excluding the seeds of war. Words are the currency of that human intercourse which is also, no less than business intercourse, aptly described as *commerce*, the commerce of ideas. If we are not agreed on the value of words, our community will be like a market in which buyers and sellers attach different values to money, so that no one knows what he is really doing when he buys or sells. What is the use of resorting to words unless we seek to understand each other, and how are we to understand each other if we do not begin by agreeing as to the meaning of words?

Even if we are to disagree, to fight with words, is it clean fighting when the foils are not even? 'Words' — wrote Voltaire — 'were given to man so that he could hide his thoughts.' There never was a time when Voltaire's bout hit more accurately; for there never was a time when the debaters sought to convince bigger masses, more untrained minds, less discriminating intellects. Our political vocabulary reeks with ambiguity and insincerity. Only the other day, the British Minister of Civil Aviation pointed out that the five freedoms claimed by the United States delegation to the Chicago Air Traffic Conference were really five privileges. And so with democracy, and with fascism, and

with 'the people', words used less as instruments of truth than as projectiles for mental war, twisted, sharpened and loaded to suit the political passions of those who wield them.

'Democracy' is perhaps the worst case of all. Few people would be able to give an intelligent account of what it means to them, let alone of what it should mean objectively to all. It is applied most inconsistently by the same person to express mutually incompatible political facts.

There are vast zones of the world, notably the American continent (with the possible exception of Canada), in which the word *democracy* means *republic*, in the modern sense of this term, i.e. not the community pure and simple, but only a community in which the head of the State is elected and not hereditary. (Note, in passing, how odd that *democracy* should mean *republic* in the country in which *republican* means the reverse of *democrat*. An apposite illustration of the verbal chaos in which we live.) Under this — no, let us not call it theory — feeling, some of the best-governed communities in Europe, and of the freest — Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Britain, Holland, Belgium — are denied the name of democracy; while the Venezuela of General Gómez, the Poland of General Pilsudski and, with all respect, the Russia of Marshal Stalin — are admitted to the title.

There is another standard of democracy: free, direct, universal suffrage. But the trouble about this standard is that it raises more queries than it solves. What is free? What is universal? What is suffrage? When these questions are analysed, they reveal that the problem of representation is closely knit together with that of the institutions of the country; and by no means only the political, but also the economic and the cultural institutions as well.

Politically no country is ripe for direct universal suffrage when its local government is not free, sound and vigorous. Britain owes the healthy state of her national government to the soundness and vigour of her local government. The local communities of Britain govern themselves. The local communities of Spain began to lose their independence, and with it their vigour, when Ferdinand and Isabel, in order to canalize the prevailing anarchy in which they found the country, appointed *corregidores*, i.e. governors endowed with authority from above, to balance and ultimately crush the authority of the *regidores* or aldermen elected by the people. The French system of *préfectures*, copied in one way or another throughout Europe, is a modern version of the old Spanish corregidores. It is unknown in Great Britain. Through its *préfets* the central government can exert enough pressure on the local government powerfully to influence its activities. Hence the importance which, in the countries where this system exists, parties attach to being in control of the government at the time a general election takes place. And when a coalition government is in power at that critical time, the most disputed portfolio is the Home Office, for the Home Secretary is the chief wirepuller in control of the local préfets.[1]

The influence of economic conditions on the vote need hardly be emphasized. Before it became the political fashion (a madness with a good deal of method in it) to present communism as a form of democracy, Marxism reserved its most vitriolic attacks for the futility of the vote in a community in which the worker was not economically free. This did much to discredit democracy and its ways among the sectors of the working classes inclined to communism or anarchism. It gave a semblance of righteousness to Lenin's dismissal of the

[1] This, by the way, explains why a communist has been put at the head of the Home Office in the governments of all the countries liberated by Russia.

Russian Constituent Assembly by military force (January 19th, 1918) — surely the most glaring assault against democracy ever committed from the Left. Yet it is doubtful whether the effect of economic conditions on the vote is as unfavourable to the working classes as the Marxist school maintains. The chief political event of our generation, the all but disappearance of the liberal parties everywhere, may well be the outcome of an economic factor, but not in the sense of Marx: for the conservative parties are backed by the capitalists and the labour parties by the unions; while the liberals have to meet their expenses with their meagre purses. The outcome is to be deplored in more ways than one. For the liberals are by position the least partial of the parties, the one most likely to stand for national, as opposed to sectional, interests; moreover they are the buffer-party in the State, naturally led to prevent clashes between the two extremes.

Finally the element of political culture has to be considered. It is important to realize that political culture need not be high when other forms of culture are high. Political culture implies a certain education or adaptation of character, which may or may not obtain even when other forms of culture have been successfully realized. There are aspects of culture in which the British people are below the German or the Spanish. But in political culture Britain leaves Germany and Spain far behind. This might well be due to the happy balance the British people have struck between the gregarious and the individualistic tendencies; while the German is unbalanced, being too gregarious, and the Spaniard is also unbalanced being too individualistic. Both Germany and Spain have lost their democratic regimes and fallen into dictatorial abysses, but on opposite sides of the hill of character. Both might have

saved their democracies had they interpreted the word less dogmatically as the system in which the will of the people is expressed by means of direct, universal suffrage.

All this would appear to show that direct, universal suffrage need not be an immediate indispensable factor — it should, sooner or later — in a democracy. After all, direct universal and free suffrage is a way of expressing and of counting the will of the people, and of registering its choice of representatives. And the first question that arises is: Who are the people?

There is a tendency to identify the people with the working classes. It is relatively modern. It would have astonished those Greeks Mr. Eden recently decorated with the name of inventors of democracy. For in their eyes democracy was a matter for citizens only, i.e. for slave-owners — exactly as it was for Washington, by the way. The democrats of those days never did a stroke of work. Manual work was not then honourable. Virgil brackets it together with Death in a list of the terrible forms to be seen at the gates of Hell; along with old age, fear, hideous poverty and the pale diseases:

> Pallentesque habitant Morbi, tristisque Senectus,
> Et Metus, et malesuada Fames, et turpis Egestas,
> Terribiles visu formae, Lethumque, Labosque, . . .

Christianity put all that right and level, when it made all men brothers and deified the Son of the Carpenter. Marx upset it all again and put it upside down. The working classes became 'it'. That was theory. It became a practice when country after country went over to statistical democracy, i.e. to government by numbers; for in point of numbers the working classes won in all industrialized lands.

This put a premium on the working classes. The

signal services rendered to our Western civilization by the Trade Unions both in the political and in the social sphere, and in particular their long-drawn, courageous and successful struggle to lift the working classes from a pariah condition to one of full citizenship, helped in the process, made it so to speak natural, and gave it even a certain amount of justification. But on top of all that, the oddities of human nature came to add less justifiable features. The new sovereign was the people. Flattery appeared on the stage. A kind of passion for self-abasement, the last but one infirmity of noble minds, led many, perhaps the majority, of liberal intellectuals to toe the line. The people, the working classes, once downtrodden, were enthroned. Intellectual workers became shy and shamefaced. And so, from a world which had failed by not admitting the working classes to citizenship, we are rapidly evolving into a world in which no one is to be admitted into citizenship but the working classes.

Nor is that all. For we are not merely asked to abide by the will of the people — in this restricted sense of the word — but by the ideas, the prejudices, the taste, good or bad, of the people. While in the old days everything popular was looked down upon *qua* popular, whether it was good or bad in itself, nowadays everything popular is *a priori* good even when in fact it is lamentable, even when in fact the best of the people do not like it themselves. The old days were unjust in that, while enjoying the flowers and the fruits of the commonwealth, they forgot and neglected the sap and the root whence they came; nowadays we are to forget the fruits and flowers in order to do obeisance to the sap and the root.

But surely it is the flower and the fruit that matters. To be concrete, the cultivation of the mind, both individual and collective, the sciences and the arts, the peaceful weaving of personal intercourse and experience

in a world free from poverty and disease, and above all — happiness? — no, not happiness, which is a will-o'-the-wisp, but the right to free experience for all human beings in whatever station of life they find themselves, whether born, or risen or fallen by their own exertions. In one word, all that which allows the common man to find in himself the man out of the common.

Nothing more significant in this connection than the glorification of the common man to which we are invited by Mr. Wallace. According to this American leader our era is the century of the common man. No, Mr. Wallace, a thousand times no. Even though I suspect we mean the same as to facts and policy, that language will not do. This, and every other century, must be that of the uncommon man. You, Mr. Wallace, are an uncommon man, without whom the common man would fare worse than he does by himself. Life is made rich and beautiful to the common man by men out of the common, and your flattery of the common man is a betrayal of the true values of our civilization.

Indeed, our era, whatever it actually is, should be the era which endeavours to find the man out of the common lost in the masses of common men; and to draw out that which is out of the common in every man. For the issue is neither of class nor of wealth, but of spirit. There is always something common in uncommon men, and something out of the common in common ones. No person with spiritual experience will hero worship or unduly idealize even such giants as Beethoven or Da Vinci. Even they had common backyards. While there are splendours of abnegation, courage, heart — have we not seen them in this war? — in the humblest folk. This is a matter of spirit and taste. The century, like every civilized century, must look upwards and not downwards, must seek the uncommon, not the common man. The language is dangerous. It must be watched.

For similar reasons we must be careful about 'the people'. A society which sets its working classes and its people above the rest of the nation is as foolish as that which tramples its working classes and its people underfoot, or lets them lie fallow or go to seed. Surely, the idealization and enthronement of the people, the identification of the people and the nation are ambiguous tricks which no healthy country should tolerate.

There is every advantage in driving out of the political vocabulary that ambiguous word. 'The people' begs the question. 'The nation' does not. What is in a word? — again. A misleading twist to all political matters by the use of a word which drags the mind down to the bottom of the pyramid and induces it to seek quantitative, oversimplified, 'popular' notions and explanations, even when dealing with problems which, like most collective problems, cannot be understood, let alone solved, otherwise than in complexity.

Government of the people by the people for the people — by all means. Nothing short of that can be called civilized. But on condition that it means government of, by and for the nation. For otherwise it could only mean government of, by and for one particular class without regard for the others; and we should be back where we were when the top class governed without regard for the rest — only upside down. That the people are the most numerous is no answer. For on the one hand the more numerous have no right to be exclusively considered, and no certainty to be wiser from the point of view of the nation as a whole. If there is one thing a democracy is not, it is a community in which the opinion of the minority is simply disregarded outright. And on the other hand, the classes, factors, elements, institutions and forces which make up a nation make up a complex organism of mutual actions and balances far too delicate to be translated into mere statistics.

Fundamentally the choice of the nation is a matter of life and not of statistics; of habits, character, institutions, traditions, memories and dreams in common, a delicate spider web which requires calm and continuity. No set rules can do justice to it; no hard and fast system can meet its requirements. Nothing but enlightened liberty can allow it to grow. But above all a democracy cannot live without variety and freedom of thought. Without variety there is no choice; without freedom of thought there is no discrimination.

Any attempt to represent as democracies systems in which one political party alone is allowed in the State is fatuous. It could only have been made in the mental chaos in which we have been living since the end of the last war. A community in which there is no other press than that of the government, where no books can be published but those that please the government, where justice is under the thumb of the government and the judges need not fear the criticism of either political or technical opinion, where therefore there is no guarantee that the private citizen who dissents from the government may not be punished for his opinions by the courts or even by the executive, such a community is not a democracy, no matter its suffrage.

The best definition of democracy I have heard fell from the lips of Senator de Brouckère. 'Government by public opinion.' Where there is no really free public opinion there is no democracy. No amount of electoral machinery guarantees democracy where the conditions for a free public opinion do not exist. These conditions should therefore be the object of the most careful study on the part of true democrats for they matter far more than the mechanics of suffrage. No attempt will be made to tackle such a vast problem here. But at a glance a number of them might be set down:

A free press; free competition between publishing

firms; no monopoly of broadcasting; independent law courts having reason to fear public opinion but not the government; freedom for individuals to come and go inside the country and leave it and come back to it as they please; guarantees of individual freedom from police interference; inviolability of the private home and of private correspondence; freedom of political opinion and a right to express it in political parties and other institutions; and an economic organization in which all but a handful of improvident tramps, unruly bohemians and vicious beggars enjoy the freedom which goes with the full ownership of one's own labour.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT IS FASCISM?

FASCISM may be understood in two ways: as an Italian political phenomenon; and as a universal movement observed in many lands.

As an Italian phenomenon, it emerged from a combination of forces and circumstances, chief among which were:

— the failure of the democratic institutions of the monarchy to carry the nation over from war to peace; and, in particular, to absorb the demobilized soldiers quickly enough to make them forget camp and barrack life;

— their more general failure to work at all, owing to the disintegration of the party system;

— the resentment caused by the peace settlement, which many Italians, rightly or wrongly, considered unfair to Italy;

— the ambition of an outstanding man;

— the general discredit of democratic and liberal ideas in Europe; and

— the success of Lenin.

These two last factors were paramount in the birth and success of fascism. The most formidable onslaught which liberal democracy had to undergo in all its history came from the Left. Attacks from the Right could never be so deadly, for they were discounted, and, in fact, they strengthened liberal democracy. But the searching criticism which came from great apostles of the working classes, like Marx and Bakunin, was to become dangerous to liberal democracy in all lands and deadly in not a few.

The reason for this is twofold. Marxist criticism of democracy contained an element of truth lacking in the

criticism which emanated from the Right. It was true that the principles of liberty were being exploited by greedy men to line their pockets at the expense of the working classes, and of the whole nation's wealth. It was true that the international anarchy fostered by the scramble for markets was a permanent cause of war. It was true that the healthy working of a liberal-democratic economy was vitiated and hindered by a number of economic anomalies and privileges handed down from the past. And, worst of all, it was true that political liberties and rights were to a considerable extent emptied of their value by economic helplessness. All this was true, and while, as Great Britain, Sweden and other democracies have proved, it was not enough to make one despair of liberal democracy altogether, and to give it up, liberal democracy was condemned and forsaken by many Marxists all over the world, and so lost thousands of adherents among the masses and the intellectuals.

The second reason was that Marxism appealed to the sectional interests of a class which it identified with those of the nation and even of the world. The pariahs of old suddenly found themselves transfigured into the nobility of the new State. 'A classless State' indeed, but one in which the classes were to disappear by being merged into the working classes. This turned upside down an inferiority complex and released the working classes from the purgatory of collective depression in which they had lived for so long. Such a transfiguration was of far deeper import than the mere economic emancipation which Marx promised as well; and it had the advantage of being immediate, while the material emancipation remained in an ever glorious but ever receding future. For the masses, Marxism soon acquired a moral and psychological value far above its merely political import. This circumstance again removed the centre of interest from merely political phenomena, such as the vote, the

party, the parliamentary system, discussion of public affairs, to the fight against the employer. And on this count also liberal democracy was the victim.

This evolution of public feeling and opinion worked silently, gnawing at the vitals of liberal democracy, during the half-century from Marx to Lenin. Marx was a bookish man whose battlefield was the reading room of the British Museum. Lenin was a man of action.

The chief difference between the man of thought and the man of action is that the first can, up to a point, select those parts and aspects of his self which will pass into his work; while the man of action plunges into the stream of life with his whole self. Lenin was an autocrat. Russia gives forth autocrats just as apple trees give forth apples. It is in the nature of Russia. Lenin read his own autocracy into Marx; or rather fed with Marx' ideas his own autocratic impulses. And while Marx, a stubborn but lazy-willed intellectual, wrote a good deal of autocracy into his doctrine as a matter of day-dreaming and wishful thinking, Lenin took all that autocracy and, along with much more of his own, made it all live by the sheer virtue of his temperament.

Lenin's contempt for liberal democracy was thus twofold. Both his temperament and his doctrine found satisfaction in his anti-democratic deeds. His revolutionary spirit, grim while he fought against the Tsarist autocracy, exulted when he fought against a Russia rapidly evolving towards western liberal ways. No kick in history was delivered with more zest than that with which Lenin dispersed the Moscow assembly in 1918. Napoleon, quaintly revolutionary and parliamentarian under his ambitious skin, trembled, fumbled and nearly fainted when dismissing the Five Hundred in St. Cloud. Lenin did not tremble in Moscow. For Napoleon was an autocrat by temperament but not by faith, while Lenin

had both the faith and the temperament. In the secret of his heart, Napoleon thought himself a traitor to the Revolution which had raised him from the dust. Lenin was a pure man.

Lenin is the true creator of totalitarianism, with its features now familiar to all:

— one single party, which openly declares itself a privileged minority in the State, an aristocracy in fact, and dispossesses every other opinion of its political rights.

— political extermination of all other parties, including physical extermination of prominent men whose lives may be undesirable to the regime.

— strict political orthodoxy. No freedom of opinion at all, and therefore a tightly held press and book-production. Since then, as a logical addition, a strict hold over broadcasting.

— mass-opinion manufactured by a special department of State in control of the above and other means for influencing public opinion.

— a powerful and omnipresent secret police with no inhibitions whatsoever.

— no freedom of movement in and out of the country. A close watch over movements within the country.

— all life, public as well as private, under close inspection of the party and of the police.

— law courts wholly under the party's control, and administering only party laws.

When Mussolini found that the chaotic conditions into which democracy had fallen in Italy gave him an opportunity to ape Julius Caesar, his model was ready before his eyes: Lenin. Mussolini was a socialist. He was quick to perceive the advantage of climbing to power attacking democracy from the Left and not from the Right. His technique was ready: it was Lenin's. But he needed

money and a political creed other than communism, for he knew too well that the Italian people were too steeped in individualism to swallow communism at a draught. He found money among the frightened capitalists who had seen their works seized by rebellious Unions; and he found a creed of some sort among intellectuals disappointed with democracy. Coloured shirts were an Italian tradition since Garibaldi. All he had to do was to choose another colour.

Fascism was the result. As an Italian phenomenon, it contains the following elements:

— all the totalitarian features of Lenin's brand of communism.

— a hotch-potch of psychological and political ideas, such as the exaltation of the will, leadership, obedience and so forth.

— a pro-proletarian attitude, in part genuine, but for the most part hypocritical.

— a nationalist, militarist and imperialist tendency.

— a number of symbols, gestures, slogans and styles of dress.

The last item seems to be the only genuine contribution Italy and fascism have made to totalitarianism as Lenin had left it. The nationalist-militarist-imperialist tendency is by no means an exclusive fascist feature. No great power is free from it, not even those who are most proud of their democratic and pacifist tendencies. It is a matter of more or less, not of yes or no. Navy Leagues, Air Leagues, patriotic school books, proudly maintained traditions of aggression and victory, biased presentation of present and past facts to suit national pride and prejudice — where is the nation that dares throw the first stone? Bombastic at times and at times odious, as when it armed children with gun and sword, the nationalist-militarist-imperialist tendency of fascist Italy was perhaps its most excusable, at any rate its least

objectionable feature. That it became irresponsible and dangerous was due to the dangerous and irresponsible character of Mussolini himself.

The pro-proletarian attitude of fascism was to a great extent a make-believe. Nowadays, no movement can thrive without the masses. Fascism had to win over a good proportion of them, without coming into conflict, at any rate at first, with the moneybags which had hoisted it to power. Even later, when the fascist State, having the national budget at its disposal, could dispense with the home moneybags, its administration was reckless enough to force it to respect foreign financial forces some of which were ready to befriend fascism — on terms. This gave a characteristic ambiguity to the relations between fascism and capital and fascism and labour.

Which in its turn contributed to obscure its political thought. The political philosophy of fascism is worthless. This indeed is the point where fascism differs most from communism. We may agree or disagree with communism; but it is a respectable doctrine. Its political philosophy is an outstanding contribution to the history of human thought, and its purpose is sincere and earnest: the economic emancipation of mankind. Fascism is a farce. Its political ideas are an incoherent mixture of Nietzsche, Macchiavelli, Sorel and every possible scrap of anti-democratic nonsense; and its aim, apart from the purely negative desire to keep communism away from the door, was mostly the enthronement and glorification of an adventurer.

Fascism then is but the muddy image of communism in the waters of fear. It is therefore a mistake to refer to fascism as the contrary or the enemy of communism. The contrary of slapping a man on the right cheek is not slapping him on the left cheek; but not to slap him at all.

Both fascism and communism are slaps in the face of liberal democracy. Both could at a pinch get on with mere democracy, were it not for liberty. For democracy without liberty can be kept indefinitely obedient to a dictator. Both fascism and communism help each other, as extremes always do. Fear of communism gave rise to fascist movements nearly everywhere: *similia similibus curantur.* Coloured shirts appeared everywhere (even communists and socialists used them in Spain just before the civil war) and the Roman salute became the fashion in land after land.

Nothing could be shallower and more frivolous than to dismiss coloured shirts and the Roman salute as details without importance. They are the gravest signs of the mental plight of our age. A political uniform means that a large body of people accept wholesale a body of ideas without discussion; and it singles out for contempt, danger and inferior status all those who dissent. A political uniform is therefore both a system of political stultification and a system of political blackmail. As to gestures such as the Roman salute or the closed fist, once they become general, they are the most efficient and diabolic instrument an orthodoxy can invent to oppress a community. Once a political gesture becomes general, the dissenting majority (for the dissentients from an orthodoxy nowadays, at any rate at first, are in the majority) are left with no other course but either to refuse to comply and risk the dreadful consequences, or to feign acquiescence in a doctrine they detest. And this dilemma becomes not merely a matter for silent decision, but one constantly renewed at every turn, every day, on every occasion. A time came in Spain, shortly before the civil war, when one had either to raise the closed fist or to perform the Roman salute. Civilized people, who would do neither, risked brawls at every step. Soon after the rising of General Franco, half of Spain had willy

nilly to close its fist and the other half to stretch the open hand at 45 degrees. In Madrid even in order to signal for a tram to stop one had to close one's fist.

The political gesture is the last stage in an evolution, in fact a degeneration, from ideas to dogmas and from dogmas to slogans. It is a pure slogan, i.e. a slogan purified of any traces of thought which might still remain attached to it from the realms of the mind whence it hailed. It is a political uniform in action; the very negation of freedom. No liberal democracy should tolerate it.

We have seen how these slogan-fed and gesture-trained masses can work. Communists all over the world sabotaged the second world war as a war of imperialist capitalists until Hitler attacked Russia. Had the world listened to the communist slogan of those days Great Britain would be to-day at the feet of a victorious Hitler. Communist slogans were suddenly turned upside down as soon as Hitler began his war against Russia. And the adepts of the party became everywhere the backbone of resistance to German tyranny and of the cause of democracy. Soon a new communist slogan turned up: 'Second front now.' And even the Synod of Russian bishops, meeting for the first time in Moscow after years of enforced silence, began by asking for a second front. '*Chi è buon fascista ubbidisce e tace*', the good fascist obeys and keeps silent, was the slogan to be read on every Italian wall. And '*Führer befiehl, wir folgen Dir*', Führer command, we follow, could be read even inside German submarines. Totalitarianism appeals to that part of humanity which feels the need to be led and knows or fears the weight of too much liberty. It also appeals to the minority of human beings who must bully and boss.

This similarity of temperament explains that flowing

backwards and forwards between fascism and communism so often noted by objective observers in many lands. Here are two examples in the very words in which they are reported in the London *Times*. Describing the situation in Italy, the Rome correspondent of *The Times* wrote on December 30th, 1944: 'They [the communists] have already recruited a large selection from the ranks of the Fascist Party, and their style and methods are strongly suggestive of Fascism. If you go into any Communist headquarters you find the same type of well-groomed young official, with the same rather haughty and aloof manner that you did in the past in any *Casa del Fascio*.'

Speaking of the punishment of war criminals in Bulgaria, the diplomatic correspondent of *The Times* wrote on February 3rd, 1945: 'The long list of condemnations to death or to hard labour which have been pronounced by the People's Court in Sofia gives the impression that the new régime — a curious combination of militarists with a decidedly violent, not to say Fascist, past, and men of the extreme Left — has resolved to make a clean sweep of all other parties. Some of the sentences will certainly cause uneasiness among persons acquainted with the vendettas which have disfigured Bulgarian political life for many years. Colonel Gheorghief, now Bulgarian Prime Minister, and Colonel Velchev, his War Minister, were deeply concerned in the coup d'état of 1923 which deprived Stambulisky, the Agrarian Prime Minister, of his power and life; and in 1934 they carried out another military coup which, while professedly aimed at the nefarious Macedonian organization suppressed press and parliament for two years and inflicted a blow on parliamentary government from which it never recovered.'

CHAPTER V

REVOLUTIONS *v.* EVOLUTION

One of the most serious obstacles against the peaceful evolution of mankind comes from the extravagant claims which are made to exalt the 'glorious' revolutions its path is strewn with. The English Civil War, which was a revolution, the English 'glorious' Revolution, which was hardly one, the American Revolution, in fact, a war of secession, the American Civil War, a revolution in a way, and above all, the French and the Russian Revolutions are names to conjure with. The French Revolution, in particular, has been declared the mother or foster-mother of all our blessings, and in France, 'to accept the French Revolution' is held as a kind of confession of faith indispensable to be considered a liberal-democrat. In this way, a habit of mind has been formed which sees revolutions as good in themselves, events to be proud of, national glories.

Two sets of objections can be raised: those which, on a close historical examination, can be opposed against the claims of this or that revolution; and a general objection of principle covering all revolutions.

The first set of objections had better be left to specialists. Few, if any, are the revolutions, which in fact happened in the highly dramatized forms as told in history manuals — forms in which they crystallize as myths in the minds of the general public. The claims made on behalf of the English Revolution are sometimes extravagant. By laying all the blame on Charles I, by exaggerating the importance of Parliament in the previous century, by exalting the puritans, and dealing tactfully with their shortcomings, a picture can be made of an England saved by the civil war from an appalling

tyranny. The best English historians are more careful than that. The fact is that the Civil War was the outcome of a complex set of circumstances, and that it was by no means fought on clear issues. Extremists on both sides forced the country to a course of violence which was not only unnecessary but injurious for the solution of the problems in hand; on the political side, in order to do away with the personal power of Charles I, it led the country to the dictatorship of Cromwell; on the religious side, the tyrannical excesses of the Presbyterians restored the Church to very much the position for maintaining which Archbishop Laud had been beheaded.

No time need be spent on the change of dynasty styled 'revolution' in many English manuals; for the change over from James II to William III was no revolution in the sense we nowadays attach to this word. It was little more than a deposition; and if the more sonorous name came to be bestowed on it, the reason may well be the very awe in which kingship was held even by the 'revolutionaries' who ousted a monarch out of touch with the nation.

Similarly the American Revolution was rather a war of secession, than a revolution in our sense of the word. True it sought to apply the principles of the humanist philosophers of the eighteenth century, and broke with kingship. But far from being democratic, it was imbued with a fear of democracy; and most of its leaders were slave owners and proud of it. Nothing is gained by describing it as a revolution, or by discussing it as such.

The French Revolution began with a monarchy in swift evolution towards constitutional forms and practices; and after a series of dramatic experiments, and smaller revolutions within the Revolution, ended in the rule of a military despot who devasted Europe to satisfy the passions of his swollen ego.

The American Civil War, which, in our sense, was more of a revolution than the American Revolution (for Lincoln was revolutionary and Washington was not) has a threefold meaning: It settled the matter of secession *v.* union; it made the nation formally accept the equality of Blacks and Whites, at least in theory; and it established the principle of Lincoln: Government of the people, by the people, for the people. But:

— if the nation had listened to Jefferson one generation earlier, the Civil War would have been avoided;

— the negro question, in fact, was not settled, but made more difficult;

— the scar between north and south can still be seen across the face of the United States.

Finally the Russian Revolution was deliberately derailed into bloodshed, violence and the dictatorship of a ruthless minority by Lenin when, still hardly more than a swift phase of an evolution, it was taking Russia from tsardom to democracy. Lenin ruined democracy in Russia for several generations and forced his country to live under a system which, despite its considerable advantages over tsardom on the economic field, is from the point of view of freedom of thought and movement and of respect of the person, even worse than tsarism was.

Of course all those revolutions brought positive changes of the utmost importance in their train. But the point is that *these changes are not due to the revolutions*; *but to the evolutions which these revolutions came momentarily to disturb*. Who doubts but that France would have evolved from Mirabeau to Thiers and from Thiers to Gambetta much quicker and more peacefully had the world never heard of Robespierre, Napoleon and (therefore) Napoleon III. Who does not see that had Russia been allowed to develop in peace the evolution initiated by Lvov, she would be to-day living under a system as

favourable, at least, to the common man, but free from the despotism which at present weighs so heavily on men out of the common?

And then, when a revolution wins so gloriously, over whom does it win? Is it over people from another nation or planet, or over its own kith and kin? And if it is over its own kith and kin, does not the glory of the Reds balance the shame of the Whites and vice versa? A revolution is a violent remedy with which a nation seeks to cure the evils it has itself produced. It is easy to shift the burden on to a particular class — but who produced that class but the whole nation? A class has no life but that which comes from the individuals which compose it. And these individuals come from the nation.

Moreover, the evil which the revolution seeks to cure is presumably due to the way these individuals of the accused class have handled affairs. But that, in its turn, is determined by their national character, which is common to the whole nation, and for which, therefore, the whole nation is responsible.

In other words: it is only the hazard of birth which has placed in the accused class the individuals who form it, instead of those who form the class which attack them. And had the latter been in lieu of the former, they would have handled affairs in exactly the same way, and brought about the same revolution. Had chance made the American northerners be born in the south and the American southerners in the north, the civil war would have taken place exactly the same and for the same reasons. Had Robespierre, Marat and Danton been born in the ranks of the aristocracy and the *émigrés* in the *petite bourgeoisie*, the French Revolution would have occurred just the same, because the Duke of Robespierre, the Marquis of Marat and the Vicomte Danton would have behaved as foolishly as Bourbon aristocrats, since they would have

been Bourbon aristocrats; and the *émigrés*, born *sans-culotte* would have turned out to be just as extremist and as bloodthirsty as the effective *sans-culotte* of history.

For the fact of being born a Frenchman, an Englishman, an American, is essential; but to be born an owner of slaves in Carolina or a puritan New-Englander, a French aristocrat or a French shopkeeper, is secondary and fortuitous. Frenchmen are interchangeable; and any Frenchman of class B accusing a Frenchman of class A of this or that generic and class crime does but describe what he would have done had he been in the other man's place.

It follows that the evils against which revolutions rant are not sectional troubles but troubles of the whole body politic of the nation, appearing in one particular spot, possibly not that which is most directly affected by the deepest cause of it all; even as the skin of the human body will at times show the diseased condition of other parts. It is the whole tissue of the nation, which is at fault though the revolution cries out only where it is most painful. And it may even happen that a class or institution is performing functions generally resented as abusive or tyrannous merely because other classes or institutions are defaulting, unnoticed precisely because of their passive attitude. Thus in many lands — including Spain — the Army has often come to play a part unsuited to its true functions, because the country was unable to produce enough civic life to keep political institutions healthy and strong.

The fact is that revolutions are not battles in which a national St. George kills a dragon foreign to the nation and to its immaculate people; but crises in the nation's life by which the nation adjusts itself to itself and pays in blood and treasure for its neglect of its own real affairs in past generations. That is all. And there is nothing in it to boast about.

What then? Are we to re-write history and rub out those revolutions which should not have taken place at all? Of course not. Our quarrel is not with what has happened, but with the way we are told it and with the table of values applied to it. A nation gets into a revolution because the two or three generations which preceded the trouble lacked the wisdom to forestall it; and because the generation in which it comes to a head lacks the wisdom to solve it with coolness and common sense. The only glorious revolutions are those which do not count as such. They pass quietly down the pages of history, unwritten but fertile; unnoticed by all but the shrewd observer who years, perhaps centuries, later will exclaim: 'Lo: there was a revolution in this country between such and such a year, and no one noticed it!'

Some nations can alter their constitution in a quiet meeting of three or four statesmen in the time it takes them to smoke a couple of pipes. Other nations must have blood and fire. Phlegmatic peoples change quietly, i.e. adapt themselves to the changes of their environment without any violence. Peoples more tensely taut go through phases of violence in order to change; just as some human beings can change only through fever, pain and delirium. Very well. Let it be so. Such is the way of life. But let us not call it glorious, for Heaven's sake. Let us be quiet about it, modest and perhaps a little shy and reticent as one is shy and reticent about disease. A nation bragging about her glorious revolution is as ridiculous as a man would be who would say: 'In 1936 I had a glorious pneumonia.'

SECTION II

COW STATE OR FREE ORDER?

CHAPTER I

THE CLAIMS OF THE COMMUNITY

THE word *politics* describes the part men take deliberately in the affairs of their community. This part may be considerable for a particular man in a particular setting—be it Alderman Smith in Back-of-Beyond or Lenin in Russia. But for most of us the particular push which we are in a position to give to the gigantic It within which we live is very small indeed: the vote every so many years, and whatever influence our conversation may bring to bear on that most mysterious of mysteries: *public opinion*. We have the impression of flowing with our contemporaries down the valley of time in a course which we are hardly able to guess, still less to alter, let alone control. The life of a nation is indeed like a river flowing in time, driven by natural forces far steadier and more permanent than fickle man and his paltry three-score and ten. When we behold the life of England through the centuries, what strikes us most is the steadiness of the flow, the ample curves of the meanders, the weight of the historical river in itself, creating its own course in tacit agreement with nature and under laws of which we guess the existence but not always the import. And though Alfred the Great and Drake, Cromwell and the Pitts, Lloyd George and Churchill, stand out as potent individual factors in the pageant of England's history, even they sink into insignificance when this

history is seen as a whole in its river-like flow, mighty but mysterious, indeed almost hermetical beyond the ken of man.

And so, with the life of every other nation, great or small, and with those wider communities such as Continents or Civilizations which, through the boundless plains of time, pass from birth to death. The men, even the greatest whom they threw up in their course, were little more than the froth of flowing water on the rock of accident — a shoulder of harder stone determining for a time a curve, an elbow, perhaps a waterfall. The flow lived down the changes and went on its course to its appointed end.

The first requisite of all political thinking, therefore, must be *modesty*. For politics in the aggregate is but a part, and a small one at that, of the life of human communities; so that even if we were in possession of the deepest wisdom, and able to advise and even to carry out the best possible measures at the best possible time, the effect of our action on the life of the community would in all probability be small.

Modesty, moreover, is required for a second reason. The effect of political action on collective life is not only small but most difficult to gauge at any time — by the historian if past, by the statesman or critic if present, by the prophet or wiseacre if still to come. Henry VIII submitted Parliament to the indignity of having to serve as a ready tool for his tyrannous ways and persecutions against the best citizens when they disagreed with him. What was the outcome? That English monarchs took the habit of legislating through Parliament, thus laying the foundations of the much admired parliamentary system. Imperial and militarist Germany smuggled Lenin into Russia in order to disintegrate her huge eastern rival by revolution. And what was the outcome?

That Russia attained thereby a massive unity such as she had never known in her history, and became more than a match for even Germany. These examples might be multiplied. Who knows the ultimate results of such far-reaching new factors as universal compulsory education, social insurance, the widespread use of the film, broadcasting and television?

In a sense, this inability to predict collective life which afflicts us may be illustrated by comparing the individual observer to a drop of water in a river trying to fathom and understand the whole stream. Poor as the chances of that drop of water would be, ours are still poorer. For the water-drop (assuming it to be intelligent) would be an integral part of the river from start to finish (unless it preferred to evaporate into the clouds), and much as it may meander, a river remains pretty much the same; while we enter the stream of collective life when it has already run for centuries, only to leave it after a relatively short number of years; the human river which had been flowing for generations when we entered it will flow for many more when we have disappeared.

Rather should we compare our individual life in the general pattern of history to a thread in a tapestry — one tiny coloured thread, a part of the ribbon on the hat of that figure amongst the many which can be seen on the picture — that is what we are, and no more. And how could that short red thread, assuming it to be endowed with intelligence, woven in a pattern of colours of a baffling complexity and multitude, ever dream of understanding the whole of the picture as imagined by the artist, let alone act on it? But man's case is even poorer than that of a thread in a tapestry. For the tapestry is ever the same, and its parts stand in a fixed relation to the whole; while man in society is as a cell of a living organism whose essence is change.

Strictly speaking, a human society may not be an organism, and the scientist may frown at us if we speak of Britain, France or Italy as we would of a horse or a poplar or a butterfly. But no one could deny the organic nature of a forest, and, on the purely biological plane, a nation is as a forest of men. The apparent mobility of man and the fact that a nation can shed its individuals at any distance from their base do not detract from the strong unity of the nation's biological mass which perpetuates itself steadily in a cloth of life made of myriads of single threads whose individual traits are woven and lost into the general quality and feel of the texture. The habit of giving human beings the name of their male parents imparts to the family name, i.e. the name of the male line, a preposterous importance. There are no families, in the sense of units lasting for generations. We are all born of a vast number of lines, particularly in our modern, itinerant days. Lines of ancestors meet in us through our parents to diverge after us through our children in as many lines of descendants, and every one of us, counting only twenty generations of ancestors, sums up in his blood millions of lives. Each of us is as a wave on the sea, whose shape and movements come ultimately from all the waves of the past and will in their turn contribute to the shape and movements of all the waves of the future.

So that though we may not be actual cells in a living body, we are very much the same. Here is London. Every day, every hour, its railways and roads throb with the incoming and outgoing movements of goods and persons, movements which cannot stop, just like those of a heart. By common consent, railways and roads are known as *arteries*. Material energy in the shape of goods, physical and mental energy in the form of persons, pulsate in and out of London day and night. Will and

thought reach and leave it constantly by post, by wire and ether waves, so that this city is a brain as well as a heart.

No one knows London — not even taxi-drivers. This huge labyrinth of streets and buildings *is*. But no one can *think* it in its vast complexity. And yet it is, thanks to a vital logic of its own, the sum total of the logical thinking done in different centuries by different men in a steady succession of ever original adaptations to new circumstances, under impulses of growth no individual man could plan, guess or even imagine. At most they might be explained after the event as one explains a fact of nature.

And so Manchester and Liverpool and many more centres, brain-hearts of collective life in constant communication with each other and with the outside world. This life goes on above, below and beyond the individual men who live it. Big units such as the Bank of England, the Government, Parliament, the Trade Unions, the Civil Service, the County Council, observe more of it than can mere individuals. But each of these entities catches only this or that side of the huge collective life which goes on of its own with a vital impulse and a vital inertia unknown to us in its deeper strength and intentions.

If that were all, the case for what goes nowadays by the name of totalitarianism would be overwhelming. Men would be mere cells of a vast body politic, and would therefore have no other rights than those of conforming to the health of the whole. The nation would be all, individual man nothing. The State would have all the rights; the citizen all the duties. Yet the mere fact that the mind gives forth the two terms of the equation, the citizen as well as the State, thus pitting them against each other, shows that matters cannot be as simple as that.

Of the two sides to the question that of the rights of the individual has been uppermost in the period between the two great western revolutions: the English-French-American and the Russian. In a sense, it is a side quickened by the Christian religion, the religion which made all men brothers because it made them sons of God, thus recognizing in them a spark of the divine before which even the massive but earthly majesty of the State must pause. But there is a typically European fire beneath this Christian spirit, a fire not altogether Christian, devoid of humility, defiant and Promethean, and resolved to meet man's fate with unabated eyes.

This liberal spirit-fire aroused man against the State and the Church; and throughout four centuries made him fight to assert what the French Revolution finally set down in the Rights of Man: a system of rules to secure individual freedom against the encroachments of the State.

The new school was but too successful. Having demolished the obsolete society inherited from medieval days it delivered over nations and individuals to the tender mercies of merchants and landowners. Marx came to denounce merely political democracy as a sham and a fig-leaf for economic slavery. The wheel had gone round full circle. The Soviet Union came to restore the prestige of autocracy and orthodoxy, i.e. to destroy political liberty in the name of economic liberty. In the past, tyrants had always come from the right. Lenin was the first who, in the name of the working classes, contemptuously kicked off the political stage a Parliament elected under unimpeachable democratic rules. We saw so-called democrats applaud this gesture; just as we have seen so-called liberals acquiesce in Stalin's drastic methods for enforcing his orthodoxy, on the ground that in Russia there is no capitalism and that the Russian armies are victorious.

No better proof could be given of the intellectual chaos of our day. The two faiths which have successively held together our societies are in a parlous state. Religion, undermined by liberal democracy; liberal democracy undermined by communism. But communism itself is a return, under new forms, to that absolutism which both history and philosophy reject. What then?

CHAPTER II

THE CLAIMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

ARE we thrown back on totalitarianism for good and all? If what matters is the common man, the masses, what right has the man out of the common, i.e. the uncommon twig in every man, to assert himself? The first task of modern liberalism is to re-state the right of the individual to be considered as an end in himself on the same footing as the community. Speaking of realism, liberals are much less realists when they take a concrete decision of immediate political import, say when they adopt the Beveridge Report, than they would be if they examined this, at first sight, highly theoretical question. Not 'What is your name, M or N?' but 'What is man's chief aim?' is the most matter-of-fact beginning for a catechism. And a political party which does not start from a clear understanding of its own views on man is less a party than a tribe.

Confessional religion is waning and letters to *The Times* will not make it wax. 'What must I do to found a new religion?' — someone asked Voltaire. 'Have yourself crucified and come back three days later' — answered the King of Wits. Pending that event, we must build up our faith in the rights of man by means which, in line with religion, may nevertheless stand without its help. Montaigne found doubt a soft pillow for a well-made head. Might it not be also a sound foundation stone for a solid liberalism?

Let us sing the praises of Doubt. Faith has shed so much blood that we must turn to doubt for kindness and charity. While two faiths kill each other, doubt organizes the Red Cross and runs the hospitals. Doubt, moreover, does not shut out faith. In itself, lack of faith would not

be dangerous. It is faith in our lack of faith which, being a faith upside down, is just as dangerous as a faith the right way up. Doubt does not altogether exclude either faith or lack of faith. It excludes absolute certainty about either of them. And therefore it excludes strife.

If we believe that man has no life beyond, above, within this painted veil, if we are sure that (to put it in a crude Spanish dictum) *once the dog is dead, his rage is at an end*, we deprive ourselves of the most potent reason for believing that man should be considered as an end in himself. For then man would be but a cell in the body politic of his nation, a much longer lived and more majestical creation than any man.

On the other hand we need not believe in life after death, either, with a sure faith. Doubt is enough. That mere doubt, that mere chance of a life beyond or within this, a life of which this might be but the surface or the shell, is enough to kill totalitarianism. For, high as we may put the claims of the community, what are they next to those of eternal individual life? Where is the Roman Empire now and where is Babylon? But all men that have been are still if there is a life eternal — and the mere chance of it must make us pause. So that in the meanest man that breathes there is that which must command respect from the mightiest State.

Then again, even if we give all its weight to collective life, how can it express itself but through individuals? When we say 'the State', 'the Army', 'farming', 'science', 'the Press', what do we mean but certain persistent forms manifested by sets of individuals? And therefore, if even the classes, institutions and forces of collective life can be made manifest only through individuals, does it not follow that, even from the collective point of view, the individual is entitled to a life of his own through the development of which, in one way or another, that of the community is bound to profit as well?

So that even those whose staunch faith in their lack of faith prevents them from respecting eternal man in man must acknowledge that the respect, care and development of the individual are in the end the only way to develop the community; or, in other words, that a development of the community which implies the oppression of the individual is no such development at all.

Our conclusion is then that both the community and the individual must be considered as ends in themselves. This may sound incompatible in thought; but life does not worry overmuch about such logical impossibilities. Far from being unscientific, moreover, this way of looking at things closely resembles that which modern physicists advocate for the phenomena of their science. The laws of physics, they tell us, are nearly all statistical. The error they may entail is measured by the square root of the number of atoms (or other units considered) to which they refer. It follows that the higher the number of atoms the more exact the law. For instance, if the law covers one million units the error may be as high as one thousand, square root of a million, which turns out to be one per thousand; but if the number to which the law is applied is one thousand millions, the error may go only as high as ten thousand, which is only one per ten thousand. On the other hand, physicists tell us that the single atom behaves in an unaccountable way.

This last observation of the physicists sounds so familiar that it makes the atom quite human. The statistical behaviour of the mass and the unaccountable behaviour of the atom tally with the relations between society and the individual. Individuals do as they please, and yet society manages to produce some statistical order out of all their chaos. One goes from London to Glasgow (in time of peace) when one must or feels like

it; but the traffic follows a fairly regular statistical curve. People commit suicide for the oddest variety of reasons, and yet the statistical figure is fairly steady. Statistics and psychology are the two poles of social science. Too much stress on statistics overpowers psychology; too much stress on psychology makes havoc of statistics. Each must keep to its own province. Each deals with an end in itself.

Any attempt on our part, men and parties, to shift the centre of gravity of our communities towards one or other of these two poles, is bound to upset the natural balance the community had reached of its own accord. Should we never try? Of course, that is not the right conclusion. We must try; but knowing that we may err, and even err in ways we may not be able to guess. Germany, for instance, is now paying for her error in shifting the balance of her collective life towards the statistical or mass pole. We do not know whether or how Russia may have some day to pay (or may already be paying) for a similar error. France paid, perhaps, for the error of the Code Napoleon which split the wealth of parents into equal parts between their children (statistics *v.* psychology, mass *v.* individual, deadly equality *v.* live inequality) by seeing her population dwindle, perhaps a reaction of the deeper being of the nation against the threat to her living wealth.

For all we know, collective life may have ways of its own to take care of itself; and events such as rises and falls in population, wars, epidemics, revolutions, may be actions and reactions whereby the vast river of collective life seeks to recover its balance, upset by our inevitably rough and uncouth interference with its course. It behoves us therefore to observe it carefully, to shun dogmatic views and to abstain from actions which force ways and customs from their usual course in too short a time and with too sudden a movement. Time and a certain

slow rhythm are the chief conditions for political events to ripen.

When we examine concrete questions of collective life our chief principle must be that the solutions advocated must suit both the interests of the individual and those of the community. If we find that a particular course of action suits them both, that course of action has strong chances of being the right one to take. If we find the two points of view to be in conflict, the chances are that the problem is insoluble, i.e. that it is in the nature of a *tension* which it is best to leave in being as one of the permanent forces within the community. For it is not reasonable to expect that society can be reduced to a logical pattern any more than can the human beings who compose it. Problems therefore which pit the community and the individual against each other should not be solved by sacrificing either the one or the other; they should be left open and unsolved and carried along from compromise to compromise until time settles them.

That word 'interests' requires some explanation. Nowadays the tendency is to lay stress on material interests, the more so as many good people believe that thoughts are just vitamins (whatever vitamins are, and they might well turn out to be mere thoughts); that love is just sex, and that religion is an after-taste of our fear of our father when we were boys. I once heard a modern Englishman, so modern that he has already devastated three great English institutions, quote with approval the opinion of an American to the effect that nowadays people are not thinking of their liberties but of their ham and eggs for breakfast every day. Many Europeans are starving to-day for having held that error. And here is another picture to the same effect. During a general election in Spain (I believe it was in 1936) a land worker of the south, with many years' hunger in his emaciated

body, stood in a queue at a polling station in Granada. A conservative agent quietly signalled to him with a silver dollar; he just looked blank. The agent exhibited a 25-peseta note in his discreetly cupped hand. The land worker stared. Piqued, the agent produced a 100-peseta note, a fabulous sum for the land worker, who this time spoke, and in words the concision of which no translation can render: '*En mi hambre mando yo.*' Of my hunger, I am the master.[1]

The Andalusian land worker had an adequate sense of the values of our civilization. He saw that liberty is more precious than ham and eggs. He was hungry but proud, because he was the master of his hunger. In discussing the chief issues raised by the relations between the community and the individual it is only possible to arrive at similar conclusions by referring to the same table of values. Since both the community and the individual are human forms of life, both share in the bodily and in the spiritual aspects of that life. We cannot expect to agree if some of us put the bodily before the spiritual and others the reverse.

But human societies must be ruled by human not by animal standards. The body of man is an animal. It is only when the spirit of man quickens it that it becomes human. Therefore the spirit must come first. Important as the body is, it is only so in so far as it is the vehicle of the spirit. Theories and practices of life, whether individual or collective, must therefore respect this order of values. Spiritual, moral, political standards must rule and shape economic life. To reverse the order is an aberration.

Similarly, it is by spiritual not by material standards that communities must be judged. The greatness of a nation should not be measured by statistics of steel pro-

[1] I owe this story to Professor Don Fernando de los Rios, who was Ambassador of the Spanish Republic in Washington till the end of the Civil War.

duction — the favourité modern yardstick. It can only be gauged by two standards: what is life like in it? What kind of human beings does it foster?

This implies due attention to time and place. For, precisely because it is the very essence of life, the spirit manifests itself through definite matter in definite times and places. We have to speak of *man* and of the *community*, somewhat abstractly, when trying to give shape to our ideas; but when it comes to living them, we have to refer to the particular nation, city, time, atmosphere, home, family, of a particular Mr. Smith. Our community is a land with definite hills, valleys, coasts and rivers, raising definite crops, making definite goods, in a definite climate; and consisting of certain men who possess certain common memories and ways of living. Those abstract problems we discuss in our books, endowing them for the purpose with a certain general form, live only in odd ways of their own, espousing the several forms of our peculiar valleys, steeped in the atmosphere, coloured by the light of our particular corner of the world. This singular, inimitable quality of actual life adds a dimension of its own to our political problems, a dimension we can seldom fathom and in which lie hidden both the seeds of the trouble and the secrets of its cure.

Hence again the need for modesty and diffidence in the handling of political matters; as well as for open-mindedness and elasticity. Dogmatic conceptions are seldom useful in any walk of life; but in politics they are a curse and a pest. While broad principles are indispensable, for without them, political life quickly degenerates into tyranny and corruption, an open-minded and elastic empiricism is indispensable in order to apply them, not indeed to weaken or to turn them, but on the contrary to make sure that they work more effectively, given the material in hand.

Ultimately, politics rests on psychology. To trans-

plant a political institution from one nation to another without taking into account the differences in character between the two nations concerned is to gamble with fate. To judge of what happens in one nation by the standards slowly grown in another nation under a wholly different historical rhythm and without due reference to the national character of the country where the events have taken place, is dangerous naivety. To settle the education and way of life of all citizens alike without bearing in mind the peculiar quality of each group and the environment in which they live is deadening. The chief requirement of the day is to restore the rights of quality over quantity; by which is meant that we have had enough sinking of the different types and characters into the statistical mass; and that the time has come to forget number 132567 and to remember Tom Smith. For Tom Smith may look very ordinary, and absolutely like Dick Jones. Yet there is something in him which no one can imitate, nor even guess. And that something, which no statistics can ever catch, thank God, that something is what matters.

CHAPTER III

LIBERTY

THERE is perhaps no problem of collective life in which harmony between the interests of the community and those of the individual is more complete than that of liberty. For liberty is an essential condition of healthy life both for the nation and for every person in it.

Liberty is less a state than a trend; less a set of rules than a disposition, an attitude which at every turn tends to let every man enjoy the maximum possible scope for doing things his own way and for expressing in his own way his views on life. There was a time when the chief danger for liberty came from small groups of men entrenched in some privilege. Serfs and slaves either in Antiquity or in the New World were thus less-than-men. The struggle for this elementary freedom explains how liberty became entangled with dignity. Men felt that to attack or challenge their liberty was a reflection on their dignity as human beings. The Christian Church, by insisting on the divine nature of all men, enhanced this feeling of dignity. And so the two ideas of liberty and dignity came to be closely intertwined.

In our day, the challenge comes no longer from kings, lords and slave owners, but from the mass of the nation. Dignity is no longer an issue. On the contrary: the appeal to sacrifice personal liberty is made in the name of dignity, and the modern tyrant, the State, decorates its slaves with the laurels of good citizenship. Other foundations have to be laid down if individual liberty is to be saved — and with it the very essence of our western civilization and culture.

I. LIBERTY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Of course, the old claim stands. The twofold value of the human being must be borne in mind: he is a cell in the body politic of the nation; he is a being who transcends the nation, for he has — or at least may have — a dimension outside the social and historical order. The destiny of man is only superficially achieved in the bosom of society. His outward happenings of family, business, career, are but the score on which the music of his deeper life is written. That liberty we ask for him to come and go, to start a family as he thinks fit, to settle here or there, to enter or leave this or that line of business or profession, is important above all because only through that outward liberty can he give full scope to the inner liberty without which his deeper destiny cannot be fulfilled.

This is the first claim of all on society: that it respects the liberty of its individual members to find themselves in life. The claim is so absolute that it has never to be justified — while every limitation to it which society may raise must be established on very strong grounds to be admitted as valid at all.

It should then be the unassailable bulwark for all liberal parties in the world, and one in which they might well feel in a kind of natural alliance with all the Christian Churches. Even the Roman Catholic Church, so often the source of angry and noisy anathema against liberalism, has of late put the matter in admirable words from the point of view of the Christian faith in a declaration of the British Roman Catholic Episcopate:

> The rights of the human person are derived not from membership of any State or party, but from membership of the human family. The first right and duty of the individual is to use his mind and will to achieve his destiny, which is eternal life. Any political system which usurps the place of God is fundamentally anti-social. Totalitarianism,

> by whatever name described, by its very nature is in conflict with Christian principles. . . . Full liberty must be granted to all men to worship God according to the dictates of their conscience.[1]

A society which overlooks these principles must sooner or later degenerate, even if, for a time, it maintains a certain appearance of power and well-being. It will in any case cease to be a free society and become a huge hive or machine. Its men, caught early in life by a cogged wheel of inspectors and committees, automatically distributed to the various trades and occupations the community requires, will find their tracks in life mapped out in advance for them, and gliding thus on the rails prescribed for them, will find themselves conveyed to their final death without having had the chance of making a mistake.

It is on this point — the right of man to make mistakes — that the two chief arguments for liberty meet. Liberty is a condition arising out of man's dignity; it is a necessity due to man's indignity. Man's powers to tackle the complexities of life are so small that he must be allowed to err so that he can learn. Of course, at first sight at any rate, individual errors are a nuisance to society and had best be eliminated. But there are two rubs. Eliminated by whom? By other men who would bring in their own errors? By the erring man's 'betters'? By the State? The problem is insoluble. But let us grant that it is solved. What then? What kind of human beings would be evolved by a society in which individual errors were nipped in the bud before its members could derive any experience out of them?

Here again the requirements of liberty are absolute. From this as from the foregoing line of argument it follows that individual liberty stands as an end in itself which need not be justified; while every limitation set to it must prove its worth.

[1] From *The Times*, February 23rd, 1945.

II. LIBERTY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE COMMUNITY

The community, and the State which acts for it, stand in need of individual liberty as much as every one of the citizens.

The first requirement of a community is to live healthily as such; and, to that end, it is necessary that the individuals, institutions and classes which perform its services and functions should be apt and adequate. The best sailors should man its fleets, the best financiers should administer its treasury, the best scholars should lead its universities. This can only be achieved in a social medium in which human beings rise by their own power and fall by their own weight, i.e. in a medium of liberty. The closer State interference, the more difficult it becomes to detect insufficiency or incapacity. But the argument goes deeper than that. For individual liberty is the hardest test of character; and, through its operation, men are sifted and raised or lowered in society till they reach the level to which they actually belong.

This is therefore one of the points in which the interests of the individual are in harmony with those of the State; for it is also essential for every man that, through the free operation of the up-and-down movements in society, his actions, fortunate or unfortunate, should produce results of a nature to enrich his experience.

There is, however, one other aspect of liberty perhaps more important for the community: freedom of thought. A community must know itself; or, at least, must try to form an opinion of itself as adequate as possible. The difficulties to be encountered in this task have already been mentioned. No one can know the community. But if some not too inadequate picture of it is to be attempted, it can only be through the co-operation of as many observers as possible, speaking from as many points of

vantage as possible. This establishes freedom of thought on an unassailable basis, as a fundamental requirement of the community.

A personal reminiscence may perhaps be allowed here. When in 1923, Primo de Rivera bolted and organized a military Directorate, a distinguished Admiral happened to be the Spanish naval member of the Disarmament Temporary Mixed Commission, of which I was the secretary. Over-night this Admiral found himself vice-chairman of the Directorate; and, when Primo took personal command of the Moroccan Army, the Admiral became acting Dictator. I wrote to him to explain that, while a certain amount of experimenting with the forms of government and the constitutional principles more likely to succeed in Spain might, in the circumstances, be excusable and possibly fruitful, all would be worse than useless unless freedom of thought, and in particular, a free press, were assured. The Admiral answered that I attributed far too much importance to such things, merely because I wrote myself, and added that the number of Spaniards who troubled about free thought and a free press were a tiny minority in the nation. My reply was: 'If you seize a man and hold his head under the water and his body out, the number of cells of his body that are under water is a small minority—but the man dies.'

The importance of freedom of thought from the point of view of the individual need hardly be emphasized. We are again at one of those points of absolute harmony between man and society. Freedom to think and believe what his own lights tell him to is perhaps the most precious part of man's liberty. We take it so much for granted that we do not perhaps react with enough vigour — do we react at all? — when we see it sacrificed to material advantages. One of the most remarkable happenings of our age has been the contentedness with which many liberals, perhaps a majority of them, have

accepted as a matter of course the closed political orthodoxy prevailing in Russia, and how men, heirs to the doctrine of free thought, have of their own accord renounced their liberty in order to join a party more tightly held than that Roman Catholic community which in many ways it calls to mind.

This is a characteristic case of a scale of values turned upside down. Millions, we are told, have been taught to read; and millions provided with work. Therefore the stifling of all but orthodox and obedient thinking is to be condoned. The number of fallacies in such a proposition is high. The educational and material advantages won by the masses need not have cost the country its intellectual and political freedom at all. There is no inevitable antagonism between education and freedom. Then, what value are we to attach to that newly acquired capacity to read when all that can be read is either government dope or literature carefully sifted as innocuous? And finally, what kind of liberals are these who remain indifferent at the mental torture of at least tens of thousands of able, deep, fine minds, such as Russia always produced, gagged for ever, doomed to spend their lives in mental prison, without communication with their brother-spirits at home and abroad? What age is this which sells its birthright for a mess of pottage?

Nor should we feel too confident about the prospects of freedom of thought in the western countries. To be sure, it is still vigorous. But it is threatened by new and strong tendencies obscurely working for a rigid conformity. There was a time when the press was suspected because, being financially dependent on advertisements, it might become subservient to the firms that advertise. This danger has not altogether passed, but it is fading. Newspapers with huge circulations keep advertisers waiting in a queue for their space. The newspaper-owner does not run after the advertiser, rather the reverse. The

strength of the newspaper lies in its circulation. Two new dangers appear. One is the newspaper magnate, always, of course, a man of genius. He has his ideas and sees that they get put through, and that the ideas of those who disagree with him, well, of course, get through also, but with a difference. This evil, however, is not widespread. There are newspaper-owners who, disclaiming genius, are content with common sense; and thanks to them, matters can be adjusted and all points of view can be expressed — while liberty lasts. But there is a worse danger which could be described as the *creeping censorship*. The paper relies so much on its big numbers that when a particular error, whim, prejudice, is widespread among its readers, the editors dare not run counter to it, and they follow the cue supplied them by the crowd. In this way a new conformity or orthodoxy sets in, the more dangerous for being tacit and automatic.

This sketch would not be complete without a brief reference to broadcasting. Even at its best, broadcasting is the most powerful agent for orthodoxy and conformity the devil of technical mechanics could ever have devised. It drives any newspaper into insignificance in point of numbers. And of necessity it tends to cater for mass tastes and ideas. This is so even when, as in the United States, there is a certain amount of competition, for owing to the economic weight of numbers this competition bears downwards. But monopoly does not seem to make it any better. If anything could make a broadcasting monopoly palatable, the B.B.C. would. Fair to all opinions, open to all tastes, the B.B.C. is a model of monopolistic broadcasting. But should we like our country to have one single newspaper, even as good as the best? The slant, the spirit, the atmosphere of the B.B.C. permeate all its service and in a subconscious and subtle way powerfully contribute to create that medium of automatic conformity which is the forerunner of loss of liberty.

But what is the good of liberty for the poor man? A muddle-headed question. What is the good of no-liberty for the poor man? For if he finds himself in circumstances which have reduced him to poverty, and on top of that, he is denied the liberty of altering such circumstances by his exertions, surely he is worse off than if at least that liberty had been left to him. Granted, he may have the liberty and not the means to profit by it. But at any rate it is good to know that if and when he comes by the means he will have the power to change.

All slaves knew that. The worst for most of them was that there was no escape. In the Spanish colonies a slave who put together as much money as he had cost his owner could always buy himself off. In the French and English colonies the law denied the slave such a liberty. Surely the slave was better off under the Spanish system. In a liberal State, the citizens who find themselves in conditions they cannot or will not bear know that at least the way out is free. The more liberty there is about, the easier the way of redemption for the poor man. For instance, while there was complete freedom of movement in the western world, and no passports were required for any place in Europe save Russia and Turkey, it was easier for a man out of work in his country to go elsewhere, settle down and often succeed. The growing mechanization of society everywhere which set in with the first world war has deprived men of all stations but the wealthiest of most of their mobility. The plight of the poor man has become worse merely because there is less liberty, not only for himself but for all men around.

The argument 'What is the good of liberty for the poor man?' has therefore no value whatever unless it means that general liberty must be sacrificed so as to provide the poor man with bread. This will not do. A society which, in order to ensure bread for a small minority, sacrifices the liberty of all is not a community of men but

a set of stables for animals. That a civilized society must struggle against destitution we are all agreed. That it must stake the liberty of most of its citizens to conquer it, never.

And then, why is that poor man poor? For if he is poor through his own fault it is a good thing that he gets the experience of being poor; and then public assistance, the health authorities, a thorough-going reform of the general economic tendencies of this country, some combination of private care and State thinking should deal with his case. But let the community avoid butting in between man's actions and their fruit, whether bitter or sweet. Let us not think of punishment. Who are we to punish anyone? Nor of 'teaching him a lesson'; for who are we to teach anyone anything? But let us not deprive any man of the wealth of experience which comes from free action and its fruit. And if the man is poor through no fault of his own, the chances are that, since he has character, provided he has liberty, he will fight his way out of his trouble.

Of course this by no means detracts from the responsibility of the community in the struggle against systematic causes of poverty. Who owns the land? How is industry organized? What are the conditions affecting the health of a particular district? How much national income is deflected to a particular section of the nation whose exertion does not justify the reward? There will always be men foolish or unfortunate enough to fall into poverty without society helping them into such an experience by its own injustice and incompetence. The duty of the community is plain: to fight against systematic causes of poverty. But, and this is the point, with the smallest possible curtailment of liberty, including the liberty of all men to get richer — or poorer.

Is there any limit to this principle? Of course there is. Though we have established that liberty has a prior

claim, we cannot overlook the fact that we are dealing with life, and that, therefore, all problems have a way of coiling themselves round themselves like reptiles. Liberty must be limited in order to safeguard liberty. This rule is only too true. Its abuse has been a godsend to totalitarian systems, both of the Right and of the Left, which have brandished it to kill liberty altogether in the name of liberty. So let us put in another coil. The limitations to liberty must be strictly limited for the sake of liberty. Two such limitations are clear. Wealth and poverty must have bounds. A community which enables even a tiny minority of its citizens to amass wealth out of proportion to that of the community itself endangers its own freedom. And dangers of another kind threaten a community which allows too much destitution. These things, however, are relative. The danger line in point of wealth is evidently higher in the United States than in Britain, in Britain than in Spain — since the dangers to which very rich men expose the community come from the relation between their own fortune and that of the country as a whole. Similarly, the very concept of destitution varies with the standard of living, and, up to a point also, with the climate.

CHAPTER IV

EQUALITY?

OUR century is equality-mad. Much of it is just snobbery upside down, a kind of resentment against those placed higher up the social ladder, which of course betrays too much respect for that very social ladder one wants to knock down. Much of it also comes from a genuine irritation at the oddities, the obsolete forms which social differences are still apt to take; and perhaps also from that desire for simplicity which from buildings to furniture and from the arts to clothes, is the mark of our time. There is no doubt an underground subtle yet definite relation between the revolutionary equalitarianism of our age and such things as cubism.

The sense of equality is both old and new in our societies. The old comes from the Gospels; the new comes from Rousseau. Broadly speaking, it may be said that sound and healthy equality has its roots in the Gospels; while the unsound and unhealthy can be traced back to Rousseau. Nor should we wonder at this. The equality of the Gospels flowed from a pure source, free from self-seeking. Rousseau was a poor mortal, well-meaning enough, but with so heavy a load of moral defects and maladjustments in his proud, lustful and weak soul, that his doctrines were bound to conceal much dross of personal resentment.

His success was due in part precisely to this. Like Hitler later, though in a different context, Rousseau was in tune with his time, and his time made his voice resound in the world. For the chief note of his time was the resentment caused by the denial of equality to the masses whom the Gospels had declared equal. The Church of Christ had failed, the Christian States had failed; for, in their midst, privilege was enthroned and

injustice rampant. Resentment — never more justified — was abroad. The first super-resentful man who turned up was bound to become the superman of the day. This was Rousseau. For him there shall be no betters. So, we are all equal. Not even merit, services, capacity, nothing at all is to justify inequality. But virtue? He pauses, and typical of him, concludes: 'No. That would just breed hypocrites!'[1]

The uncompromising, passionate character of extreme equalitarianism is thus traced back to its root. It is a passion presented as a doctrine. It is useless, therefore, to refute it. It thrives on refutations. We still remember the tragic comic scenes it produced in Russia, when the bolshevist revolution was still very green, and hospitals were run by every member of the staff but the doctors. Similar cases occurred in Spain during the civil war. Not till the second world war, which it began still furiously equalitarian, did the Red Army grow epaulettes, discipline and common sense. But much of Rousseau's passionate and resentful equalitarianism still remains.

The difference between Christian and Rousselian equalitarianism can be detected in the tone of the claims and the mood of the claimants. Christian equalitarianism of course transcends this world and only blossoms in this world from roots which plunge in Eternity. It matters little that those who feel it and live it are conscious of being religious and Christian or not. Europe has been Christian for so long that no European ever knows to which grandfather or great-grandmother he owes his best and deepest feelings. The Christian equalitarian is so sure of the equality of all men before the Essence, in fact, of their essential unity, that he is hardly

[1] Dans un Etat bien constitué, tous les citoyens sont si bien égaux, que nul ne peut être préféré aux autres comme le plus savant ni même comme le plus habile, mais tout au plus comme le meilleur: encore cette dernière distinction est-elle souvent dangereuse, car elle fait des fourbes et des hypocrites. *Narcisse*. Préface, vol. II, p. 229.

ever assertive or challenging about it. All men are equal and that is that.

Not so the Rousselian. For he has a resentment and an inferiority complex, and he lurks in waiting for the affront which he is going to repel. The Rousselian equalitarian is assertive and challenging. '*Ah, Monsieur le Comte, parce que vous vous êtes donné la peine de naître . . .*' He is sarcastic and jeers at those who claim to be his betters, because deep down there still lingers in him a trace of a feeling that they *are* his betters, or at any rate, that there is such a thing as 'betters', which the Christian equalitarian simply ignores.

That is why political quarrels are apt to be more poisonous when they are fought over equality than over liberty. Much of the violence of equality-strife — for instance in the French, the Russian and the Spanish Revolutions — may have been due to the exasperation of the equalitarian against himself for believing still so much in what he was knocking down.

But human beings are so constituted that, had it not been for this evil, resentful, destructive kind of equalitarianism, the true equalitarianism of the Gospels might well have remained ineffective, at any rate for a much longer time. Beaumarchais had to rise and jeer at the aristocrats with his: *Monsieur le Comte . . .* for the Church of Christ to come to its senses. But much blood had to be shed, for humiliation, suffering, injustice had been stored in the people for centuries; and, in the process, the Christian faith lost much ground in European life, as it was bound to do.

Christian equality should manifest itself in political terms. Their failure to secure this was the chief crime of the Christian societies of Europe, a crime which grew worse as Europe became more cultured and civilized, and showed itself at its worst during the eighteenth

century. We shall see why hereafter. All men must be equal before the law; and the law must not establish differences among them which cannot be justified before a reasonable public opinion. Everybody is agreed about that to-day. In principle, at any rate; for in practice, privilege has a way of turning up as soon as a section of the population feels strong enough to impose it. English and American readers may remember cases, sometimes of rich classes, sometimes of workers, farmers, ex-soldiers and what not, who tried to enforce a privilege through legislation when they found that they had the whip in hand. In my brief ministerial life in Spain I witnessed a case of privilege law. The Minister of Public Works brought to the Cabinet a Bill granting railway-men's sons the right to enter the railway service in three vacancies out of every four. I caused much offence by pointing out that this was a monarchist law: Railwayman II succeeds Railwayman I.

Equality should mean: no privilege. This, however, is pregnant with consequences. It is enough, for instance, to justify many socialist reforms. When the economic exploitation of a public service has outlived whatever utility it had as a stimulus for private initiative, it becomes a privilege which nothing can justify. Why should the tenth Duke of Blackthunderland own several streets of houses in London because his tenth grandfather saved the life of the King of England in battle? Why should public services of a clearly monopolistic kind remain in private hands or even earn money for private people after the capital invested in them at the outset has been paid several times over? These and similar questions are not really issues of socialism so much as of equality and justice, and as such they ought to be studied under the item: no privilege.

On the other hand, the equalitarian rule of no privilege would become monstrously unjust if it were understood

in a levelling way. It does not mean that all citizens are the same; but that all are to be treated in the same fair way. This implies not an equal but a different treatment; only, instead of being arbitrary, these differences are to be justified by standards acceptable to all reasonable men.

There would appear to be at least three such standards: stimulus; function; justice. We grant patent rights to the inventor, interest to the capitalist, bonus to the worker, rewards, honours and distinctions to soldiers, sailors and airmen, to stimulate behaviour useful to the community. We grant certain exclusive rights to doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, M.P.'s on account of their functions and competence. And we reward services to the community not merely to stimulate others, but out of a sense of justice for those who have served us well. Nothing could be more disastrous than to allow these differences to be razed by a false equalitarianism.

But it is honest to set down that such is the trend of our demagogic age. Two currents tend in this direction. One comes from the suspicion every special position arouses lest it conceals a claim of superiority, and from a disposition to assume that we are all equally good at everything every time. The other comes from the growing anti-liberal tendency of our day to mechanize the State and gradually reduce the areas of free initiative. For it is obvious that the adjustment of claims to differential treatment can in the end take place only in the elastic atmosphere of liberty. To take a crude and extreme example: it is evident that travelling abroad is objectively more important for certain citizens than for others. Statesmen, scholars, thinkers, businessmen, artists, have a higher claim than other people, both from the point of view of the individual needs and from that of the advantages for the community. But who can settle such a complicated issue? There is no solution but liberty. If a

totalitarian State holds the key of the border and can decide without appeal who is to travel abroad and who is to stay at home, nominal equality will in fact be identical with monstrous inequality and injustice.

It is not equality but inequality which is the salt of life. Inequality is natural, and it is indispensable to liberty. Nature gives forth inequality of its own accord. William Pitt the first had an elder brother, Thomas Pitt, born of the same parents, brought up in the same house, and endowed by nature with much better health and by society with far more money and influence. But it was William who became Lord Chatham and conquered Canada. William Pitt the second, likewise, had an older and a younger brother. Who knows about them? Nature willed this difference.

Where is the justice of nature? Why should one brother corner all the good combinations of the parental genes, leaving the bad ones for the others? The language hints at the answer. It was *his lot*. Birth is a lottery. Who plays? All of us on the threshold of life. What determines that this unborn being shall be the son of Lord Verisopht and that other one the son of Molly Tearsheet and the third be born a Cromwell and a fourth a Leonardo? Those who look askance at the fortunate ones (are they fortunate?) forget that they stood the same chance with the unfortunate ones at the gates of this world before birth; some just got the prize. Someone had to.

Nature must have differences and inequality, so that there are tensions and there is life. If the surface of the earth were flat there would be no life on it, no movement. All water would be stagnant and putrid. Life comes from differences of level.

A community is a natural fact. It is a form of life. It has its ways, which are not necessarily our ways though

they work through our ways. One of them is to grow classes. The Marxist philosophy created the classless State — on paper of course. The only time it was tried, at an appalling cost in human life and suffering, in Soviet Russia, the community, in the course of time, evolved new classes again. In fact, the classless State itself began by erecting a class above the rest of the nation — the communist party.

Classes as a natural fact rest on psychology. There are three natural classes: the leaders; the burgesses;[1] and the peasants. The peasants are in touch with the soil and with the elements. They embody the instinct and the traditional memory of the nation. They stand for the past. They are conservative. The burgesses are the experts of the arts and the crafts. They express the intellectual and conscious life of the nation. They are the guardians of its forms. They are liberal. They stand for the present. The leaders incarnate the intuition of the nation. They stand for the future. They see the world that is coming and want to bring it forth. They are in sympathy with the two other classes and partake of the liberal intelligence of the burgesses and of the conservative instincts of the peasants.

In a perfect army the commander-in-chief would be a leader; the officers burgesses; the soldiers peasants. A society left to itself tends to produce these three classes according to the conditions determined by place and climate. Conflicts may occur for two reasons: within the setting of the time and place, the leaders may incur the displeasure and contempt of the burgesses, or both these classes that of the peasants, for their incapacity; or else the setting of time and place may change so as to need a corresponding change in the qualifications of the upper classes; and should this not be forthcoming, a conflict may arise.

[1] May I use this word instead of *bourgeois*?

As an example of the first case, the aristocracy of France towards the close of the eighteenth century had degenerated to such a state of frivolity and greed that it had won the contempt of the *bourgeoisie*. This was the chief cause of the French Revolution. As an example of the second, when the feudal aristocracy ceased to be useful owing to the growth of the monarchy, in France as in Spain, a new class of leaders appeared recruited from among scholars and lawyers. Similarly, in modern times, great business-men have gradually displaced the old landed aristocracy, to be displaced in their turn by great managers, and possibly soon by great statesmen.

What, by the way, are we to do with the class of workers? Where do they belong? Before we come to that, we might observe that in the United States there are hardly any peasants, and in Britain few. The farmer is something between a burgess and a worker. This comes from the advanced degree of urbanization of the English countryside, and as for the United States, from the fact that it is a transplanted nation. The accumulated effect is that, in both countries, the burgess-worker group is strengthened out of all proportion to the rest. This makes the two nations steady burgess democracies; for in psychological reality the worker class is an appendage of the burgess class. Despite appearances to the contrary and despite all the maledictions which Marx and Engels heaped on the bourgeoisie, possibly also because of these maledictions (for the human soul works in strange, devious ways), the ideal of the worker is the burgess.

Social classes and natural classes hardly ever coincide. There are many leaders but a lot of fools at the top; by no means all the burgesses are intelligent, care for form or possess some technical ability; there are workers endowed with leadership, peasants rich in technical ability. Nature just throws up individuals with the riotous carelessness of a prodigal. This was to be

expected, for we have not solved, nor can we solve, the antinomy between the ultimate end of the individual and that of the community, and nature attends to both with marvellous impartiality. As the animal and spiritual mother of man, nature gives forth human beings irrespective of their station; as the mother of society and history she evolves natural classes and the social classes which both grow and degenerate out of them.

Tensions result. Life lives on tensions. Classes become obsolete. Individuals feel 'ambitious', i.e. out of their natural class in the social class they are in. They must rise. Others are no longer able to carry the load of the social class they are in, belonging to a lower natural class; they tend to fall. Owing to the inertia of situations, to the continuity of families and to the laws governing inheritance, the leaders become the aristocracy. With few exceptions, every aristocratic family traces its pedigree back to an illustrious ancestor who was a leader. If the aristocracy remains capable of leading, all goes well. If not, it is ousted, either by evolution or by revolution. A nation can be compared to an animal which would be able either to cut its head off (revolution) or to resorb it (evolution) and grow another one instead. Social and natural classes tend thus to be identified. But the natural classes feed themselves from the nation at large. Mr. Ernest Bevin and even Mr. Aneurin Bevan are both leaders; they belong to the leading class, and in the most accurate sense of the term can both be described as aristocrats. They certainly are no longer members of the working class. I mean neither that they do not work (I am sure they work more hours per day than any of their former comrades) nor that they have forsaken their comrades of old. Far from it. They serve them better as leaders than they would in the ranks. But they had to come out of the ranks in order to serve them. They are no longer 'workers'.

All this influence of nature on society depends on the free working of two social forces: ambition and necessity. Let milk stand by itself and the cream comes to the top. Ambition and necessity are, in a free society, the two vertical forces thanks to which natural selection takes place. Privilege prevented them from working freely in the old regimes, and the cream of leadership grew thin and sour. A healthy society should see to it that ambition and necessity work freely enough in its midst for the able to rise and the inept to fall and everyone to reach his level.

When, therefore, we butt in with our well-meaning legislation let us make sure that we do not disturb natural laws in society and even in man which are not well known to us. The community will always tend to 'grow' and feed its classes as a body grows and feeds its tissues. Moreover, it will do so just as it lives, closely espousing, indeed rooted into, the thousand nooks and corners of the land, taking everywhere the atmosphere and flavour of the place, and changing from mile to mile in an uncanny way with the soil, the sky, the trees and the animals, which, together with the human beings, make it up. Our laws are but rough sketches, crude maps of this rich natural landscape of nature and character. And the effect they have on the community is nearly always difficult to predict and at times unfathomable.

Equality of opportunity is a case in point. It is one of the slogans of our time. It rests on the worship of money and of education, considered as utilitarian tools only, which is typical of the capitalist-labour era. It is a characteristic burgess conception. It assumes that 'facilities' are of necessity beneficial to a young man. History does not seem to confirm this view. Most great men had a raw deal from nature or from society or from

both. To come back to Pitt, he was not a nobleman, which, in his day, for a man born to be a statesman, was a heavy handicap; he was the younger, poorer, and subordinate brother of the heir of his father's estate and political boroughs; and so had to depend on the whims of his commonplace and erratic brother for his own career. He had no money, till the Duchess of Marlborough left him a most embarrassing fortune the prospect of which made him commit some political mistakes. His health was so bad that he had to waste more than half of his energy in conquering pain. And yet Pitt led the Seven Years War.

Money and education are but coefficients of character. They make the brave braver, the shy shier, the foolish more foolish, and the clever cleverer. Remove the obstacles on the path of the indolent: he will grow more indolent; remove them before the progress of the active and he will go further.

There is, however, another side to the question. This boy to whom you want to give equality of opportunity lives somewhere; he belongs to some local community, is a limb of some concrete local unit of life; of fishermen or of miners, shopkeepers, scholars. He has a set of men round him whom he feels his own more than other people. Are you to pump him out of his life by artificial means? Would it not be better to allow nature to take its course and let those who feel the call to leave leave of their own accord, conquering obstacles by their own will-power? Are we, for instance, going to pump all the talent out of the working class into the bourgeoisie, which grows already enough talents of its own, and is this fair to the working class?

Of course, at first sight at any rate, it looks excellent for the community. It sends the best people where they can be put to the best use. But are we sure that it contributes to breeding strong characters as well as

educated men? Or, in other words, are we sure that what on the surface looks like lack of opportunity is not at bottom an advantage in disguise for those who can take it? And as for those who cannot, should they not remain where they are?

These points are put in the form of questions deliberately, and not rhetorically. They are not statements, but doubts. They are intended to suggest that, both from the point of view of the individual and from that of the community, this problem of equality of opportunity should be handled with care and possibly with more respect for nature. For nature is always unexpected and mysterious, but social nature most of all.

This applies with particular force to the present trend to assert equality between men and women. It often springs from a feminine inferiority complex, revealed, incidentally, in the way many women imitate masculine styles in their clothes, hairdressing and so forth. The question of superiority or inferiority between the sexes is, of course, futile. For feminine purposes, women are superior to men; for masculine purposes, men will be found more useful. Men and women are correlative forms of the human being, whose conjugated action is indispensable for the physical but also for the spiritual life and balance of the community. An excessive equalitarianism between two forms of life so essentially co-equal in gifts and dignity is bound to aim at abolishing difference — the only thing which nature will refuse to abolish between them. Paradoxically enough, this unbalanced equalitarianism denies the difference between men and women while in the same breath claiming that offices and honours must be granted women *qua* women.

The industrial revolution of the last century and the two world wars have accelerated the process by forcing

into industry millions of women who should have remained at home. The organic sense of woman's place in society tends to disappear. Women flock to the wages market where they compete with men. Broadly speaking, they multiply the men by two, divide by two the average wages and so, the family earns the same, only half comes from the man and half from the woman. But in real wages, i.e. in amenities and comfort, the home is very much the poorer, for the woman who cannot be everywhere at a time, has to neglect the home if she is to attend to her work. The children go by the board when they do not get killed off by foster parents. This is, of course, a deliberately exaggerated picture in order to foreshorten it and mark the trend. The chief thing, the organic cell known as the home, no one seems to bother about. And yet there is no wealth but life.

It seems that the reasonable attitude should be, while of course respecting the right of everybody to make mistakes, to encourage the return of the bulk of the women to the chief occupation which is the home, the family and the children. And to this effect, to begin with a radical change in the education of women. Of course any woman not gifted for motherhood or family life and on the other hand gifted for any of the professions should be perfectly free to follow her preference; and to this effect the present arrangements in high schools and universities would appear to be satisfactory. But since they can only be considered as institutions in which women are educated as men, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that there are no institutions in which women are educated as women.

Every university should develop a faculty of feminine education, in which all the arts and the sciences likely to make the home a healthy and a beautiful place should be cultivated. Just as the medical faculties are not complete without a hospital attached to them, so these

feminine faculties should have under their care a children's home, where the derelict, the orphans and the foundlings would be brought up and cared for by the future young mothers of the nation. This would turn a heavy liability such as the care of children, now incompetently handled by local authorities, into an asset in the field of education.

But nothing of this is possible if the consciousness of the difference between men and women is not reborn. Here again, inequality proves to be the true creative standard instead of a drab and deadly equality.

One point remains to be treated: that of the influence of equality on liberty. There is little doubt about the answer. The more equality, the less liberty. This word is of course understood in the spiritual sense defined above: scope for the individual to find himself in experience. It is plain that the more varied, broken, colourful the social landscape, the more opportunities exist for the individual to design the pattern of his life. Too often this matter of equality *v.* inequality is discussed as if the community were like a ladder with steps offering no possible movement but up and down. This is the outcome of a purely economic, capitalist-labour conception of society. True inequality should provide a gamut of gamuts, sideways and sloping as well as up and down, and many peaks and valleys other than the peak and the valley of money. It is no reflection on the United States, it is a mere truism to say that for a number of reasons the social landscape there is less rich than, for instance, in Britain; because in the United States there is almost no other hill than that of money. But in Britain the millionaire looks down on the petit bourgeois, the Duke looks down on the 'vulgar millionaire', the don looks down on the 'stupid' Duke, the sailor grins at the 'queer' don and so on and so forth, and all get a

good deal of fun and satisfaction out of it and no one is the worse for it and of course there are far more possibilities of tasting life.

Thus liberty and inequality enrich each other and foster each other as well. For liberty, by encouraging the virtue of private initiative increases the forms and colours of life, thereby developing inequality; while inequality offers to liberty a rich and varied set of — note the word — *walks of life*. Who would enjoy walks in life if life were not a rich landscape? That is why the modern prejudice in favour of equality should be carefully watched. Essential in its highest, or Christian form, to all democracy, it is in its extreme and Rousselian form, poisonous to liberty.

CHAPTER V

SECURITY

It is perhaps typical of our age that, as shown in Britain by the national debates on the Beveridge Report, matters of security are discussed from the point of view of the actuarian, the Treasury, the benefits to be expected by this or that class or citizen, statistics and what not, but never, or hardly ever, from that of national character. What will be the effect of such a scheme as that embodied in the Beveridge Report on the character of the British people? No pessimistic conclusions need be jumped at in a hurry. For all we know, the effect may be excellent. But the point is that few people seem to have troubled about this aspect of the question.

And yet, it is the most important of all. Field-Marshal Wavell once stigmatized the slogan *Safety First* in severe terms. Harmless enough as a warning to pedestrians about to cross a road, this slogan was bound to sink into the subconscious of the nation and alter its character in ways the great soldier could not but lament and wanted to avoid. This modern universal cry for the milk of security flowing from the Cow-State might well produce effects even more disastrous. Two historical cases come to mind, by no means identical, or even similar; yet fairly suggestive of the dangers that lurk ahead.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Spain gradually lost her parliamentary institutions. There was some violence in the early sixteenth century on the part of a despotic king. But the chief reason why they grew weaker and weaker was that, owing to the prevailing standard of values in the country, gentlemen would choose no career or profession outside the famous three

symbolized in the words: 'Church, Sea or Royal House'. Spain became a nation of clerics, sailors and civil servants. A nation of 8 million, it counted 31 universities (present figures: 25 million; 11 universities). Everybody became dependent on the State. Political liberty was at an end.

The other example is of our own time. The whole world admired the German social-democrat movement about 1910. It was the strongest, the most progressive, the best organized, the richest in the world. It provided its members with benefits on every possible basis. It was indeed security. But when the events of 1914 put it before a *crise de conscience*, how did it react? It thought of its funds and its benefits, not of its duties. It had plenty of cash but no spirit.

It is by no means suggested that the Beveridge Plan would cost the British nation its spirit and its political liberty. More expert knowledge of the plan and a closer familiarity with the British people are required to express an opinion on so complex a subject. But an examination of these risks ought to be the pre-requisite to any technical discussion of the scheme. For it might well happen that the labour party of Great Britain, led by an outstanding member of the liberal party, and with the collaboration of liberals and conservatives, unwittingly sold the liberty of one of the freest countries in the world for an ideal of safety.

It is true that the modern State which gradually extends its tentacles over every part of the citizen's life, is, in its turn, unlike the State of the old regimes, dependent on the will and opinion of the citizens it absorbs. But do the two effects balance each other? Is not the control of the State by the citizen much weaker in actual fact than the control of the citizen by the State is or is likely to become? It may be truly said that modern democracies tend to become dictatorships of the civil

service; and the chain of subordination which attaches civil servant to minister, minister to Parliament and Parliament to electorate cuts a rather bookish and theoretical silhouette when one happens to be queuing up at the Food Office, Passport Office, Labour Exchange or any of the other Levees which H.M. the Civil Servant holds for his distracted subjects.

Then again, even if all these fears proved to be imaginary, the psychological — apart from the political — danger would still remain, of a nation getting used to its State services as one gets used to expect that the gas will hiss out of the pipe when the tap is turned on.

The State is too much with us. It is our policeman, our teacher, our priest, our accountant. If it is also to be our house agent, our landlord, our banker, our insurer, and our doctor, are we not running the risk of becoming just a cog in its huge machinery? And do we not run the risk of gradually taking on the psychology of calf-citizens waiting for the Cow-State to come and feed us instead of venturing out to pastures new?

These, again, are questions, doubts. Security and insecurity, like money and education, are but coefficients of character. The active and enterprising man, provided with security, will probably feel more buoyant and enterprising. The lazy dog, once secure, will lie in the sun and growl at any suggestion of work. The least that can be said is that a scheme of universal security interferes powerfully with social nature and is therefore bound to produce far reaching and largely unpredictable effects. Such a scheme removes necessity from society. This is a formidable change. We have already defined the essential part necessity takes in the life of the community, as one of the two vertical forces which allow natural selection to take place and classes to be rejuvenated. What will be the effects of the removal of

necessity on the individual and on society, it is difficult to foresee. Perhaps very good. More likely very bad. Has the point been studied? Malingering, shirking, the manning of difficult, unpleasant or simply unpopular trades and professions — these and other similar problems which social nature solves in a free medium by the interplay of ambition and necessity, how are they to be solved? Are we to trust to the emergence of new social impulses, fresh virtues, a purified citizenship, some kind of collective holiness such as can be found in monasteries? What has been so far the effect of a universal unemployment benefit? What is unemployment? Is it complete and absolute lack of work, or is it lack of a particular form of work a particular man likes? If the second is the rule adopted, can such a man wait by his door, with his unemployment benefit in hand, till the occupation he fancies passes by? If the first is the rule adopted, is the unemployed man to go to whichever occupation H.M. the Civil Servant allots him? The community runs great risks in the first case; the individual graver risks still in the second; liberty runs great risks in both.

'If we put full employment first, we can do it,' it is argued on the financial side. But should full employment be put first? Should we not put liberty first? To be precise, if, in order to ensure full employment, the freedom of travel, of movement of funds and other forms of liberty must be curtailed (a measure which inevitably carries with it a formidable State machinery for controlling all kinds of human activities, not excluding private correspondence) would it not be better to be a little more moderate about the possibility of achieving full employment? In any case, the issue should be faced and the claims of full employment and of liberty should be debated not merely in theory but in actual fact, with direct reference to the details of the machinery

needed in all its intricacies and inquisitions, before the nation decides.

It seems natural to expect two conditions of the State: (*a*) that it should rest on sound and well probed principles; and (*b*) that it should confine its legislation to general and broad issues. *De minimis non curat lex.* War excuses many things and even makes them respectable and sacred; yet should the British President of the Board of Trade have to answer questions in Parliament about women's stockings and even about other feminine garments more difficult to describe? There is perhaps a good deal of grab and greed behind the hue and cry about removing war controls; but as a matter of broad principle, it would seem that the State in normal times should keep aloof from socks, turned up trousers and the number of buttons to be allowed on a waistcoat; if only because it does not befit its dignity, let alone its competence, to vie with tailors.

On the other hand there are a number of services which modern life, by its very size and complication marks for State control. Water supply; post and telegraph; electricity; gas; possibly the heating of whole cities from central stations; fuel; the railways. Thus a pattern emerges of a grid or framework of State-owned or State-controlled services — within which free enterprise would be able to flourish the freer.

Among the many advantages of this composite solution — neither capitalist nor socialist — would be that of meeting the needs of the two chief types of human beings: those who prefer security to liberty, who would flock to the socialized services; and those who prefer liberty to security, who would probably prefer to dwell in the free initiative sector. These two types should be treated differently, both because of their own personal inclination and because of the services which they would

instinctively seek. In the first, the socialized grid or framework of services, everybody should be treated as a civil servant. Strikes should be forbidden; complete security ensured. In the second, the area of free initiative, a system of healthy rivalry between capital and labour should prevail.

There are two problems of collective life which, better perhaps than any other, illustrate its complexity. Should the press remain in private hands? Should banking remain in private hands? The desire to put these two great collective functions outside the temptations which go with money-making, and under public control, is but natural. That the present situation of both the press and banking in democratic societies is not satisfactory, few would care to deny.

And yet . . . the press cannot be 'nationalized', for, in actual fact, this would mean putting it under the control of the State, which it is supposed to criticize. Something will have to be done, possibly not the same thing everywhere. Complete publicity of the audited accounts of all newspapers might go a long way to put a remedy to most of the evils of the present system. But on one point every genuine democrat is agreed: the press cannot be nationalized.

The case of banking is more difficult, and here it is possible to hold different opinions as to nationalization. On the whole it seems that a nationalized banking system would present more drawbacks than advantages from the point of view of liberty. As with the press, the line of evolution should be to put banking more and more under the control of public opinion, but not of the State.

This flows from the chief political feature of money, which is its *neutrality*. Money is the vehicle of power, as paper is of thought and water of whatever it dissolves.

And just as anything good or bad, provided it is soluble, can be distributed by water, and anything good or bad, provided it can be expressed with pen and ink, can be distributed through papers, so money is indifferent to the ethical and political connotations of the power it conveys. Money passes from the millionaire to the trade union, from the charity fund to the gambling den, from the holy man to the gangster, with complete equanimity. And that absolute amorality of money is the reason and the condition of its universal utility in the community.

Money would lose this virtue, its total impartiality in politics, if banking were subjected to a political body. This would mean a deadly danger for private opinions and individual liberty. Nor would it do to argue that the nation would control the State which would control the banks, for that is precisely one of the worst dangers of our future: that mass-orthodoxy may censure out of existence the free expression of minority opinions. All progress without exception has been due to the initiative of minority opinions.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

THIS rough and rapid sketch of prcsent day problems in the field of home affairs is offered as a contribution to the reconstruction of Europe. It rests on the assumption that the chief value in man's life, from the individual as from the collective point of view, is liberty. After undergoing a deadly peril from the Right, liberty is now just as seriously threatened from the Left. The nazi-fascist period was too odious and too grotesque, and so it defeated itself in the minds of men. The perils of mass-legislation and mass-opinion, whether under the communist label or not, are more dangerous because there is a generous inspiration in them which makes them attractive to the heart and, through the heart, to the mind. Liberals all over the world have fallen in their thousands, victims to this fascination of communist or para-communist ideas and tendencies. They join, unashamed, in the chorus which repeats that *liberalism is dead.*

So it would be if it revealed itself incapable of rising from the ruins of the capitalist civilization, to call mankind to a new hope. Much of the present day anti-liberal prejudice (for it amounts to that) is due to the fact that nineteenth-century liberals allowed money-lenders and speculators to defile the temple of liberty. A scourge should clear them out. But the temple of the Goddess must stand. For if liberty were to die among men, no equality, no security, no prosperity would mean anything that a horse cannot get in well-kept stables.

PART TWO

WORLD AFFAIRS

All wars are civil wars

SECTION I

FALLACIES *v.* FACTS

CHAPTER I

FALLACIES ABOUT GREAT AND SMALL NATIONS

I. THE GREAT NATIONS MUST WIELD PARAMOUNT POWER, SINCE THEY WILL HAVE A PARAMOUNT RESPONSIBILITY

THIS idea has been expressed by every statesman and journalist of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union as if it were undeniable. There is a sense in which it is of course true. The three great industrial powers alone possess the mass of territory and man-power needed nowadays for a world war; and therefore must take upon themselves the leadership of whatever military action is required *if and when it comes to blows.*

But when we are told that because the three great powers must assume the leadership of the armed forces of the world in case of a world war, they must also wield an exceptional degree of power in time of peace, i.e. when we are given to understand that, because they are to be responsible in war they must be irresponsible in peace, we stop to think a little.

Here is the way Mr. Churchill put it: 'It is on the Great Powers that the chief burden of maintaining peace and security will fall. The new world organization must take into account this special responsibility of the Great Powers and must be so framed as not to compromise their unity

or their capacity for effective action if it is called for at short notice.'[1]

There are a number of answers to this:

(1) What is meant by 'the chief burden'? Let us look at the second world war. Who has contributed more to the burden of the war, the Russians or the Greeks, the Britons or the Dutch, the Americans or the Norwegians? True the three great powers have given all they could. True they would have given more if required. True they would have given as much as Greece, Holland and Norway, had they been in the situation of these three small nations. But we are speaking of facts, not of good intentions. The chief burden of reconquering the peace of the world has been borne by the men and women of the small European nations, not by those of the big powers. Great Britain, Russia, the United States have given more in bulk, but infinitely less *per head* of the population. They will come out incomparably less scarred and weakened than the martyred small powers of Europe. The premiss, therefore, falls to the ground.

If peace had to be 'maintained' again by war, which God forbid, it would be again the small European nations that would suffer most. The argument so often heard turns therefore against those who use it. It is reactionary, as reactionary as would be the claim of the Duke of Blackthunderland to have more political rights than Tom Smith on the ground that he had lost ten of his forty London houses in the blitz while Tom Smith had only lost one — all he had.

(2) *The great powers could not have won the war without the small powers.*

This is so plain that it is hardly necessary to enlarge upon it. Greece, Poland, Belgium, proved indispensable positions and battlefields for the campaign. So did the Azores, by the way.

[1] House of Commons, February, 1945.

(3) *The great nations bear a heavy responsibility in the state of affairs which led to the war.*

The U.S.A. because it withdrew from the League of Nations, and because it pursued a tariff policy which plunged Europe in an economic chaos;

Great Britain because it fell between the two stools of collective security and rearmament, and adopted neither of the two policies;

The U.S.S.R. because it made a Pact with Hitler without which Hitler would not have begun the war.

(4) *If there is another war it will be again the fault of the big nations, for wars big enough to become a general danger are not started by small powers.*

(5) *Numbers and powers do not predicate more political sense.*

(6) *It is obvious that the three big powers are already pursuing power-seeking policy.*

CONCLUSION

The three big powers are of course the nucleus of any world-organization; but the greater and the more intimate their collaboration with the other nations, the more useful for the peace of the world is that organization likely to be. And the argument so often heard in favour of an omnipotent triumvirate should disappear from the debate as an utter fallacy — though the paramount influence of the three great powers over world affairs remains, of course, a fact.

II. THE SMALL POWERS WERE A SOURCE OF WEAKNESS FOR THE LEAGUE

(1) This fallacy is at times assumed as a self-evident proposition, and at times left frowning like a shadow in a discreet background, behind the argument. Thus: 'However cogent the other objections to the predominant role assigned to the great Powers, one fact seems incontestable: the more nearly membership of the Security-

Council is made to coincide with the possession of effective power, the less danger there is likely to be of a recurrence of the old divorce between decision and enforcement.'

So said a *Times* leader on March 28th, 1945. This proposition is of course untenable. Two clear cases are on record: Manchuria and Abyssinia. The present writer was at the very core of both.

Manchuria: There was no divorce between decision and enforcement because there was no decision. And there was no decision because England would not take any, owing to the absence of the United States; and France would not take any, because the conflict was 'too far away', i.e. from the Rhine.

Abyssinia: There was a decision, but there was no enforcement because England was not very keen, having had recent dealings with Italy about a division of Abyssinia into economic zones of influence between the two; and France still less because, as we know from the revelations made by M. Laval during the trial of Marshal Pétain, a treaty had been concluded between Mussolini and Laval in Rome at the beginning of 1935 whereby, in violation of the Covenant, both countries promised each other in secret on the one hand military assistance against Germany and on the other a free hand in Abyssinia. In these conditions the League could not but fail, and all that was done was due to the moral pressure of public opinion in general and of the governments of the small nations in particular.

Therefore, this argument is based on a complete distortion of the facts.

(2) The argument takes at times another form. It consists in suggesting that the small powers were a nuisance in the League because they brought about a kind of international indiscipline. Corruption has even been hinted at.[1]

[1] Cf. 'Where the League Failed'. *News Chronicle*, March 1st, 1945.

This is of course utterly false. The League proved, time and again, the deference the small nations felt for the big powers. One instance may do. It is well known that the big powers had permanent seats in the Council. It is less well known that they had to be elected in order to belong to the 'Bureau' or steering Committee of the Assembly or of International Conferences. In the eighteen years of the League's existence there is no case of a great power having failed to be elected thus; even when, as was the case with Italy and Japan, they happened to be under a black cloud as aggressor States.

The only case that can be quoted of small powers blocking the League is when the entrance of Germany had to be postponed from March to September 1926 because Brazil and Spain claimed permanent seats on the Council at the same time. The ins and outs of that case would repay study. For our present purpose, it is enough to state: (*a*) that the difficulty was due perhaps less to the stubbornness of Brazil and Spain than to the insistence of Germany to be granted her permanent seat on the Council apart from any other similar concession, which, if made, should be granted later; and (*b*) that the powers concerned, Brazil and Spain, had to withdraw, so that there was no such check to the action of the League. True there was a delay of six months, but no one would claim that any danger was implied in it for the peace of the world.

CHAPTER II

FALLACIES ABOUT AGGRESSION

I. THE LEAGUE FAILED BECAUSE ITS DECISIONS WERE NOT BACKED BY FORCE

THIS is an old and sturdy war-horse in the field of fallacies. We have heard it even from the most illustrious British lips: the new body, Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons on his return from Yalta, will differ from the League 'in this essential point that it will not shrink from establishing its will against the evildoer or evil planner in good time and by force of arms'.

'Its will?' Whose will? The League of Nations never had any will. And that was the trouble. It had — contrary to what is said — plenty of force. You may say that it was not *its* force, but that of its members; and Lord Davies spent much devoted endeavour in the vain attempt to endow the League with a force of its own. What good would a police force be to a League without a will of its own? The trouble was not that the League had no force but that of its members; the trouble was that it had no policy but that of its members. The League had no will and no policy. As a single entity, it never existed.

I have two 'arms', i.e. two weapons, two armies, if you will. But I have but one mind and one heart, i.e. but one government. Therefore I wield my two arms as one. Had I but one arm (as Lord Davies wished) but two hearts and two minds, what use would it be to me? So with the League: its trouble came not from the fact that it had no armed force, it had at least thirty of them; but from the fact that it had thirty wills and thirty minds, or at any rate thirty governments, to say (or not say) when and how these forces were to be used.

We must therefore invert the statement: the League failed not because it had no force to back its decisions but because it had no decisions to be backed by its force.

II. THE AUTHORITY OF A LAW DEPENDS ON THE CAPACITY TO ENFORCE IT

(1) That is nonsense. The truth is the reverse. A law cannot be enforced if it has no authority of its own. If the British Parliament voted a law providing that in every family at least one boy should be compulsorily made a monk of the Roman Catholic Church, the Government would not be able to enforce it.

This fallacy is sometimes put in other words: *the State rests on the police.* Of course, the truth is exactly the reverse: *the police rests on the State.* You can imagine a State without a police: in fact, the more advanced the State, the less police it needs: you cannot imagine a police without a State.

Therefore it is idle to try to set up an international police force; because if there is enough world-citizenship to run a world-State, the armies and navies of the several powers will obey the behests of the world authority; and if such a world-State has not yet found its world-citizens, the world police force cannot be set up, for who is to control it and on whose behalf?

(2) There is, of course, a border case. A law or a system of laws may gain enough support in a minority strategically well placed within the State for a body strong enough to enforce this system to be evolved out of the minority. This is the case for instance in totalitarian nations, of the Right or of the Left. But in that case, there is a distinction to be made between the nation which suffers the law, and the State which makes it and enforces it. And *within this inner State*, the general principle holds good that enforcement is based on authority and not authority on enforcement.

We may anticipate that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals differ from the League Covenant in that they have incorporated into the League's democratic spirit a good deal of this totalitarian trend. The big powers are, up to a point, to constitute a world State within the world Commonwealth. But even so, the query arises: will they have the united purpose indispensable to wield a united force?

III. THE CHIEF TASK OF A WORLD ORGANIZATION IS TO FORESTALL AND REPEL AGGRESSION

This is a disastrous case of wrong stress. The world is led astray into thinking of negative things such as aggression and security, instead of positive ideas such as policy and co-operation.

A moment's reflection shows that the stress on aggression lacks that very realism its advocates praise in it. This can be proved from several points of view:

(1) *Kinds of aggression.*

Three may be considered:

(*a*) Small power *v.* small power
(*b*) Big power *v.* small power
(*c*) Big power *v.* big power.

The first is relatively unimportant, from the point of view of the peace of the world, at any rate; it can moreover be adequately met . . . when the big powers behind the small nations in conflict do not stand in the way.

The second case, a typical example of which is the aggression of Italy against Abyssinia, can only be effectively met by the direct armed intervention of great powers whether as such or as members of a world organization; which automatically turns it into case (*c*).

This case (*c*), that in which a big power attacks another big power, can only occur after favourable circumstances have been evolved or fostered. No nation is mad enough

to indulge in war if the political conjuncture is unfavourable. Let us now assume that a World Organization exists predominantly set on stopping aggression. Under the 'Security' forms, the separate power-policy of each of the big powers goes gaily on. This leads to estrangement, lack of confidence, actual distrust. It is then that one of the big powers strikes, knowing that the Security Pact will not work. For, in effect, the nations belonging to the World Organization will fail to achieve a unified will, and the Security Council will be unable to reach a decision.

This conclusion is made even clearer when we consider the following line of argument:

(2) *The whole idea of sanctions and punishment of the aggressor is obsolete and must be discarded for something more realist.*

Sanctions are based on a false analogy between inter-individual and international relations. A man is attacked in the street. A policeman and half a dozen zealous citizens rush to defend him, collar the bully and land him in gaol. Can this scene be transferred to international life? Evidently not. Nations cannot 'rush'. They are stuck in the particular area of the planet in which they have grown. They are determined by the natural laws of their place to do certain things and avoid others. Finland can shout at Australia, but not at Russia; Denmark can shout at the United States but not at Germany. Portugal can shout at Russia but not at England.

This subordination of policy to place is made more intimate by the fact that nations are not merely pieces in a Chinese puzzle called the Map; but organisms whose life oozes through frontiers as the life and blood of man through the tissues and membranes of his body. Great Britain is not merely that red area north-west of Europe. It is a life which goes on all the time along sea lanes,

air-lines, cables, ether-waves, weaving a cloth of interests, thoughts, emotions with all the world. And so every other nation, and all of them in a constant interchange of life.

It follows that sanctions — even only so-called economic sanctions — hurt the punishing nation as much as — at times even more than — the punished. This law of social nature grows stricter, as human inventions increase man's power for good and ill. The second world civil war has proved it tragically. The war will, no doubt, punish Germany heavily. But at what cost for Europe? Europe as a body politic was stabbed by Germany. Germany is punished by the avengers. In the process of punishing Germany, Europe is stabbed and starved by both the murderer and the police.

No one should be foolish enough to conclude from this that Germany should not have been 'punished', in fact that her aggression should not have been repelled. That is not the trend of the argument. But to show that if, in world affairs, all we do is to wait for aggressions and then repel them, we are embarking on a policy of despair.

(3) *The laws of peace-time politics lapse when war begins, and war-time laws rule international relations.*

International relations are a network of attractions, repulsions, dependant and dominant connections, public and private interests, bondages, strategic and economic considerations and legal and diplomatic ties forming a kind of kaleidoscope whose pattern changes completely from peace to war. The Security Pact is only a part of this network of relations, one of the elements of its legal-diplomatic form. When the general atmosphere veers towards war, the real forces which rule international relations change; the form remains rigid. The forces tear it. If these forces work against war, the aggression remains unpunished. (Japan *v.* China, Italy *v.* Abyssinia.) If these forces work for war, the aggression is

punished. (Hitler-Germany.) *But in both cases the Security Pact is brushed aside.*

IV. THE WORLD ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE UNIVERSAL. GREAT BRITAIN WILL NEVER FIGHT ABOUT NICARAGUA

Nations never fight over nations. They fight when their vital interests are threatened. If Germany attacked Nicaragua and tried to settle there (and an excellent place it is for a canal), Great Britain would fight for Nicaragua, by the side of the United States.

The United States would not fight for Danzig, nor even for London. But Danzig begat Pearl Harbour, and the United States had to fight — for Danzig.

This fallacy is trotted out in order to justify the division of the world into zones of influence; a division which all the big powers favour each in its particular case, though disliking it in the case of others. But this 'monroization' of the world runs counter to every rule of justice and even of common sense. Of justice, because in each of the areas thus carved, small powers are left to the tender mercies of one big power only; which is surely a most unjust arrangement; and of common sense, because the experience of the twentieth century proves that war, like peace, is indivisible.

CHAPTER III

FALLACIES ABOUT (AND AGAINST) INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY FORMS

I. THE LEAGUE WAS A TALKING MACHINE WHICH WASTED TIME AND MONEY

THIS is not true. It is, of course, aimed against the Assembly which was by far the most important organ of the League.

— the Assembly wasted no time;

— it wasted no money;

— it was most useful to the peace of the world.

(1) *The Assembly wasted no time.*

It met once a year for a month; it heard a few speeches for a couple of days; then split into Commissions which worked hard; met again two weeks later to consider the reports of the Commissions, and dispersed. For a World Congress, it was not too much time to discuss in one month the events of the whole year.

(2) *It wasted no money.*

The League's budget was the most closely and repeatedly scrutinized budget in the world.

(*a*) It was most carefully studied by the Secretariat;

(*b*) submitted to the Supervisory Commission;

(*c*) presented to the members of the League, most of whom had it carefully searched for superfluities by their treasury departments;

(*d*) discussed in great detail by the fourth Commission of the Assembly; and

(*e*) finally passed by the Assembly.

Moreover, the League budget could only become effective if voted unanimously by the Assembly. It

always was. This is a striking proof of the statesmanlike way in which all nations, great and small, co-operated in the League.

True there were arrears in some cases. The matter is too complex to be discussed here. But two points should be noted: for a number of small, distant States, the direct and indirect use of the League was not apparent, from the narrow point of view of their interests; and there were no defaulters.

As for actual expenditure, perhaps I shall be allowed to reproduce here a calculation I put before the League Assembly in September 1931. Let us assume that in 1936, the world spent ten thousand million dollars ($10,000,000,000) in armaments (the actual figure was higher) and that the League budget (including the Court and the International Labour Office) amounted to eight million dollars ($8,000,000) (the actual figure was lower). On this basis, if the nations of the world had made the League a free grant of 2 per cent of their armament budgets once for all, as a present never to be repeated, and the League placed this money at 5 per cent, the League budget would be met for ever and any reasonable growth fully provided for, for the rest of history, without any more expenditure from national budgets.

(3) *It was most useful to the peace of the world.*

The Assembly was useful particularly in two ways:

(*a*) it brought publicity to bear on world problems. Now, publicity is the strongest force to coerce small nations and the only force to coerce big nations. When Mussolini occupied Corfu, the Assembly was sitting. In order to bring the Duce to reason, the Council (led, of course, by the big powers) obtained from the Bureau of the Assembly that there should be no plenary sitting for a few days. I was then an official of the Secretariat. I came across Dr. Benes̆, who led his country's delegation

to the Assembly; and he said to me: 'They fear us. That means that we exist.'

(*b*) By the mere fact of meeting, the Assembly fostered the spirit and the habit of world affairs. How often had we to deplore that men who, in Geneva, spoke admirably from a world point of view, fell back into nationalism as soon as they returned home! But nationalist speeches at home were as old as the hills. What was new was world-citizenship in Geneva. And that was growing. The same men felt new men, wider, nobler, more constructive in Geneva than in their own capitals. And that effect was undoubtedly due to the mere fact of the Assembly.

CHAPTER IV

FALLACIES ABOUT NEUTRALITY

I. NEUTRALITY IS DEAD

It is a singular paradox that this last war should have been considered by so many persons, not excluding some of its leaders, as the swan song of neutrality (some swan! some song!) when every nation in it fought mainly, and most of them only, to defend their neutrality.

With all respect, may I recall to my American friends that they entered the war only because their neutrality was blown to bits at Pearl Harbour by the Japanese? The United States had been till then stubbornly neutral. Every man is free to argue that, even if the dastardly attack on Pearl Harbour had not taken place, the U.S. would have entered the war. But 'ifs' in history lead nowhere. The fact is that the U.S. fought because they were violently bumped off a neutrality which — as a whole — they cherished and jealously sought to maintain.

No one will doubt that Soviet Russia fought also to defend her violated neutrality. The magnificent services rendered to the common cause of the United Nations by her armies may have caused people to forget that the Soviet Union did not enter the war until Hitler made her, forcing her out of her neutrality as roughly as the Japanese the United States. Indeed, Soviet Russia was still neutral towards half the war till a few days before the end. I am not criticizing, nor finding fault. For all I know the fact that Russia was a neutral in the war in so far as it was fought against Japan may have been one of the ways in which victory was assured. I do not know. But I do know that Russia did not give up her neutrality in the Hitler war till she was attacked, nor till a few days before the end in the Pacific war.

China was in the war — or at any rate, at war — for over eleven years. But that war began because she was attacked. Moreover, with truly oriental subtlety, she fought for years against Japan without actually breaking relations with her enemy — remaining so to speak, a 'neutral' in her own war.

The only big powers to enter the war deliberately were France and Britain. Yet, without minimizing by a thousandth of an inch the integrity of their decision, and in fairness not merely to the argument but to the facts, it must be stated that Britain and France decided to fight for Poland because they had the wisdom to realize that they were next on the list of Hitler's victims; again, because their neutrality was directly, even if not immediately, threatened.

This brief analysis of the origin of the war with regard to the great powers shows that all entered the war solely or mainly to uphold their neutrality, i.e. their right and desire to be left out of whatever trouble happened to be going on at the time.

The case of the other European nations which have been dragged into the war by Germany, is even clearer. Norway made frantic efforts to maintain a 200 per cent neutrality up to the very eve of invasion. Holland, Belgium and the rest, hugged their neutrality till Hitler wrenched it from their hands. And even Poland would have blessed Providence if she had suddenly been 'earthquaked' westwards into a position that removed her from Hitler's path towards the Ukraine, thus enabling her to remain neutral.

As for the neutrals, it is hardly necessary to elaborate the point that they attach more value than they ever did to the principle and practice which enables them to keep out of the war.

Therefore, our first conclusion must be that neutrality, far from being dead, is more alive than ever.

II. NEUTRALITY MUST DIE

The time has come to examine more closely what we mean by neutrality. Considered not merely as a mental concept, but as a living fact of world life, it appeals to the mind as a kind of *fruit*, with a legal rind, an economic, political and military flesh and a spiritual core.

(1) *The Legal Rind.*

Neutrality may be considered as a legal or formal concept. This is the surface of neutrality. By which it is not meant that the legal skin or peel of neutrality is unimportant. All is vital in life, and if a man loses his skin he dies — though the injury is only skin deep. In the days when the western world tried to reach a spiritual and political unity in a common Christian faith, lawyers who were, of course, theologians, admitted no such thing as neutrality. Wars were either just or unjust, and no Christian nation could look on while the Christian nations were unjustly attacked. Neutrality was born because this Christian unity of the west never actually materialized. Shattered from within by the Reformation and from without by the discovery of America, the unity of Europe gave way to separate sovereignties; and the notion of just war disappeared from practical politics since there were no criteria of what was just, acceptable to all, and no authority to define and uphold it. The legal concept of neutrality became then indispensable, and this was one of the notions on which Grotius had to work in defining his laws of war.

From this point of view, therefore, neutrality is the *form* of life which nations adopt by agreement during conflicts over which *in their opinion* they are not concerned. It matters little that in actual fact, despite what they themselves think, their interests may be at stake. We are in the realm of *form*. In this realm, neutrality means that there is room for differing as to the pros and

cons of a particular war, and that there is no agency to decide the issue other than the nation concerned.

It does not appear that this aspect of neutrality is under any danger except in one or other of two sets of circumstances: the rise of a power or powers which would wield enough brute force to brush aside such a concept from the field of international *positive* laws or, at any rate, behaviour; or the constitution of a world State strong and stable enough to enact laws defining afresh the concept of *just war*.

(2) *The political 'flesh' of Neutrality.*

This flesh or substance of neutrality is made up of the tissue of living circumstances which give bulk and inertia to every nation. While the legal rind is the same for all, this bulky substance differs from nation to nation. Legally speaking there is such a thing as neutrality. Politically speaking, there is no neutrality: there are only neutrals. Neutral A differs *in toto* from neutral B. Bring to mind the neutrals of the last war: Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Eire and Argentina: no two of them can be compared as to the origin, causes, colour, evolution, feeling or any other attributes of their neutrality. A country may be neutral because it is too far from the conflict to feel any interest in it; or too near to expose itself to its 'splashes'; because it is too powerful to care what happens, or too weak to resist pressure; because it is too indifferent about what is at stake, or too hotly concerned in it and in ways which split its public opinion; too ignorant on the issues or too much doped by propaganda to feel confident about what it knows.

Countries, moreover, are not mobile like persons; they cannot group and regroup at will, like a platoon of soldiers, as need or opportunity require; they are stuck to earth, rooted to their allotted plots like trees, and therefore organically dependent on their situation in a

manner which overrules all other considerations. Arteries known as railways and roads, sinews known as commercial and economic ties, nerves known as telephones and telegraphs bind them together in ways grown with time, queer, odd, strange, annoying to our sense of order or of justice, grown gouty and rheumatic, aching limbs and articulations perhaps, yet living and resisting any movement which ignores them with an all but animal force.

These are the passive forces which even the League found in its way when Article 16 of the Covenant (popularly though inaccurately known as 'Sanctions') was applied to Italy. Switzerland, no country to be suspected of sympathy for fascism, found it impossible to sacrifice her neutrality to this clear case of common action against an aggressor State; because the corner stone of the Franco-German building which is Switzerland is the one Italian Canton it contains; and feelings are deeper than ideas. No one in his senses could have expected Denmark to have broken her neutrality against Germany, even if convinced of the righteousness of Germany's enemies. And similar examples might be found elsewhere.

Those who talk glibly about the death of neutrality forget therefore this biological weight and inertia of the several bodies politic of the nations concerned. A strange argument — it may seem at first — to be put forward by those who claim that the body politic of the world-community is a biological reality, which has absorbed those of the several nations. But the inconsistency is only apparent. The resistance in many nations to break their neutrality is biologically sound under either of the two political philosophies. If we maintain the separate and independent existence of national entities, there is no reason why a neutral should cease to be a neutral unless *in its own eyes it is in its own interest to fight.* This was the political philosophy upon which all the States entered the war against Germany — chief of them the United

States. If, on the other hand, the world-community is a biological unit, then it must be governed as one, and wars between its several members should be made impossible by driving out all causes of strife. Sanctions and punitive wars can hardly be considered remedies, any more than punching one's own face can be considered a remedy for a fit of neuralgia.

This is the point overlooked by all Covenant draftsmen who lay stress on the repression of aggression. *All plans for the repression of aggression are doomed to fail*, for all will be suspected of being camouflaged alliances to prevent some nations from conquering what other nations have got. Or, in other words, in all plans for the repression of aggression there always remains enough power politics to render licit the attitude of third nations who refuse to co-operate when it comes to blows, since they were admitted to scanty, if any, co-operation, while the going was good.

(3) *The spiritual core of Neutrality.*

This ultimate resistance to yield to the allurements of belligerency comes from a spiritual core which is in fact the very essence of the national being, that thread of 'perseverance in her being' which runs through the beads of centuries and events in the history of a nation. Two brothers may love each other, be good friends, help each other in their needs — yet each will have his destiny, and an instinct will tell each that this destiny is his and not the other's. So with the nations. Every one of them has the sense of her own destiny, and this sense cannot yield, no matter how much outer yielding the pressure of stronger nations, or other circumstances may induce in her. This last fortress of inner neutrality, like all living things, can never die. It can only integrate itself into a wider life. Scotland and England can no longer be mutually neutral to any event in which the destiny of the

other nation is concerned. Eire can be neutral towards both.

Unless a new higher and wider destiny absorbs the separate national destinies, spiritual neutrality cannot die.

So, to sum up: the legal rind of neutrality may be peeled off; its political and economic flesh may be bruised. But its spiritual core will resist all changes and pressures and can only die with war itself.

III. NEUTRALITY SHOULD DIE

While wars last, certainly not. Neutrals are most useful in war. They can and do undertake to carry on that modicum of intercourse which even among enemies has to be maintained. Moreover, however justified the war may be on one side, all wars carry with them enough deadweight of power-politics and injustice to make a detached view valuable for mankind in general, and even for both sides to the war, for the one who is nearly right as well as for the one who is almost quite wrong.

Neutrality, however, should certainly die, in this other sense that such conditions should be brought about by the nations of the earth that no major event can happen which any one of them feels outside its interests. Or, in other words, a world commonwealth should be set up aware enough of its own existence, and governed with enough clearness and wisdom, to make both wars and neutrality obsolete — as is the case between England and Scotland, between Norway and Denmark or between Burgundy and France.

IV. NEUTRALITY CAN DIE

Certainly not of an indigestion of paper. Covenant-writers, pact-writers, charter-writers may give their pens

a holiday. Covenants make no commonwealths just as articles of faith make no religions. When we say that what is wanted is a commonwealth we mean that what is wanted is faith in, awareness of, a commonwealth. It is clear that the world of men is ready for such a revelation. It is ready to believe in it. But the revelation must be made. The word must be uttered.

It must be clear, simple and straightforward. It must not be blurred by reservations, hedged in by limits, curtailed by exceptions. It must be an act of faith and a promise of fulfilment. It should simply say: 'We believe in the oneness of the world commonwealth and intend to live up to our belief.'

This statement would kill neither neutrality nor war. But it would set the world on the road towards a phase of civilization in which both wars and neutrality would become rarer and rarer. How quick would progress along that road be? That depends entirely on the quality of the deeds which would follow on the part of the big powers. Deeds of national egoism, imperialism or acquisitiveness would kill their declaration of faith. Deeds of constructive world-statesmanship would root it firmly and make it flourish.

SECTION II

THREE-ORDER OR FREE ORDER?

CHAPTER I

THE CHIEF PROBLEM—GERMANY

This problem of Germany has dominated the war and cast its shadow over the post-war period as well. But the war itself has transformed it. In material resources, in population, in spirit, and even in political outlook, Germany emerges broken from the conflict. One element alone remains to keep alive our misgivings. But this element is formidable. It lies hidden in the recesses of the heart. We may best describe it as the human element.

What is the meaning of this fact: Germany-in-Europe; and how can a defeated Germany still influence European life? The essential point is that in the centre of the Continent there is a people of between sixty and seventy millions at least, endowed with a truly formidable combination of characteristics:

1. Outstanding mental powers, which put Germany in the forefront with regard to a number of sciences, arts and above all techniques.

2. Outstanding application and reliability which enable her to apply this talent to civilization and industry.

3. A gregarious spirit which makes Germans helpless, if not willing, slaves before tyranny.

4. A sense of obedience unqualified by any individual criticism or conscience, which makes them, if need be, willing executors of infamous orders.

5. A national arrogance and egoism which know no respect for other nations.

6. A strong tendency to resentment and brooding over their own sufferings which makes them bad losers and seekers of revenge.

7. An utter lack of political sense which prevents them both from organizing their own country and from leading Europe as a political unit.

The list might be continued; but as it is, it is bad enough. There are people who believe that a change in her internal economy might be sufficient to alter the political attitude of the country. In so far as this attitude is based on the national character, such a view is untenable; and so one falls back on the conclusion that it is the German people as a whole who are at fault.

But before drawing any consequences and policies from this conclusion, it is necessary to define that 'fault' of the German people. This is important not merely for the sake of Germany but for that of her adversaries themselves. Their tasks are as vast as they are important for the future. They demand truth, clarity and sincerity. The Allies cannot act efficiently if they do not know what they are doing; and in order to know what they are doing they must know themselves, in particular their own past, and a not very remote past at that.

We may attempt a description and an appraisal of the German guilt by reviewing the series of accusations which can be levelled against her.

1. *Imperialism.* Germany is imperialist. Come late to the banquet, she found other powers had occupied the best seats. She claimed hers unmannerly. For those of us who believe imperialism a dangerously obsolete form of world-life, this stamps Germany as a reactionary, backward country; and so we consider her.

But the great powers, whose policy includes a perceptible, and in some cases, a glaring element of imperialism, have little ground for complaining. Until about 1914,

power politics aiming at national aggrandizement was the sole rule of policy for all nations, great or small; and it still is the chief consideration for all of them. As an imperialist nation, therefore, Germany was no worse in substance, though she was much worse in form, than most of the other nations of the world — great as well as small.

2. *Racial arrogance.* Germany plunged Europe into this dreadful war because the *Herrenvolk* considered that they should have more *Lebensraum* at the expense of 'lesser breeds without the law'. But this quotation, which came home of its own to roost in this sentence on racial arrogance, is not from a German; it is from a British — and how British — poet. Could it then be that, in this at any rate, the Germans were merely behind the times, and no worse?

Here is what the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* wrote in 1875 (9th edition, p. 716) under 'America'. After some figures purporting to provide the trend of vital statistics, the article said:

> It hence appears that, supposing both races to have free space for expansion, the Anglo-Saxon population in 220 years from the present time (1875) will amount to 2,816 millions, while the Spanish-Indian population will only have multiplied to 200 millions, or *one-fourteenth* part of the other. It will be shown by and by, on probable grounds, that the new continent, if fully peopled, could support 3,600 millions, and there would consequently be room enough for both; but long before this density is attained the two races will inevitably come into collision.
>
> In the new settlements, where the best lands are invariably first occupied and the inferior neglected, the population is always thinly diffused. The Anglo-Saxons will therefore crowd to the richer fields of the South, while millions of acres of their own poorer lands are still untenanted; for we may rest assured that before cultivation is extended to the third-rate soils of the north side of the boundary, means

will be found to appropriate the first-rate soils on the south side. These may be acquired by purchase like the lands of Louisiana, or by conquest like those of New Mexico and California, but in one way or another they will be acquired. Supposing the two races to maintain a separate existence, the weaker race will probably be driven, like the Welsh before the English, into the mountainous and inhospitable regions. On the other hand, it is possible, and not improbable, that the smaller population may be absorbed into the mass of the greater, be incorporated with it, and adopt its language. The result, like other things in the womb of time, may be modified by causes yet unseen; but in whatever shape it may present itself, there is little risk in predicting that the Anglo-Saxon race is destined by its superior intelligence and energy to rule the New World from end to end. American statesmen now speak of the whole continent as the heritage of their people.

3. *Militarism.* The word is vague. It may be taken to mean an undue influence of the armed institutions on the home and foreign policy of the country. Germany under the last Hohenzollern was the most blatant example of this. No nation has ever become the willing instrument of an army in the degree in which Germany had; for German policy, following Clausewitz' dictum with a vengeance, became, under the pressure of German militarists, the mere prolongation of the last war into an apparent peace in order to prepare for the next war. This cannot be gainsaid, and, to that extent, we are entitled to level a special reproach of militarism against the German nation.

Yet two points must be borne in mind. The first is that few powers, if any, are exempt from a strong influence of their armed institutions, as an inevitable consequence of their imperialist trend; even though for a number of reasons, they manage to control them better than imperial Germany did. The second is that, under nazi Germany, the trouble was not that the *Wehrmacht*

wielded too much power, but that it did not wield enough. The nazis made one regret the days when Germany was 'only' militarist! This charge, therefore, would appear to merge into graver accusations later to be considered.

4. *Looting and ill-treatment of conquered nations.* This is the specific crime of the Germans; one in which they have far surpassed anything known to history. There are some aspects of it, however, in which the Germans differ only from other nations in a matter of degree, and possibly also in the phase of evolution of their behaviour.

Looting is a case in point. In 1762 the British took Havana 'with fourteen of the line, thirty merchantmen loaded for Europe, three million dollars of the King of Spain, beside immense private treasures'. Albermarle and Pocock, the commanders, made each £122,697 out of this bag, much of which was private wealth.[1] In 1758, the British took Cherbourg. 'Bligh entirely failed to control his men, who treated the civil population with infamous brutality'.[2] During the Peninsular War, Badajoz, San Sebastián and many towns and villages in the south-west were the victims of unspeakable horrors committed by the English soldiery, though England was the ally of Spain.[3] And we have all seen in our lifetime the Allied European Armies shamelessly loot the Imperial Palace of Pekin during the Boxer War.

For the sake of truth, and in the interest of the heavy task in hand, the victorious nations should therefore severely scrutinize their own records before deciding on their line of policy. Even in the case of the most unmistakably German guilt, that of the infamous tortures they have inflicted on so many victims, Americans should

[1] BRIAN TUNSTALL, *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham.* London, 1938, p. 210.
[2] Ibid., p. 322.
[3] See GORDON: *The Journey of a Cavalry Officer in the Corunna Campaign.*

read a candid history of their Conquest of the Philippines, Frenchmen the outspoken works of some of their countrymen on the Congo and Indo-China.[1]

5. *Mass-murder as a means to power.* Withal, this certainly is the specific ground on which Germany stands at the dock of mankind. All the other cases differ from hers in two important aspects: quantity and purpose. Quantity, in crime, brings in quality as well. To kill or torture a man is a crime; to kill or torture one thousand or ten thousand is not merely a deed one or ten thousand times more criminal; it is an altogether different and far more terrible crime. For it is always possible to imagine concrete, specific, local circumstances in an isolated crime, which make it a tragic but explicable error; but the torture or execution of quantities of victims argues a permanent aberration in the executioners.

This conclusion is confirmed when along with the number of the victims we observe a deliberate purpose in their persecution. The men who organized the concentration camps were not mere madmen to be handed over to mental specialists: they were men with a calculated purpose. They planned, organized and kept these hells in order to hold Germany by terror, and through Germany, Europe and the world.

True, many of the worst treated victims were Germans. But the responsibility, if not of the German nation in its entirety, of a considerable part of it, seems evident. Millions of nazis and hundreds of thousands of military officers are directly responsible. The *Wehrmacht* and the *Schwerindustrie* who subsidized and backed the nazi party when they knew for certain what was going on, are fully responsible. And the rest of the nation, while perhaps impotent, are responsible for their impotence. The

[1] Such as the *Conquest of the Philippines by the United States*, 1898-1925. By Moorfield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco. Harvard Law School, New York and London, 1926; and for the French the works of Gide and Viollis.

crime of Germany is to have decided *as a nation* to commit, officially and admittedly, such things as the extermination of Poles and Jews, and the mass terrorization of all the peoples she has conquered, including, up to a point, her own people; crimes due to discipline and to purpose, not to passion and indiscipline, crimes committed 'for the profit and good of Germany'.

How are we to meet this situation?

The first condition is to act with reason. Not with justice, because justice cannot be created *ex-nihilo*. Justice presupposes a number of conditions which do not obtain; such as: a commonwealth in the name and interests of which it is administered; and a law, or code of laws, recognized by that commonwealth.

Nothing could be more excusable in the whole history of man than a gigantic vengeance against the German nation; and the chances are that a defeated Germany may suffer much at the hands of her ex-victims,[1] though never enough to balance the evil she has caused. Vengeance, however, may ease off a tension; but it does not provide a lasting political solution.

Reason is wanted. The victors should deal with Germany as a doctor would with a disease.

This has been put with his usual terseness and lucidity by Mr. Winston Churchill, who, speaking in the House of Commons on the Yalta Decisions (February 27th, 1945) said: 'Our policy is not revenge: it is to take such measures as may be necessary to secure the future peace and safety of the world.'

A soft peace? Let us examine the case with the coolness a doctor would. If our examination led to the conclusion that a soft peace was the best solution for securing our aims, we should have to adopt a soft peace. Nothing

[1] Since this was written, events have proved it only too right.

is more obvious than that. But an objective study of the facts leads to the opposite conclusion. To ensure a permanent peace it is imperative to impose a hard peace on the Germans.

This follows from a number of considerations. A reasonable peace must contain two kinds of measures: punitive and preventive.

True we have rejected the idea that the Allies should sit on the case of Germany as judges. But if they examine the matter as doctors, and if they are wise, they will recognize that the balance of emotions in Europe requires punitive measures if only to relieve pent-up feelings which, kept under pressure, might become dangerously destructive.

The mountain of crime the German people have piled upon their shoulders is so overwhelming that, if a scapegoat is not provided, Europe will pile upon her own shoulders a nearly equal mountain of bloody vengeance. The scapegoat is there, self-defined: the nazi party. It must be made to suffer for the sins it made the nation commit, in some form both substantial and symbolical. For example they might be made to wear the nazi uniform as a stigma of shame and allowed to appear in no other clothes; and they should be made to pay in labour for what they have destroyed.

But hard measures will also be necessary in order to prevent a third world war. Were the Germans to be granted by their victors the slightest possibility of recovering their military power, they would unhesitatingly plunge Europe and the world into the horrors of a third war. Indeed German prisoners do not hide that their hopes are already turning that way. The responsibility of the victors is therefore too heavy to allow them to play with fate. The peace must be a hard peace.

The question is: What sort of a hard peace? And how hard?

The answer is not easy. For it depends on the kind of world in which Germany is to live in the future. The evolution of Germany will be determined:

— by her own biological processes;
— by military, economic and in general power-pressure from outside;
— by moral forces emanating from the environment in which she is to live.

Leaving aside for the present the biological processes, it is plain that the terms to be imposed on Germany and success in ensuring permanent peace will depend:

— on the stability of the alliance between the victors;
— on the moral authority of this alliance;
— on the chief trends prevailing in the world in matters of power and principle.

What are the prospects for Europe and for the world? Before answering these two questions as they present themselves to-day it may be useful to put on record the form they took in 1942 and 1943. We therefore devote the two following chapters to the study, respectively, of Europe and of the world order to come, as they seemed still within the realm of possibility barely three years and four years ago.

CHAPTER II

FIAT EUROPA

THOSE who turn their minds to planning for the world after the war, seem at times to imagine that world as a kind of life after death. Our power to shape and determine that life-after-the-war is thereby exaggerated. Monstrous as the thought may seem to us, the passing out of nazidom, the ignominious defeat that awaits it, will entail no deeper changes in the historical flow of Europe, than say, a change in the geological structure of its bed entails in the flow of a river. Let us then, by all means, prepare for whatever activities we may think necessary to canalize the flow of Europe's history and to make it less agitated and more fertile; but let us be modest as to our power for radically altering its course.

Rather than endeavour to force our views on Europe, let us understand her own workings. Much of what is now happening may be explained as a process whereby Europe is endeavouring to create herself. Even nazism and Hitler can be understood as dark forces which Europe called forth out of the depths to work in darkness what the League of Nations had failed to create in the light of reason. This war is a world event and cannot be explained in merely European terms; but in so far as it is European, it is one of the birth-pangs of the European nation.

Some light may be shed on this process by recalling the birth of the great western nations of Europe. England, France and Spain were born out of congeries of feudal estates or lordships living in mutual independence, in rivalry and even in warfare. The process which gradually made these petty sovereignties melt into the one sovereignty of the King and country may be described as the

development of a pattern of social life which cut across feudal divisions and gradually deprived them of any meaning. This new pattern grew under the impulse of three new forces: economic solidarity; cultural consciousness; danger from outside.

Economic solidarity was an organic growth which demanded its blood-vessels, the roads, and its metabolism-exchanges. The network of roads which it fostered cut across feudal estates and paid little or no attention to them. The nation-to-be went on growing its veins and arteries for the centuries to come while dukes and earls fought their chivalrous battles or gouged each other's eyes out. One of these feudal lords gradually acquired more powers than the others; he made his court stabler and gathered round him a greater number of scribes, who kept his records and were therefore in a position to decide on points of custom. This lord became the King and his court the Court. The Latin of his scribes became the law of the land and his own vernacular the language which everyone tried to imitate. Thus, economic solidarity coming from the limbs met cultural solidarity coming from the head, and the two forces worked in biological alliance against the obsolescent pattern of the feudal lords.

Finally, the danger of foreign attack came to impart a sense of urgency to the process. While economic solidarity had developed the arterial system, and the King and Court had developed the brain and heart, the foreign danger developed the skin and the nerves of the nation, and her sensitiveness to outside challenges. The nation was now of age.

A similar, though by no means an identical, process had been going on in Europe in our time. On a first approximation, the several national States stood for the feudal estates of old; the unifying trends symbolized by Geneva,

the Pan-European Movement and so forth, for the King's Court; and modern, total, devastating war, stands for the foreign danger. But the parallelism must be carefully handled.

At first sight, it would appear to justify those rough and ready minds who would do away with small nations, as if small nations could be struck off the face of the earth by a stroke of the pen. The problem is more complex than that. This is one of the aspects of our collective life which call for modesty as to our powers to alter the course of nature. Nations, big or small, are facts of nature, and it is not in our power to destroy them. When the ruthless methods of the systematic nazi to uproot the nations that stand in his way by destroying their intellectual classes and removing their peasantry to far-off lands were bound to fail, how could the blander methods of the diplomatist succeed? And in any case, even if it were possible, why destroy? Moreover, what is a small nation? The answer is not easy. Do we go by millions of men? Then, Great Britain does not count as a great nation by the side of China. Do we go by industrial enterprise and power? Then we deliberately enter into a new iron age. We must learn to appreciate the cultural value of small nations, the local environment through which universal culture reaches the consciousness of most men in the only way in which they can assimilate it.

In so far as they possess this value as repositories of human culture, with a functional utility of their own, nations, great or small, have a staying power which feudal lordships lacked, and it may be anticipated that they will survive in the new pattern which economic solidarity, European awareness and the danger of war are developing in Europe. Mankind never discards useful limbs or tools. But the new pattern will claim its rights. And the first symptoms of this historical phase are bound to take the form of strife. There is a clear case

on record. Albert Thomas, one of the great Europeans of the twentieth century, had conceived a plan of European public works, two important items of which were the building of a European network of roads and the setting up of a European 'grid' for the production and distribution of electric power. This was the true way to peace. Why did Albert Thomas' plan fail? Because there were nations in Europe which feared the military effects of the plan on their national security: easier access to their territories by those roads; dependence on foreign sources of power through that grid. The incident was what we might call a twilight episode. It was seen under the light of the new era and also under the shadows of the old. Albert Thomas was already a European but the spirit of Europe was still too weak in several important European nations.

This episode illustrates the difficulties which lie across our path. The chief of them are two: the weakness of the cultural centre of Europe and the internal nature of the danger of war.

The process which had led to the creation of England, France and Spain had been fostered by the radiating power of a central court of authority, learning, tradition and good manners. The chief vehicle for this radiation had been the language. The King's English (as it is still called in England, in characteristic confirmation of all that precedes) the French of the Isle-de-France and Castillian were the harbingers of unity in England, France and Spain. This feature of the process does not tally with that which is now shaping Europe. Not at any rate in our day. In the period between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, however, Europe had a language of authority, learning and tradition: Latin. Europe was then very much aware of herself, owing mostly to this prevalence of the Latin language throughout her territory. When Latin lost its European status —

perhaps the most grievous, though indirect, consequence of the Reformation — Europe lost her sense of unity, that part of it, at any rate, which comes from unity of language. But Europe had to be, and the sense of European unity had to assert itself across the language frontier as well as across any other frontier. In this way, the process of European unity may be best compared with that of the unity of nations such as Switzerland, which has four language groups, or Belgium, which has two, or France and Spain, which have at least three. Switzerland is the most successful of all and points the way. A nation built over several language frontiers and which, despite them, maintains her unity for reasons grounded on common sense and historical tradition is more in harmony with the spirit of intelligent progress than the naive and unintelligent nationalism which, like certain forms of extremist Flamingant, Catalan or Basque separatism, claim to constitute separate nationhoods on the mere basis of language, a medieval hankering out of touch with the century of aviation.

The second chief difficulty on the path of European unity is that this time the danger of war does not come from abroad but from within. The enemy of Europe is inside Europe. The enemy of Europe is Germany. And we might just as well be clear from the outset as to the position. Let us not dream. If Germany does not become European-minded, Europe is doomed to a series of suicidal wars. The crime of Germany is not that she seeks a European unity of sorts. Far from it. If she actually seeks it, which is doubtful, this would be her saving grace. The crime of Germany is that she seeks a German tyranny over Europe. And it might well be that her endeavour to reduce Europe to a unity is due to her feeling that it would be easier to chain one slave than twenty. The most disquieting thought about the

situation is that, leaving aside the flag of European unity which the nazis have flown over their ship, the goods which the ship conveys are exactly the same which she carried under the flag of the Junkers, the Prussian Emperor and the ninety intellectuals of the notorious manifesto: annexation of this and that and the rest, German might and no regard for others.

Prudence therefore advises not to underestimate the dangers which the spirit of domination and tyranny lurking in Germany has in store for Europe, and to guard against these dangers with circumspection and foresight. The European appeal which the nazis advertised was in part sheer camouflage. But only in part. The spirit of unity is in the air of our epoch. The nazi tried to turn it to his own purposes. But he was caught, up to a point, in his own words. The spirit of the age, made use of by the nazi, made use of the nazi as well. It turned to some good purpose a movement of evil, so that even after nazidom has been lived down by Europe as a nightmare, the spirit of unity which it has contributed to foster may remain, if only as a feeling of solidarity against the recurrence of such a thing as nazidom. Though the nazi wanted European unity the better to enslave Europe, he had to work for it as such.

But in order to guard against yet another attack of the German danger, mere dreams of the subjection of Germany will avail nothing. Force while Germany is still the defeated country and Europe is convalescent will no doubt be required; but this period of respite and reconstruction is bound to be short. If the powers that be during it do not act wisely enough to alter the core of Germany during the short time History will grant them for the purpose, Europe will have lost the peace.

A thorough-going transformation of Germany's social structure is necessary. The type of human being which is the core of German power is not the nazi but the

professional army officer. This human type must be uprooted from Europe. It is useless to imagine that such a thing can be done without serious foreign interference in the internal life of the German nation. Left to her own resources, Germany will not be able to evolve a different spirit. The evolution must be actively fostered by non-German forces penetrating into the utmost recesses of her body politic.

The moral authority for such an interference could come from no outside nation. It could come only from a commonwealth which, including Germany, and working for the good of Germany as well as for its own good, could not therefore be looked upon by Germany as altogether foreign. Admittedly, the nazi-corrupted Germans and the Junkers and the militarists would hate and despise such a commonwealth; but we must not think of them: we must think of the German-to-be, and it is the esteem and assent of the Germans-to-be which our post-war activities should aim at conquering. Admittedly also, we might fail and in the end the task of turning Germans into good Europeans might prove impossible. But our answer to that is that, if such were the case, we should at least have no responsibility for the catastrophe which would result; and that, in any case, no other policy makes sense.

The third set of activities has already emerged during our examination of the two first. We must create a European commonwealth. The respite, the second great armistice which we must endeavour to transform into a permanent peace, must be imbued with a strong European sense. Nothing short of a European standard must be allowed to move in Europe after the war. In the name of Europe we can hold Germany by force while our force lasts and raise her to a better self so that she does not again challenge the peace and unity of Europe. Anything short of a European standard is bound to

stimulate the beast of prey in the depths of the German soul. But to these negative reasons must be added positive reasons of no lesser weight. The two crises of 1914-18 and 1939-45 are birth pangs of Europe. We must see to it that this time Europe is born.

What is wanted is mostly a matter of attitude. Committees, leagues, unions, federal or otherwise, will avail nothing if the spirit is not there. What is needed is the habit of thinking and feeling in European terms. But good statesmanship could foster this habit by concrete exercises, very much as one learns a foreign language. A European Board, for instance, might be set up even now to deal with European problems in a European way. The chief objection which has been raised against this idea is that such a Board might lead to friction between the several European Governments now united for war, as to their respective rights, frontiers and so forth. That shows that the old spirit dies hard. The Board should deal with no national problems. It should deal with no 'inter-national' problems either, for there is 'national' in 'international'. The board should contemplate Europe and nothing but Europe. It should examine a number of European problems of a concrete nature, such as roads, railways, air transportation, rivers and canals, physical and moral health and others, *as if frontiers did not exist*, and only from the standpoint of a nation called Europe. This study would lead to a body of European facts and desiderata which would act as a mass and a force to counteract the dispersive masses and forces of the several European nations.

To sum up: Europe cannot be saved unless it be born, and it cannot be born unless we act as if it were already alive.

CHAPTER III

A MINIMUM PROGRAMME FOR A FREE ORDER

I. WHY AN ORDER?

THE need for an order must be there, for 'order' is the open sesame of this century, just as 'liberty' was that of the nineteenth. And as things flow from things, and life from life, it might be wise to seek the cause of our thirst for order in that very thirst for liberty which lit the eyes of our forefathers with a feverish fire. Why did our romantic .ancestors, why did Payne and Jefferson, Bolívar and Diderot dream of liberty? Because they lived under the sway of a decrepit order in which the persons and institutions which incarnated authority had outlived the spirit and the faith which in earlier days had created and fostered them.

Western civilization had been sustained and developed by a Christian political philosophy, a more or less empirical synthesis of the political traditions of the Roman Empire and of the theological disquisitions of the Fathers of the Church. The chief exponent of this synthesis was perhaps St. Thomas Aquinas. It taught that the Christian State was the temporal image of the Church, a *body politic* whose head was the monarch. Kings were the ministers of God on earth, and under them, the positions of power in the State were to be understood as trusteeships. Authority was everywhere identified with service. A spiritual hierarchy of priests, bishops, archbishops and Pope, deeply rooted throughout the general body politic of Christendom, ensured unity amongst the nations and maintained an independent, strictly moral authority, ever watchful and critical of the acts of the temporal power.

It would be difficult to devise a better system of government than this. Its failure was due to two orders of causes: one historical, the other spiritual. Historically, the unity of the faith which inspired it was broken both from within by the Reformation and from without by the discovery of America and the exploration of Asia. Spiritually, man is unable to keep any system of government or any way of life uncorrupted for long. Everything rises, reaches its full vigour and decays. The system was rotten when Columbus burst its crust and Luther made its core explode.

But nature is so made that the forms it creates linger long after the substances for which they had been evolved have ceased to exist. Think only how long it took for the automobile to evolve its real form out of the forms it had inherited from its ancestor the horse carriage. It may even be doubted whether this evolution is complete. The bonnet of even the newest cars is bigger and longer than technical requirements warrant, probably in order to satisfy a queer fossil feeling in us which misses the horses. Notice too that for a long time the driver was seated high as if he had to control the horses with rein and whip and as if his seat had to leave room for two enormous wheels underneath. Forms in collective life outlive their purpose even longer than in machinery. It is easy to smile at the wigs of the English Law Courts. There are many less obvious wigs in every land, visible only for the wary eye. Our romantic ancestors did away with the wigs people wore over their hair. They were less successful with those people wore under their hair. It is hard to unwig our brains.

Fashion is as capricious and unaccountable as a society lady; but its protean faculties seldom hit the core of truth with a straighter hit than when it created the wig. The eighteenth century was the century of artificial institutions. Kings were philosophers or en-

joyers of life; priests were society lions and revolutionists. The monarchy did not reign. The Church did not pray. The nobility served no purpose and were not noble. The rich were frivolous drones. Authority, emptied of its moral value, purpose and utility, was but oppression. The order of the past was but an empty shell which weighed heavily on the life of the day and prevented it from growing.

All this explains the stress which the nineteenth century put on liberty. It was necessary to get rid of the empty forms of a dead order. It was necessary to bury the dead. The process lasted a century. But the impetus towards liberty which the nineteenth century inherited from the eighteenth led our forefathers to overstate their case. Liberty was cherished to the bitter end. Freedom from the wrong and obsolete institutions of a dried-up past was often misunderstood as freedom from all institutions whatsoever. In one word, liberty led to anarchy.

This was particularly so in two fields of collective life: industrial affairs and international relations. In the first, liberalism obtained legal recognition for free competition and later for free association of workers and consequently of employers. (This, of course, foreshortens the process.) The result was free dog fights between workers and employers on the back of the nation. In later centuries, this our period when any Judge Gary or J. Lewis is legally permitted to, and feels morally justified, in holding up the nation's life because of some dispute which three reasonable men with adequate files at their elbows could solve in half an hour, will seem one of the most barbarous of history. The arts of collective life with us lag centuries behind the arts of individual life. To-day, however, few men dare breathe a word against the sacrosanct right to strike and lock-out, though this so-called right is nothing but an anarchical caricature of liberty.

In international relations, the spiritual unity of Christendom had given place to complete anarchy. The doctrine that a nation can do as it pleases, indeed that anything is justified when done in the national interest, held sway over what, in the circumstances, it was strange still to describe as Christendom. This doctrine became known as that of national sovereignty. It transformed the world into a den of collective brigands, and when all the property available had been grabbed, the situation inevitably led to dog fights between the brigands themselves.

Human beings are what they are and most of them contain a certain percentage of fighter and even of brigand. So that this situation might have been accepted as, on the whole, not too bad, but for one circumstance: the progress of science put weapons of such frightful power in the hands of the big nations that it has become impossible to localize wars, and wars have become too destructive to be lightly accepted by mankind. The aeroplane has killed national sovereignty.

The wheel has turned full circle. Our forefathers sought liberty because the old order had died and their obsolete institutions oppressed them; we seek order because our old liberty has run riot and degenerated into anarchy, so that if we do not set up new institutions we are doomed to die in chaos.

The first aim of our new peace must therefore be ORDER.

II. WHY FREE?

This first of our aims, order, is not without its dangers, for after all, it is also the first war aim of our enemies. The recognition by both sides of the priority of order over all other aims is a signal proof of the importance of order in our modern world. But the nazis and fascists are not capable even of understanding what order is,

let alone of creating it. They use the word as a slogan. For them order is something like the dairyman's idea of shape: the modelling of a passive mass by repeated beatings. For us it must be like the idea of form for a sculptor, a creation from within. It must be a real word, the wing of an idea. Every man and woman in the free world should have as clear an idea as possible of what the order we have in view means.

That is why not a little uneasiness is justified on hearing or reading the words 'new order' used by the free world. New order is the nazi slogan. 'New' does not mean anything in this context. It does not qualify the order to be stablished except negatively. It means that the nazi-fascist order will not be the order which prevailed before the war. But in our opinion there was no such order, but only anarchy and disorder. The nazi-fascists are not really thinking of building up a new world; they are merely revealing their intention to destroy the old. What they seek to destroy is not merely anarchy but liberty as well.

We, on the other hand, while convinced that anarchy must go, are determined to preserve liberty, indeed to set liberty freer than it ever was. This point should be strongly emphasized in all our statements on war aims. It is two-edged: *against* anarchy; *for* liberty. But since the word order is strong enough and clear enough to signify our first purpose — against anarchy — we should qualify it with another word which would express our second purpose in no less clear terms. That is why the motto of our struggle should be FREE ORDER.

III. WHY A PROGRAMME?

The need of a programme flows from the very fact that our aim is to create an order. How could we create an order if we do not define it beforehand? It follows that the first item in our programme must be a general

agreement on the free order we are striving to create. Unless we are agreed as to our aims our union can be but precarious. We may sing: 'We are united' till Doomsday, but if we are not united in our aim we shall certainly not be united in our impulse and driving power. During the war, the double end: defence against a common danger and destruction of the power of the adversary, suffices to keep a minimum of unity. Yet it is doubtful whether these merely negative purposes can instil enough enthusiasm into the struggling nations to carry them through sacrifice to victory; and it might well be that differences as to the order to set up after victory might even now be having a more serious effect on the war than more glaring weaknesses in the strategic machinery.

In any case, a unity of purpose will be required after the enemy has been removed from the path of progress, and this field, though ploughed by many volunteers, each pursuing his lonely furrow, has not yet yielded a collective and official harvest of any substance — be it said with all respect for the Atlantic Charter. What is needed is not so much a more or less loosely, yet guardedly, drafted statement of political purposes and methods as a few concise and clear articles of faith.

Our problem is to rebuild the Commonwealth which once was Christendom, but of course on a wider pattern. Nothing short of this will ensure peace for a few generations ahead of us. The first thing to strive for is therefore a central idea, conviction, belief, acceptable to all; the stone upon which our new Republic of Men and Nations is to be built.

At this point many admirable men and women in this field of world affairs point to the Cross. There, they say, is the solution. We have already shown why this is too ambitious. We are trying to build a world commonwealth in an era in which religious faith must be, so to

speak, filtered through and by the delicate tissue of thought. In our search for a basic conviction for our time, we cannot afford to rise as high as Calvary because in our commonwealth we must admit men and nations of all types, some of whom would not follow us in our ascent, either for lack of spiritual power or because they worship on other heights. Christians, however, may remember that it was Christ Himself who spoke of the many mansions there are in the house of His Father. This at any rate must be granted those who would found the world commonwealth on Christian principles and beliefs: that the basic conviction of our Free Order must fit Christianity as to the manner born if it is to possess a value of its own and to exert any influence on the millions who compose the Christian world. But it must also fit the other chief religions of civilized mankind, as well as the growing number of men who either deny all supernatural and divine meaning to the world or seek it by themselves unaided and alone.

The basic conviction of our free order must therefore be not a religion but a philosophy of collective life. It must not seek to appeal only to our religious emotions, but also to our reason and common sense. It is usual at this stage for religious persons to argue that a mere idea without religious roots will never raise men to that level of sublime unreason which we call sacrifice. This matter should not be discussed by itself, as a psychological problem, but in the context in which it occurs. There are three answers to those who at this stage again would replace the problem on the religious, instead of the rational, plane. The first is that we have admitted that our basic conviction, though in general appealing to our reason, must fit all the chief religions; therefore, nothing prevents these religions from presenting it to their faithful as an article of their faith. As for the vast world of agnostics, it is idle to complain that they are

not offered a religious belief, since they are not ready to accept it. The second answer is that we are not merely advocating that a particular idea should be imparted, but that a conviction should be driven into people's minds, so that they should come to act upon it as one acts nowadays upon many a conviction without any other backing but that of common sense. A man will pay a considerable sum a year to ensure a pension for his family after his death. There is no evidence to show that agnostics or atheists insure their lives less than churchgoers. And this leads to the third answer. We are trying to define the basic condition for a free order, and for the purpose feel no need for any sublime unreason and sacrifice. But even if we did, again there is no evidence to show that free minds struggling to find the star of divinity in the enigmatic skies, or indeed humbler men who live without any particular curiosity for religious matters at all, are less capable of abnegation, courage and sacrifice than religious souls. The essential unity of mankind need not be expressed in words, formulated in dogmas or sublimated into beliefs to act direct through the individual will and show itself in love, charity and self-denial. A conviction well grounded in common sense, assimilated by education and fostered by collective culture can be as strong a motive of high behaviour as a faith, and in some cases it may be a more intelligent one.

As to what this conviction should be, enough has been said already to anticipate that it must be both simple and old. It cannot be a new discovery. It can only be a new statement of an old but neglected truth. This truth is no other than the biological and spiritual unity of mankind considered as one collective being whose home is the earth. The only historical and rational conclusion to be drawn from the virtual shrinking of the earth brought about by scientific progress is that this unity of

mankind has now to be translated into technical, administrative and political terms. Scientific progress has created the world community; political progress must create the world commonwealth.

The appeal to reason is obvious. All communities must be governed as such. The world of men has become one single community. It must therefore be governed as one community, i.e. it must become a world commonwealth. Everyone of the events which are shaking the earth around us comes to confirm this idea. National sovereignty has vanished, not only for small nations but for big powers as well. And through the smoke and noise of battle, what both sides are offering their multitudes is a World Order.

The idea appeals to common sense because it appeals to our wider and more enlightened selfishness. We need not ask men and nations to sacrifice themselves for an intangible ideal beyond and above their daily mood; all we need is to point out to them that unless they behave like healthy limbs and cells of a world-wide and of a national whole, the evil they will thereby cause will recoil on them.

Finally, the possibility of raising this conviction to the higher level of a faith remains intact. All civilized religions accept the unity of men and several of them, including Christianity, symbolize it in the fraternity of all men as the children of God.

The first item in our programme might therefore be an explicit declaration made by all the united nations recognizing the doctrine that men and nations are the limbs of the living body politic of the world community, so that our free order should rest on the idea of an intelligently governed world commonwealth and should aim at realizing it. This explicit recognition is the more necessary as, outside national sovereignty, there remains nothing on which to found policy. National sovereignty

was a disastrously bad basis for policy, but it was a basis. It led to power politics — and war. That gone, what remains? The Soviet Union spread to the whole universe, a solution which, as we shall see anon, will not do; and the old League, i.e. the co-operative union of national sovereignties, which of course will not work, for no amount of zeros will ever make a unit. What else?

'United nations' is good. It will serve its purpose: to tickle the ear of the citizens of the United States and to carry the more sluggish of them on the way they will have to go. But though excellent for war-time, it does not go far enough for after the war. It remains *plural*. Yes, I know that the United States *has* set into a singular. But in *her* case the human raw materials were infinitely simpler; and moreover we want to get away from that word 'nations' and give it a well-deserved holiday. We must seek an all-in word such as the world commonwealth, the members of which are not merely nations but individuals as well.[1]

IV. WHY MINIMUM?

There are a number of reasons for this. The first is that we cannot dictate to mankind. The river of history is too mighty to be dammed or even canalized. Modesty is the word. Not only are we well nigh powerless to act on events, not only do we know next to nothing about what is going to happen, but we know precious little about what should be done. Dogmatism should be avoided. Nature seldom follows one single law or principle, and this by the way suffices to condemn all closed philosophies of collective life such as communism. Everything in life is bi-polar. Forces outwardly antagonistic are often inwardly in collaboration and preserve the balance of things. Communism (a tendency which fits in with 'order') is only creative when conjugated

[1] See Appendix, p. 294.

with liberalism (a tendency which stands for 'free'). Therefore our own basic conviction itself must share men's hearts with its opposite: the belief in the final value of individual man. Life can reconcile ideas which logic declares incompatible. Were we to surrender man's final rights as an individual to the over-ruling claim of the State, we would fall into fascist philosophy. But we do not surrender it. And that is why we insist on that *free* which qualifies our *order*. The citizen must serve the State, but the service he gives the State must be free.

Moreover, we believe that the State can only justify itself in so far as it provides security of life and tradition of culture for the individual. Of States can it also be said: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' And the fruits of the State are the men and women it fosters. The complete, two-sided principle would therefore be: *the citizens must serve the State; the State must serve men.* At a higher stage, the principle still holds good: *the States must serve the world commonwealth; the world commonwealth must serve the nations.*

Provided these general principles and ideas are explicitly recognized, no further details should be insisted upon, for (and this is yet another reason why our programme should be reduced to a minimum) mankind is apt to vary considerably with climate, race and history, and what is food for one may be poison for another. Too much has been made in the past of uniformity, of machinery and even of policy. Some of us attach much value to institutions such as the League of Nations or the International Labour Office. Yet it must be roundly declared that such institutions will be worse than useless if they are made to turn idly for lack of principles and beliefs, while principles and beliefs, if of the right kind, might work wonders even without institutions.

This stated, the limit of detail down to which it is desirable to go in defining the programme of our free order is a matter for argument. Some say that the world community is not interested in the internal regime of States; others that it is. The first view is untenable. Had the League made Mussolini keep quiet when, shortly after he seized power, he began to talk through his helmet, we should not be at war now. The second view however must be carefully defined. It is obvious that nothing but mistakes and irritation can come from the intervention of foreign bodies in any land. The principle therefore must be freedom for the nation (as for the individual) save when collective principles or interests of a fundamental kind are at stake. The world community must intervene in particular when the nation threatens the individual or when it threatens the world community in their respective fundamental rights. But even this intervention must always be wise and restrained and bear in mind the baffling variety and complexity of mankind.

V. CONCLUSION

Granted all that precedes, the minimum programme for a free order might be sketched as follows:

1. The united nations to declare explicitly that they fight this war on behalf of the world community.
2. The united nations to declare explicitly that they plan the free order to be set up after the war on behalf of the World Community and in order to foster the gradual development of a world commonwealth.
3. The united nations to take active measures to foster a world public opinion and the consciousness of belonging to a world community, notably through schools, broadcasting and the film.
4. The united nations to plan and carry out their

schemes for after the war bearing in mind the world-wide character of the institutions which may then be necessary.

5. Subject to these explicitly acknowledged principles and methods, the united nations to carry out an empirical and realist policy, the use of force being justified by their purpose.

6. The rights and duties of citizens, States and the world commonwealth to be defined in the light of the preceding principles.

7. Such rights and duties to be reduced to the bare minimum required by the freedom of the individual and the peace and health of the commonwealth; but this minimum to be rigidly enforced.

8. The world commonwealth to guarantee freedom of opinion regardless of frontiers. This must include:

(*a*) freedom of the press; (*b*) of broadcasting; (*c*) of speech; (*d*) of religious and political opinion; (*e*) of political and professional association.

9. Normally, national governments must retain their power to legislate and administer the laws on freedom of opinion in accordance with national institutions and traditions; but the world commonwealth must retain the right to decide, without the vote of the State concerned, whether any national law, measure or practice, is compatible with its safety, and the power to intervene, if need be, in such a case.

10. The world commonwealth must exact complete publicity of State budgets, and in particular a complete report of defence budgets tabulated on a uniform basis within the rules laid down by the budget committee of the League Disarmament Conference.

11. Individual armaments must only be wielded on the authority of the State; State armaments on the authority of the world commonwealth.

12. Conflicts between States, or between States and

individuals, or between States and the world commonwealth, must be brought before the world court.

13. A world bank must be set up to provide capital which is non-national, and from which either private individuals or nations may borrow.

14. Aviation, petrol, the merchant navy, and the manufacture and sale of arms must be put under the control and administration of the world commonwealth. A limited number of other important materials and services might follow.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED

THE programme outlined in the preceding pages was drafted in 1943. It would nowadays call forth cries of 'idealist' in London, 'starry-eyed' in New York and 'traitor' in Moscow. How is that?

Comment en un plomb vil l'or pur s'est-il changé?

The answer must be left for a later chapter. Here we have two other tasks to perform.

The first is to point out that our programme was by no means lacking in realism. If by realism is meant due regard for the realities which condition and limit the possibilities of a course of action (and that is what every straightforward person should mean by it), our programme could not be more realist. It asked of the powers no sacrifice of force whatever. They were to sacrifice no single warship, tank, aircraft or gun. They were to sign no Protocol. Under point 5 of the programme, it was especially declared that subject to their public recognition and acceptance of a number of general principles, so evident that no State would dare officially to deny them, the united nations were 'to carry out an empirical and realist policy'.

Of course all this had been done deliberately. One day, in one of the early sittings of the Council of the League of Nations, a representative, known both for his 'realism' and for his silence at meetings, caused a general stir by asking to speak just as the Council was going to rise. The realist representative soothed his surprised colleagues, eager for their luncheons, with these immortal words: 'Gentlemen, a thing of no importance whatever. Just a matter of principle!' And of course he got a hearing from his much relieved audience.

It is on this model and precedent that our scheme for a free order had been put forward. 'Only matters of principle.' Nothing a hard-boiled realist could have boggled at. The small powers would have found no difficulty in adopting it. They have been ready for more drastic and 'starry-eyed' plans for some years. But even the big powers might have acquiesced in it. Any of the consequences which the principles laid down might have entailed could, on the strength of point 5, have waited for better days. Everything in the programme was staked on the *slow but certain effects of the general acknowledgment of the same faith.*

Now, assuming that this programme had been accepted by the chief — and consequently by the small — united nations, what would then have been the peace?

It is submitted that the conditions created by such a programme would have been the best for obtaining a durable peace with the least amount of harshness. The reason is simple. An action in itself means little unless it is explained by its intention. A man's stomach has been ripped open with a knife. That is the action. Was it done by a gangster out for money, a soldier defending his country, a surgeon operating for an ulcer? *The effects on the mind of the wounded man will be quite different.*

The big powers take the Ruhr out of German hands and put it under the control of an international commission. That is the action. Whose interests does that commission stand for? Europe's? The big powers'? Certain sectional interests within the big powers? Germany is deprived of the free use of her factories. Is it to foster a better world of which she will be a member? Is it the better to enable the big powers to pursue the policy of grab as grab can, i.e. that very policy for putting down which they declared war on Germany? That makes all the difference.

It makes all the difference from the strictly realist point of view we have adopted, which is that of reason. We are not considering harsh measures to enjoy the pleasures of vengeance, nor to punish a criminal nation. We are considering measures which happen to be harsh (and we cannot help that), because we think that, through them, another war may best be avoided. Now the point is that the seeds of the coming war will not lie in the Ruhr. They will be hidden in the hearts of the Germans. And if we take away their territories and wealth in the interest of sectional or national groups, and not of Europe and its peace as a whole, instead of easing those Germans of their tensions we are going to reload their hearts with political explosives and stimulate their minds to further schemes and struggles.

No one disputes the right of the victors to impose stern measures on Germany. No one should dream of reproaching them for it even if they did so out of a vindictive passion. They have suffered enough from the infamous nazis and from the whole nazified nation. But, again, we are not discussing 'natural' and 'excusable' reactions, the outcome of a dreadful past, but practical and effective measures to forestall an equally dreadful future. On the plane of vengeance and poetic justice, we have no right to speak, we who have not suffered enough. But on the plane of objective study and efficient policy, we have the right to be right, if we happen to be right, on a footing with any other European. For, again, the victim of a disaster *may* be the best judge of the measures to be taken to prevent its recurrence; but he may not; and the chances are that he is too moved to reason coolly on the causes and cure of the trouble.

Stern measures must be taken against Germany; and, of course, they must be taken by foreigners. But if they

are taken, not only by foreigners, but in a foreign spirit, for the benefit of foreign interests, and not of a higher common interest which would thus integrate the higher interests of Germany herself, then Germany, instead of being tamed, will be stimulated to a rebellious attitude.

The more so as she will be living in a world ruled and led by a table of values identical in substance — even though not in form — with that she had herself adopted. Naked power politics. Each big nation for herself. Have we forgotten the growls of the bear at the leopard and the eagle when they came upon each other at the edge of the Persian oil pool?

Such are the facts which influence a beaten nation, and confirm her in her political philosophy and faith.

There is a delusion abroad known as the re-education of Germany. This magic process will be carried out by school teachers from other nations such as Czechs and Danes; or even by German teachers previously re-educated abroad. We need waste no time on these fairy tales. Educating is a difficult enough process, with results often doubtful and nearly always disappointing. But re-education, assuming it means anything, surely describes an impossibility. Here is a nazi youth who, before he used a razor on his face, had already tortured dozens of victims. Who is going to re-educate him into anything but a man with a background of murder? Who is going to re-educate, and into what, a boy who has delivered his father over to the Gestapo for listening to the B.B.C.?

Such things simply do not happen. In any case, whatever the other nations do or do not, it is likely that large numbers of young Nazis are past praying for. But what would have been possible, in circumstances such as those outlined in our programme for a free

order, is a wholesale change in Germany by a kind of fermentation of her thoughts and emotions, on finding herself living in a world of genuine world citizenship and co-operation.

It is useless, and therefore dangerous, to entertain the delusion that victorious powers, who are proud of their victory, carve for themselves royal shares of power and declare themselves responsible to no one but themselves, can induce Germany to give up her right at the table. It is equally dangerous to imagine that to deprive Germany of fuel, steel and territory will be enough to prevent Germany from gathering strength again. On the contrary: it will act as a stimulant; and so will the sight of millions of helpless refugees expelled from territories which had been German from time immemorial.

Furthermore, either these territorial changes can be upheld or they cannot. If they cannot, the fact that they had been imposed will make their return to Germany the more dangerous; if they can, what will be the life of Europe with sixty million mentally poisoned Germans in her midst?

And finally, this programme would have ensured the most precious condition for a permanent peace — a stable union between the great powers.

For union can only endure if the same action is contemplated. No amount of repeating 'Let us unite' will bring about union; no amount of repeating 'Let us preserve our union', will save it if the same aim is not sincerely and fully held in view. Our programme ensured the union of the three big powers in the only possible way: by inducing them to foster in their respective public opinions the faith in a higher community which they all would serve.

CHAPTER V

POWERS AND PRINCIPLES

WHY has this course of action, which in 1943 seemed still within the realm of possibilities, become idealism for the British, starry-eyed idealism for the Americans and downright treachery for the Russians?

The answer is: because Great Britain, the United States and Russia do not want to adopt it.

The situation would be humorous were it not tragic. Every day statesmen and leader-writers come forward to lecture at us about our impatience. We must be content with the proposals so far made; since, for the present, it is impossible to go further.

But we are not told *why* this is impossible. Were we asking that any of the great powers or all of them scrapped their armaments, we should deserve to be stigmatized as 'idealists': but we are asking no such thing. We are asking that the three great powers should lead the rest of the world into declaring explicitly that they believe in the world commonwealth and mean to adjust their respective policies to it. And the great powers answer: 'Sorry, we cannot.'

Who prevents them? Is there on the planet any force capable of withstanding the common purpose of the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth?

There is no doubt whatever that the other powers would follow, nearly everyone of them, highly satisfied, none reluctant. It follows that the obstacles come from the great powers themselves.

These obstacles are complex; they are moreover of an entirely different character in Russia and in the Anglo-

Saxon west. In the Anglo-Saxon west reluctance to enter the true path of world citizenship is due partly to national, partly to sectional causes. The United States and Britain went to war under the impulse of two entirely different, indeed almost antagonistic forces — idealism and power politics.[1] The first would have led the world forward towards a true peace; the second holds it back. But both forces are national in their scope.

On the other hand, there have been cases in which sectional business interests worked now to help, now to hinder the war effort; and these same forces will stand as obstacles for a true peace. So that, all in all, it may be said that the system of forces which led the United States to the war and which is shaping the 'peace' is the desire for security, and if necessary, for increase of national sovereignty abroad, combined with a somewhat defective watch over national sovereignty at home.

The care bestowed on naval bases by both Britain and the United States is a case in point. Let us consider the Caribbean bases leased to the United States by Great Britain. This curious episode of the second world civil war reveals the vicious circles into which we are getting: the United States cannot do without the British Empire; the British Empire cannot do without the United States. The first fact has been brilliantly proved by Mr. Walter Lippman; the second, no less brilliantly by — Adolf Hitler. For purposes of foreign

[1] Cf. the article, 'The Peace of the Future', by the Washington correspondent of the London *Times*, April 23rd, 1945, in which, after describing the idealistic policy of the State Department ('the Kingdom-of-Heaven-or-nothing') aiming at putting under trusteeship 'any colonial territory anywhere, though it can be fairly doubted whether the framers of this policy ever thought that their sweeping plans could be interpreted to include Hawaii and Porto Rico', that most distinguished journalist adds: 'A fatal blow to the argument was delivered, not from abroad, but by the American Navy . . . High naval circles strongly believe that American control of islands such as the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Marianas . . . is necessary, indeed vital, to the preservation of peace in the Pacific and of security in the United States . . . This strong stand by the American naval authorities had resulted in the tearing up of the trustee policy.'

policy, of common safety, these two nations are no longer two, but one. And yet, the United States is not content to rely on the British bases; she must have bases of her own in the British islands of the Caribbean seas. It would seem that a permanent understanding for the common use of the bases and harbours of the two nations in time of emergency, with adequate consequential clauses for peace-time, would have been a more practical solution. Why was it not adopted? Because there is still too much emotional and mental distance between the two Anglo-Saxon nations. Although every intelligent American is alive to the fact that a strong and powerful Britain is indispensable for the United States, there are still many of them who rejoice in detecting signs of 'decadence' in the industrial and economic vigour of the British. The old prejudice of Georgian days, and the modern prejudice fostered by the hyphenated Americans, feed this tendency; while naval and diplomatic circles of American life cultivate it. Lastly, for as long as power and prestige go hand in hand in world affairs, it is unfair and unrealist to ask or expect of the United States that she should be content with a permanent alliance with Great Britain, when she has the power to rise to the top of the world.

The chief obstacles might well be Britain's experience and America's youthfulness as world powers. Britain is an old hand at the game, and yet (or perhaps therefore) is none too keen to let go any of her assets, even though fully aware of how easily they turn into liabilities. The United States comes to a similar conclusion for opposite motives. For her, it is as if a young heir to a colossal fortune, soon after coming into it, were confronted with a proposal to pool all private fortunes for the benefit of the community.

Americans have no cause to feel *blasé* yet about

world power; and they intend to wield the royal share which their numbers and their qualities of heart and brain have conquered and may still conquer for them.

Moreover, the average American is a keen salesman. The psychology of salesmanship pervades the atmosphere of public opinion. Generous to a fault outside his business, as a private man, the American, as a businessman, is a hard-bargainer. The idea of being worsted at this his chief and favourite activity arouses his temper. There is a kind of honour in it. Foreign affairs are therefore apt to be watched by the public as bargains between Uncle Sam and a not over-scrupulous foreigner, who, being assumed cleverer (for the American is modest, all too modest, about his brain) is sure to do in poor Uncle Sam, whose innocence is proverbial.

This background adds considerably to the difficulties the British find in the United States. For if the Briton sticks to realism, the American reacts: 'Hang it all, I have the strength and you have the Empire. This is not business'; and if the Briton waxes idealist, the American sneers and asks: 'How about that Empire of yours?'

This is the background which explains such things as the simultaneous offer of fifty destroyers from Uncle Sam to John Bull and the lease of a number of bases by John Bull to Uncle Sam. It provides the key to their constant differences over such things as petrol, the British share in the Far Eastern campaign and a number of other affairs; and is at the core of the trouble over civil aviation.

No human activity is more clearly marked for world-co-operation than air traffic. From the negative point of view, it is plain that the air arm has dominated the second world civil war, and will henceforth be the determinant factor in world force. Hitler smashed all

tendency to resist his demands on the part of Czechoslovakia by holding eight hundred bombers in readiness as a reply to a negative. Any nation will in the future hold the key of war or peace in whatever zone of the world she holds the skies. To speak of organizing collective security against aggression while leaving air sovereignty in national hands may be realism, but it certainly is not of the right kind.

Now military air power rests on civil aviation even more closely and completely than naval power on the merchant marine. Bases, pilots, industry, experience, are the civil roots of the tree of military air power. A nation that builds up a strong system of civil aviation under her sovereign control is *ipso facto* establishing a system of domination over the remaining nations of the zone its system covers. And this domination will be absolutely effective, for a threat of air-action would be enough in nearly every case to determine an issue without actual recourse to war.

It follows that no zone of the world in which air traffic has not been federated can be said to have emerged from the dark ages of power-politics; and that rivalry in air traffic defines rivalry in power politics.

From the positive point of view, the air is the last element to be conquered by man, and the most universal. The land is the most national; the sea is both national in its bays and straits and gulfs, and international in its high roads. But the air is universal in fact and should have been universal in law. Of course, air-navigation is impossible without airfields, weather stations and such like land establishments. And then, there are those air rights. But who does not see that these problems are thorny only because they are put before the nations concerned in the interests of single powerful nations instead of in those of the community?

And finally, there is progress and safety. While

nations remain estranged by mutual rivalry, inventions, research, every step forward is bound to be considered from the point of view of military or of commercial superiority. The world will be spending separate and mutually overlapping research funds, to improve, not its general service, but the service of Nation A *v.* Nation B; while in every country civil aviation, instead of being developed for its own sake and for no other reason, will have to be subordinated to what the air marshals whisper to the Government, the inventors and the pilots.

At this point, someone bleats something about 'international control'. The contrast between control and world co-operation has to be imagined somewhat concretely in order to realize the frivolity of the so-called realists who throw that bone to the true realists whom they accuse of idealism. Here is a line run on nationalist principles. Its factories, air fields, crews, are all national. The controllers come, all foreigners, of course, to nose into its processes, regulations, accounts and doings. Their visit has no meaning whatever, unless it is explicitly based on distrust. Unless these foreigners come with set faces and minds which mean: 'We do not believe a word you say and are going to see for ourselves', these foreigners might just as well have stayed at home. Is this system ever likely to produce a good spirit of mutual confidence and friendship in that air service in which it is most essential? Is it not likely, on the contrary, to give forth international incidents almost every time there is a visit?

Here is a line run by the world air office. Its factories, airfields, bases, crews are all alive with men from a variety of countries, now and then transferred from one place to another the better to develop them technically and to weave the whole into a confraternity of working comrades. No control is needed. No breach of faith is to be feared. No sudden turn from quiet hand-

ling of passengers and mail to loading with bombs to cow a small nation into submission. The mutual friendship and trust of the men is enough to insure the world against that, and the world security council may sleep in peace.

Why should all this be 'starry-eyed'? Two Governments proposed it officially at the Chicago Air Conference (1944): those of Australia and New Zealand. Were they starry-eyed idealists? Of course not. The two great Dominions are mothers of men with very large feet, which they know how to keep on the solid ground of realities. These two Governments knew what they were doing. Their two countries are both dependent on air traffic in a world-wide way. The distances at which they are situated from the centres of interest for them — Britain, Canada, the United States — are enormous. Australia and New Zealand wanted a world air office to run the world airways. They were right. The British Labour Party backed them with similar proposals, even though in almost the same breath it declared itself ready to accept a somewhat more modest, i.e. more dangerous solution.

Nor was the plan of the Dominions new. A similar one in substance had been presented by the Spanish delegation to the Disarmament Conference in June 1932. One almost identical was put forward in February 1933 by the French delegation, with an air world police force thrown in. In those days, the world was not yet ready for such bold courses. Germany was in the way. But now Germany is no longer an obstacle; on the contrary, she provides an added inducement for such a plan, for her complete elimination from the air is one of the conditions of the coming peace system. And therefore if the air is going to be the new ring for imperialist cockfights, what is the moral effect on Germany going to be? And

what on those who keep her out to help themselves to the spoils?

Despite all of which, the Chicago Conference rejected the proposal of Australia and New Zealand; it rejected even the British proposals, far more modest, i.e. more dangerous; and was bound, in the main, to toe the line of the American delegation whose proposals were the most dangerous of all. The causes are two; the first is that the United States think that the new era, that of aviation, must be an American era, just as the naval one was Britain's. In this the United States reveal their proud nationalist independence, and perhaps also certain traces of dependence on Britain still lingering in their subconscious being from the colonial days. For in imagining that the air era must be a second edition of the sea era with the United States ruling the clouds instead of Britain ruling the waves, the United States may subconsciously be fashioning herself on Britain; while a true original United States, wholly free from the mother complex the American nation suffers towards the British nation, would have struck a new line, such as a world air office, truly in keeping with the republican spirit of the free America, and moreover an institution in which the authority and power of the United States would have been unmatched.

The second cause is sad to tell. While the United States insist on keeping their sovereignty unimpaired in a world ruled by power, they neglect to uphold their sovereignty at home, and sometimes allow internal forces to control the State instead of being controlled by it. The interests behind the American air lines — not the financial interests only, but the whole organic power behind these lines — have proved too strong for the American nation; and the upshot of it all is that the United States have barred a progressive step for which the world was ready, not however for her own benefit,

but for the benefit of just one part of the nation, the boundaries of which it is not easy to assess.

Within the span of a short study it is impossible to cover all the negative aspects of the policy of the two Anglo-Saxon powers. The points so far covered are given only as illustrations of trends. The earnest democratic and liberal instincts of both Britain and the United States stimulate strong currents of idealist common sense in their midst. This constructive side of Anglo-Saxon opinion has undoubtedly made great strides in both nations and is nowadays a chief source of motive-power for world progress, indeed almost all our hope. It is a far cry from the opposition against Wilson to the opposition against Roosevelt, even when due account is taken of the vastly superior gifts Roosevelt had as a tactician. And in Great Britain, Mr. Eden and Mr. Bevin are far more advanced leaders in world affairs than any of their predecessors. It is, moreover, fair to take into account that the reluctance to change, the political inertia, so to speak of a nation, must be proportional to its mass and weight. All this should be borne in mind. But the result of it all is that the two great Anglo-Saxon powers enter the stage of the world community with a load of power-commitments which is bound to hamper them in their policy towards their eastern partner in world affairs.

This is aptly illustrated in the difficulties they meet with to 'put over' their respective Monroe Doctrines. Much is made in the United States of the evolution for the better of the Monroe Doctrine under Roosevelt II. The history of Bolivia and of Argentina in the last three or four years must be better known before we estimate this progress accurately — for progress there no doubt is.[1]

[1] As shown in the attitude of the Spanish-American Republics in the San Francisco Conference.

But few Americans seem to realize that the crux of the matter is precisely that the continent south of Río Grande lives under a system which makes it depend for its political life on the particular quality of the man who happens to be at the White House. Put in parable form the Monroe Doctrine may be said to be something no one in the United States can either explain or suffer to be touched — the two characteristics, not of a doctrine, but of a dogma; and, once analysed, the Monroe Dogma reveals itself twofold: the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of America's Continental Policy; and the Dogma of the Infallibility of the American President.

All the elaborate machinery of the Pan-American Union, the conferences and the commissions, all the efforts made by Washington circles to clothe the Doctrine in regional and collective-continental forms, cannot hide the power-facts that stand under it. Mr. Lippmann has shown the importance of the British Fleet in making it effective as a means for preserving the political independence of the Spanish American Republics; henceforward, however, the American Fleet and Air Force will see to that. But the fact that the Monroe Doctrine institutes a political preserve, or zone of influence for the United States cannot be gainsaid; and so the United States take away with one hand what they seem to have guaranteed with the other. How then could the Government of the United States argue against the 'realist' policy of the Soviet Union in Finland, Poland and Rumania? How could it even argue against the annexation of the Baltic States when the United States are keeping Puerto Rico as a subject State against the wishes of the population, and in a state of starvation and misery?[1]

[1] See chapter on Puerto Rico in J. GUNTHER, *Inside America*, and article by PEARL BUCK in *This Month*, March 1945.

Such are the facts which must make the west pause and be modest. Western states must put their house in order, first because order is a good thing in itself; and then because the west will need all the moral authority it can muster to save Europe from the imminent dangers of a second totalitarianism. India, Burma, Indo-China, the African Continent, in which, despite much admirable progress, forced labour still persists under all the flags,[1] are crying for freedom, justice and more sincerity in the fulfilment of the ideas the west professes to hold. For we are here arguing in favour of true democracy and true liberty for the west; but if the west were to use its democracy and its liberty as mere bunting to cover the exploitation of other peoples, those who sneer at liberty and stigmatize it as a bourgeois idea would carry the day, and liberty, despite its services, would perish because of its sins.

[1] See the facts in *African Survey*, by LORD HAILEY.

CHAPTER VI

RUSSIA'S FAITH

IT is generally admitted by political biologists that a leopard cannot change its spots. But can a bear? Of course not. No animal, real or heraldic, can do such a thing except the chameleon, and not for long.

If we wish to understand Soviet Russia we had better start by dropping that 'Soviet' first; then, when Russia itself is clear, the Soviet qualification can and should be added.

'The sovereign' — wrote Catherine II of her own Empire — 'is absolute: for no other than an authority concentrated in his person alone can adequately operate through the extent of so large an empire. An extensive empire presupposes an unlimited power in the person who governs it. The celerity of decision in matters that are brought from distant places must compensate the tardiness that arises from that remoteness. Any other form of government would not only be prejudicial to Russia, but even at length be the cause of its total ruin. Another reason is, because it is better to obey the laws under one rule than to conform to the will of the many. But what is the aim of an absolute government? Not to deprive mankind of their natural liberty, but to direct their actions to the maintenance of the highest prosperity. Consequently, a form of government which is more than others constituted to that end, and at the same time contracts the natural liberty less than others, is that which best coincides with the aims attributed to rational creatures, and is most adapted to the object they have ever had in view in the institution of civil societies. The object and end of unlimited governments is the glory of the citizen, of the State, and of the sovereign. Among a

people who live under a monarchical government, from this glory flows the spirit of liberty, which in such States bursts forth in such great actions as are able, in the very same proportion, to promote the happiness of the subjects as liberty itself.'[1]

We perceive in this text the two guiding principles of M. Stalin's policy: the maintenance of the highest prosperity and the glory of the citizen, the State and the sovereign. To these principles of a permanent Russia, Lenin added a new faith. *Communism.*

True, we often hear nowadays that there is no longer such a thing as Russian communism. Whereupon the high salaries of works managers, the epaulettes of the officers and what not, are trotted out, and we are told that Stalin is not a communist but a Russian nationalist. Everything falls into a clear picture as soon as we realize that communism is a dogmatic religion. For then, the best parallel for Stalin — twentieth-century Russia — communism is Philip II — sixteenth-century Spain — Catholicism.

Philip II was a Spanish king, but of a Spain which he had identified with the interests of the Church. He was, in the telling phrase of Oliveira Martins, a Pharaoh. He did not discriminate between the interests of Spain and those of the Church, because for him they were the same. All over the world, and in particular, in England, in France and in the Netherlands, the Catholic party worked for him, whether subsidized by him or not; for Catholics everywhere knew that if Philip of Spain lost a

[1] TOOKE: *History of Russia*, vol. VII, pp. 220-2.

Catherine was not offending eighteenth-century opinion at all. Rousseau repeatedly states that big empires must be 'monarchical', i.e. autocratic. 'Plus l'État s'agrandit, plus le gouvernement doit se resserrer . . . Il s'ensuit qu'en général le gouvernement démocratique convient aux petits Etats, l'aristocratique aux médiocres, et le monarchique aux grands.' *Contrat Social*, pp. 83-4. And as for liberty, here are two impressive authorities in unison: 'La liberté'—writes Rousseau—'n'étant pas un fruit de tous les climats n'est pas à la portée de tous les peuples. Plus on médite ce principe établi par Montesquieu, plus on en sent la vérité.' *Contrat Social*, p. 293.

battle they lost it also. The Catholic party was thus both the Spanish party and a universal party knowing no frontiers. It was a party which everywhere with vociferous insistence demanded to be allowed freedom of worship and propaganda; but which at home tolerated no other faith. Strong, unified, solidly united under the King, Catholic Spain was ever ready to subsidize or even organize armed risings and revolutions in other lands in order to put the Catholic party in office. It kept a close watch on the few Spaniards it allowed out and an even closer watch on the still fewer foreigners it allowed in. Books were welcome but on condition that they conformed to a strict orthodoxy.

Now for Philip II, Spain, Catholicism, put Stalin, Russia, Communism, and read that again carefully. Not one word needs to be changed.[1]

Nor is the evolution, so often observed in the Soviet Union, and so often attributed to a fall in the communist faith, without its precedent and parallel in Catholic Spain. For the Spain of Philip II was as strictly Catholic as any nation ever was, and yet it did not live up to absolute Christian virtues; the leaders of its Church were not fishermen but learned and princely men living in comfort and wealth. Philip himself lived by no means as a strict Catholic; not only is he known to have had feminine adventures definitely beyond the bounds of the ten Commandments, but in his public policy he was excommunicated by the Pope and often was at cross purposes with the Holy See. Neither the King, nor promin-

[1] As for Russia's isolation and the severe control of the Government on any cultural influences from outside, any person acquainted with Russian affairs is of course fully aware of the facts, many of which are public. The mere fact that nothing can be published in the Union but by agencies under the direct authority of the Government, i.e. the party, is a powerful guarantee of orthodoxy. Imports of books are also carefully regulated. And finally broadcasting is also organized so as to prevent any danger from contamination. It is curious that the B.B.C., which broadcasts in every language on earth (including one the Corporation claims to have evolved) does not broadcast in Russian.

ent members of the Catholic Church nor anyone else in the Kingdom would, however, have considered these compromises with life as a reason for anyone to doubt the sincerity of their Catholic faith. Similarly, the many compromises with reality introduced into practical communism by the realist Stalin should in no way be read as impairing his faith or that of his party in the principles of Marx and Lenin. 'I remain faithful to Lenin' is a saying of Stalin.

That she has a faith is, of course, the fundamental fact about Russia. There may be a certain lack of historical perspective in believing that this faith is what accounts for the magnificent behaviour of the Russian soldier in the field. The Russian has always been a magnificent soldier, whatever his faith. George Borrow, who knew the Russian well, speaks a century ago of 'his placid courage, which renders him insensible to fear and, at the command of his Tsar, sends him singing to certain death . . . At the last attack on Warsaw, when the loss of the Russians amounted to upwards of 20,000 men, the soldiery mounted the breach, repeating, in measured chant, one of their popular songs, "Come, let us cut the cabbage".'[1]

And yet there is perhaps an element of truth in the view that the communist faith stimulates the Russian to fight. War exacts the sacrifice of the individual for the common good; and peoples such as the Russians, who from time immemorial have been strongly communistic by instinct and tendency, and are therefore bound to be brave, no matter the cause, will be braver still for a cause which gives mental shape to their innate tendencies.

This makes Russia the strongest totalitarian State in the world (quite apart from size and economic self-sufficiency, for which she stands supreme); for the other

[1] *The Bible in Spain*, ch. XII.

totalitarian States had no faith but a hotch-potch of doctrines and bad literature, while communism is a respectable and coherent doctrine which appeals to many men. As such, therefore, this fact that Russia has a faith endows its policy with a singular integrity. We delude ourselves if we do not realize that there is more integrity in Russian than in western policy. To be concrete, such things as the compacts between certain American capitalists and German and Japanese interests brought to light by the American Government during the war would be unthinkable in the U.S.S.R. But it is possible to go further. The policy of the western States being opportunist and not quite sure of its own ideal (Empire? World Commonwealth?) hovers between principle and power. The policy of Russia is of a perfect integrity. It seeks the triumph of its faith through the triumph of the U.S.S.R. And it makes no bones about it.

The fact is sometimes overlooked because Russian ways are apt to be devious and Machiavellian. It may at first sight seem odd that Russia's policy should be made to rank above that of Great Britain or the United States in point of integrity when everybody knows that neither Great Britain nor the United States would dare stage the Lublin committee tragi-comedy and get away with it.[1] But the paradox vanishes when the distinction is made between ends and means, or between strategy and tactics. The Anglo-Americans are careful about political tactics. Their means have to conform to 'the standards of the west'. Their political strategy, however, is confused, and now they are led by public opinion to utter idealist principles, and even to stick to them, and now they have to yield to other forces and take cover under that good old word *realism*.

[1] At least nowadays. For Roosevelt I dared to set up a Lublin committee in Panama, which Roosevelt II would have been too shy—possibly too proud—to do.

M. Stalin, on the other hand, is sure of his strategy and never swerves from it: to make the Soviet Union universal. We, non-Marxists, may dislike it as much as we will; it is a great aim; as great as was Philip II's; for it also strives to make the world one under one faith. But, Stalin is ready to use many ways and means which we, liberals, condemn. Here again he is a modern Philip II, who was ready to go to any lengths once he had made up his mind — and he was most conscientious about that — that the course to be taken, however grim, would serve his faith.

It is now clear to us why the U.S.S.R. confronts the west with ways and methods of her own. The most important difference here is that the U.S.S.R. is a dictatorship ruling through an oligarchy, and enforcing an orthodoxy. It is therefore a system in which the lines of force go downwards. It is useless to argue that workers pass resolutions and back the Government; for in the U.S.S.R. every institution is bound to be, directly or indirectly, a mouthpiece of the Government. The real lines of force emanate from Stalin and go downwards.

This system has remained in operation simply because the communist party is a ruling and privileged minority in the country. Such a minority can only conquer power by force. That is precisely the way Lenin snatched power from the hands of Kerensky. Had Lenin held a genuine general election, he would certainly have lost. What would happen to-day, we do not know; for before a real general election could take place in Russia, a free press and free broadcasting (including listening to foreign stations) would have to be allowed for at least a year.

A point must be made here which may be useful later. For all its economic interpretation of History, the only communist State in the world keeps its communism

going by means of a dictatorship — i.e. bases its economics on its politics, and not, as Marxism would lead us to expect, its politics on its economics. The stranglehold on public opinion which the highly centralized political system of Russia ensures is the guarantee of the communist regime. Born of a political revolution, kept going by political and highly artificial means, the communism of the U.S.S.R. is therefore a standing example of the primacy of spirit over matter, i.e. a denial of what it stands for; since it owes its existence to the spirit of Lenin and its persistence to the spirit of Stalin — both in powerful opposition to the general trend of economic and material forces which would otherwise have destroyed it long ago.

This precedence of the political over the economic, paradoxical as it may sound in a Marxist State, must be accepted as a fact, patent in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R. It will be found writ large over the foreign policy of the Union.

CHAPTER VII

RUSSIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

It is evident that a statesman who is a totalitarian does not drop his totalitarianism when passing from home to foreign affairs. This truism explains the foreign policy of Russia, in what concerns both her relations to this or that nation, and her ideas on how to organize a world authority.

A survey of Russia's dealings with her neighbours will show that, in every case, she has pursued the same aim, and in every case, by similar means. This policy was put by *The Times* correspondent in Ankara in the following terms: 'The Soviet Union has stated clearly that she desires to see "friendly" governments established in all the neighbouring States, from Finland to Persia, and that the term "friendly" is interpreted in Russia as meaning a government which would be largely, if not exclusively, communist.'[1]

The dictatorial tone will be noticed. Russia 'desires to see' governments largely if not exclusively communist from Finland to Persia; and what the countries themselves desire to see in their own houses is another matter.

To expect from Russia any respect for genuine democratic methods in her foreign policy is a delusion. Why should she apply to the neighbouring nations she happens to control democratic methods which she does not apply at home? The communist party being both totalitarian and universal, it will see that totalitarian methods are adopted everywhere.

I. THE BALTIC STATES

On September 19th, 1939 the Tass Agency announced that Polish submarines were in Baltic ports and had

[1] *The Times*, March 15th, 1945.

received 'assistance from certain persons in Government circles'. In the eyes of the Soviet Union, this was an unfriendly act, for Russia had invaded Poland on September 17th. A Polish submarine, the *Orzel*, had taken refuge in Tallinn on the 14th, and had escaped on the 17th. The Estonian Government dismissed the two chief naval authorities. Estonia and Latvia denied that submarines were hiding in their harbours. But the Soviet Government found their explanations unsatisfactory; and the Foreign Secretary of Estonia was invited to visit Moscow. Within four days, he had signed a pact of mutual assistance. On October 1st his Latvian colleague succeeded him in Moscow, and within the same four days, had also signed a similar pact. Finally, Lithuania, though not in the least involved in the submarine incidents, was also requested to send her Foreign Secretary to Moscow and, this time, within seven days, a pact of mutual assistance was also signed.

The three pacts were identical, with the one exception that Lithuania received from Russia the city of Vilna, just recovered from the Poles. The chief provisions were as follows: (1) Mutual military assistance in case of attack; (2) Russia to supply arms and other war material on favourable terms; (3) cessions to Russia of certain naval and air bases and of certain coastal batteries, and the right to maintain 'strictly limited Soviet forces in them'. (No bases were claimed from Lithuania. Nevertheless, Russia secured the right to maintain land and air forces of strictly limited strength 'at various points on Lithuanian territory to be agreed upon later'.) Each party undertook not to conclude any alliances and not to participate in any coalitions directed against the other. The carrying out of the pact was declared in no way to infringe the sovereign rights of the contracting parties; especially their economic systems and government structures.

On October 15th Russian troops entered Estonia, and—later — Latvia and Lithuania. On October 31st in the course of a statement on the war, to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., M. Molotov said:

> The relations of the Soviet Union with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are based on the peace treaties concluded with the respective countries in 1920. By these treaties, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent States and ever since then the Soviet Union has invariably pursued a friendly policy towards these newly created small States. This is a reflection of the radical difference between the policy of the Soviet Government and the policy of Tsarist Russia, which brutally oppressed small nations, denied them every opportunity of independent national and political development, and left them with most painful memories. The development in the past two decades of Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian and Soviet-Lithuanian friendly relations has created favourable conditions for further consolidation of political and all other relations between the U.S.S.R. and its Baltic neighbours. This has been revealed, too, in the recent diplomatic negotiations with the representatives of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and in the treaties which were signed in Moscow as a result of these negotiations.

Then came the beginning of active land operations in the west, and the collapse of France. Great Britain stood alone between Hitler and a nazi world empire. On June 15th Russia presented an ultimatum to Lithuania; on June 16th, to Estonia and Latvia. The three governments were accused of having violated their pacts of mutual assistance with Russia; Estonia and Latvia, because they had not cancelled their mutual military alliance, had extended it by including Lithuania, and had tried to include Finland also; Lithuania because she had allied herself with Estonia and Latvia. The three Baltic governments accepted the ultimata, and, as a consequence, Soviet troops occupied the three republics,

and Left-Wing governments took office. They were, of course, 'friendly to the Soviet Union'. On July 14th, National Assemblies were elected, under a procedure similar to that of the U.S.S.R.: the electorate was offered one list of peasants', workers' and soldiers' candidates, no opposition list being permitted; and a unified electoral programme was offered to the three States. It included: alliance with Soviet Russia; democratization of the armed forces; a 'purge' of former regime men from State and city posts; suppression of fascist papers and organizations; increased wages; land for the peasants; a moratorium on all peasant debts to the State; the right of free speech; the right to strike. The National Assemblies thus elected unanimously voted their respective countries into the Soviet Union on July 21st, 1940.

Mr. Sumner Welles, at the time Acting Secretary of State, commented on these events which he described as 'the devious process whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics [was] to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbours'.

II. FINLAND

As late as December 26th, 1938, Finland and the Soviet Union had officially agreed on their frontiers as laid down by a joint demarcation commission. But the events of September-October of the following year, whereby Soviet Russia made the three Baltic States sign treaties of mutual assistance which made vassal States of them, caused great alarm in Finland. On October 8th, when the Estonian and Latvian treaties were already signed, and the Lithuanian treaty was to be signed within two days, the Finnish Government announced that a Soviet invitation to send a special representative to Moscow had been accepted and that M. Paasakivi

was being sent. The invitation was couched in identical terms as those addressed to the Baltic States: to discuss 'questions of a political and economic character'.

Finland sent M. Paasakivi but instantly prepared herself for defence. That the anxiety felt in Finland rested on objective grounds is amply proved by the fate of the Baltic States. Sweden took some military precautions; and the three Scandinavian Ministers in Moscow presented identical notes simultaneously to the Soviet Foreign Office, expressing the hope that no action would be taken prejudicial to Finland's independence and neutrality.[1] The United States Ambassador in Moscow also handed to President Kalinin a message from President Roosevelt expressing the hope that the U.S.S.R. would make no demands on Finland 'inconsistent with the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two countries and the independence of each'. In his reply President Kalinin stated that the Soviet Union had recognized Finland's independence in 1916, and later in the treaty of October 1920. But at least three other instruments were relevant: the pact of non-aggression and the treaty of conciliation of 1932, and the League Covenant, binding both countries.

Negotiations began in October and were laborious. Russia presented heavy territorial demands. The Finns were secretive about them; but M. Molotov spoke somewhat freely in his speech on October 31st to the Supreme Council. He described the Russian proposals as 'extremely modest', and explained that they included: 'a change of territory whereby Finland ceded space on the Isthmus of Karelia, withdrawing several kilometres to the north of Leningrad, while territory about double the size was ceded to Finland in Soviet Karelia; the lease of a small section of Finnish territory in the Gulf of Finland for a naval base; a territory which later was revealed by

[1] i.e. in the war then waged by Germany and Russia against Poland.

the Finnish Government to refer to the port of Hankõ; though M. Molotov did not mention it; the Soviet Union also demanded the use of the Bay of Lappvik and the cession of a number of islands. Finland was also to disarm the entire fortified zone on the border across the Isthmus of Karelia.

Threats in the Soviet press continued and increased as the Finns, though willing to sacrifice territory in the Karelian Isthmus, were stiff on the other points. And finally on November 26th the Soviet Government accused Finland of a frontier incident: Finnish artillery had fired on Russian territory and four Soviet soldiers had been killed. Russia demanded the withdrawal of the Finnish troops twelve to fifteen miles behind the frontier. Finland answered that the Soviet allegations were unfounded and suggested a bilateral withdrawal from the frontier and an inquiry by a mixed commission.

The next day, November 27th, the Soviet press declared that Russia 'had reached the end of her patience', and demonstrations and mass meetings all over the Soviet Union passed resolutions demanding 'strong action'. Within twenty-four hours, on November 28th, the Soviet Government officially denounced the pact of non-aggression. (The pact stipulated that six months' notice would be given before it could lapse.) On November 29th M. Molotov announced the rupture of diplomatic relations. On the same day the Finnish Government handed in a note proposing a conciliation commission and the unilateral withdrawal of troops except customs guards. At nine a.m. on the morning of November 30th Soviet bombing planes attacked several cities, including Helsinki where they caused two hundred casualties. Russian troops occupied Seiskari Island, in the Gulf of Finland, and attacked the fortress of Hankö by sea and air, though an attempt at landing failed.

Russia turned down a proposal for mediation made on

that day by the American Chargé d'Affaires. A new government took office in Helsinki; but in Terijoki, a seaside town they had taken ten miles beyond the frontier, the Russians set up a government under Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish communist who had lived many years in Moscow and had been Secretary of the Comintern. The 'Finnish People's Government' issued a proclamation asking the Red Army to rescue the Finnish Democratic Republic from the 'warmongers and reactionary plutocrats' and soliciting a pact of mutual assistance from the Soviet Government. On December 2nd the signing of the pact was announced. The U.S.S.R. ceded to Finland 23,000 square miles of Karelian territory; Finland receded in the Isthmus to the extent of 1300 square miles; the U.S.S.R. paid 120,000,000 Finnish marks (£600,000) as compensation; Hankö Island was leased to the U.S.S.R.; eight islands in the Gulf of Finland and the Rybachi and Sredni peninsulas in the north were sold to Russia for 300 million F.M. (£1,500,000); a pact of mutual assistance, an economic convention and a promise of arms completed the picture. This pact defined what Russia meant to wrest from Finland better than M. Molotov's recent speech.

On the same day, December 2nd, the Finnish Prime Minister, Dr. Ryti, defined his policy as: resistance to the Soviet aggression; and efforts to seek contact with Russia to reach a settlement by negotiation. Proposals were presented through the Swedish Minister in Moscow, but on December 4th the Soviet Government rejected them on the ground that it recognized no other government than that of Kuusinen. On December 2nd the Finnish Cabinet decided to submit the dispute to the League of Nations.

The League Council was convoked on December 3rd for December 9th, 1939. Russia was, of course, a per-

manent member. There is no doubt that the Covenant had been violated; Finland was appealing on the strength of Articles 11 and 15. On December 4th Russia published her answer to the Secretary-General in which she declared the convocation of the League Council to be unwarranted, since 'the Soviet Government is not at war with Finland and does not threaten it, so that the reference to Article 11 of the League Covenant is incorrect'. How could the Soviet Government maintain such a thing four days after it had bombed Helsinki and invaded Finnish territory? The explanation could not be simpler. The official Soviet statement went on:

> The Soviet Union has a pact with the People's Democratic Republic of Finland which regulates all questions which former negotiations with the former Finnish Government failed to achieve. The People's Democratic Government appealed to the Soviet Union for military assistance to liquidate the war danger created by the former Finnish Government . . . The Soviet Union will not take part if the Council is convoked. Moreover the provocation of M. Holsti's appeal and the convocation of the Council are irreconcilable with respect for the Soviet Government.

The Council met on December 10th, 1939, Britain being represented by Mr. R. A. Butler and France by M. Paul Boncour; but the Assembly soon took the matter over, and its committee of thirteen, on the proposal of the Swedish delegate, Professor Unden, sent a fresh appeal to Russia to cease hostilities and accept the mediation of the League. Russia refused on December 12th merely repeating the arguments of her December 4th telegram to the Secretary-General. Here, the League procedure went astray, for it followed passion and not sense. Russia was expelled unanimously. What good was that and to whom? Again the false analogy between individuals and nations. When a club finds a member undesirable it expels him, and he goes out. But

when *the* world organization finds one of its members obstreperous it can no more expel it than the body can expel a hand or the liver. No Covenant should ever comprise an article permitting the expulsion of a member. What the Assembly should have voted then was the declaration of aggression, and a statement that Article 16 was applicable to the case. That would have given League sanction to any Allied military help to Finland.

Despite the moral help which the League vote gave her, Finland did not cease to seek a direct settlement; on December 15th M. Tanner, Finnish Foreign Secretary, broadcast a message in Russian to M. Molotov reiterating his readiness to resume negotiations.

Everywhere in the world the attitude of Russia was severely condemned. On November 30th Mr. Chamberlain, in the course of a statement in the House of Commons, said:

> His Majesty's Government have observed these developments with increasing concern, and they have found it difficult to believe that strategic measures of such scope and importance as were suggested should have been considered necessary to protect the Soviet Union against a country as small as Finland.

President Roosevelt, at a press conference on December 1st, said:

> The news of the Soviet naval and military bombings within Finnish territory comes as a profound shock to the Government and people of the United States. Despite efforts made to solve the dispute by peaceful methods, to which no reasonable objection could be offered, one power has chosen to resort to force of arms. It is tragic to see the policy of force spreading and to realize that wanton disregard for the law is still on the march.
> All peace-loving peoples, those nations that are still hoping for a continuance of relations throughout the world on the basis of law and order, will unanimously condemn this

new resort to military force as the arbiter of international differences.

To the great misfortune of the world the present trend towards force makes insecure the independent existence of the small nations of every continent and jeopardises the rights of mankind to self-government.

The people and Government of Finland have a long, honourable and wholly peaceful record which has won for them the respect and warm regard of the people and Government of the United States.

'The aggression against Finland' — said the French Premier, M. Daladier, in the Chamber of Deputies on December 8th — 'has caused horror, disgust and stupefaction throughout the world.' But there was one exception: the *Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz*, organ of the German Foreign Office, described Russia's attitude as the 'understandable, historically well-founded and natural tendency of a great power such as Soviet Russia'. And the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Dr. Goebbels' paper, after accusing Finland of 'resisting the law of gravity', explained that the strong were forced to exercise pressure on the weak when the weak did not adjust their neighbourly relations to the necessities dictated by geo-political laws.

The resistance offered by the Finns from December 1939 till March 1940 astonished the world and even themselves; and the magnificent successes the Russians have won since over Germany make this episode even more mysterious. Help of all kinds, including volunteers, arrived in Finland from every country but Germany. From February 26th, 1940, a Franco-British expeditionary force of 50,000 men had been ready to go to the help of Finland, after substantial supplies of aircraft and munitions had been sent during the winter by the Allies. But the Finnish Government would not appeal for help

till the Swedish and Norwegian Governments had granted a free passage to the Allied troops; a concession it repeatedly asked without success. In the absence of a League decision applying Article 16 of the Covenant Sweden and Norway were within their rights. And in any case, given the state of Europe at the time, it is difficult to blame them. The upshot of it all was that Finland sued for peace. The treaty was signed on March 12th, 1940. Finland lost all Russia had asked for and much more — including the whole Karelian Isthmus and the town of Viipuri, as well as the Rybachi Peninsula; while the territorial concessions in Soviet Karelia were, of course, withdrawn — Hankö and the islands were leased to Russia for thirty years. The Finnish Government won a moral victory in that Russia herself quietly dropped the so-called Finnish People's Government which they had hoisted upon the stage and shown even to the League as the true Government of Finland only three months earlier. But there were provisions in the treaty which drove a coach and four through Finnish sovereignty: Soviet citizens in transit to and from Norway through Petsamo were to be allowed free passage on the strength of their passports, and goods to be subject to no control; and Finland granted a right of way between Russia and Sweden by the shortest route, agreeing to build a railway for that purpose jointly with Russia.

Finland thus became a satellite State of the Soviet Union. But neither her memories of past relations with her eastern neighbour nor her recent experience warranted much optimism as to what lay in store for her. And within three months of her acquiescence in her fate, she saw three Baltic States forcibly 'plebiscited' into the Soviet Union, and swallowed up behind the pall of silence which covers all life under Russian control. The west was closed to her by the neutrality of the Scan-

dinavian States. The old pro-German tradition of her conservatives and army officers took its chance.

On September 24th, 1940, nine days after signing a convention with Russia on Russo-Swedish transit, Finland signed a convention with Germany, allowing the passage of German troops, with their weapons to and from Norway. Britain protested. Russia . . . not yet. On November 12-14th, 1940, M. Molotov paid a visit to Berlin, at the invitation of the German Government, received or visited the chief nazis, and returned to Moscow. The German communique spoke of 'an atmosphere of mutual confidence' and of 'agreement on all important questions'. But *Pravda* revealed on April 19th that M. Molotov had been asked to adhere to the Tripartite pact. He refused, but *Pravda* insisted that Russia did not want to extend the war; Moscow was beginning to feel uneasy about Germany and accused Finland (April 26th) of having allowed 12,000 German troops, with tanks and artillery, to pass to Norway. Finland put the figure at 1300. A certain neutral respectability was lent to Finland's action by the fact that Sweden had been compelled to grant similar facilities to Germany. But on June 21st Hitler attacked Russia; Finland declared herself neutral, but was overrun by German troops and acted no longer as a fully independent nation. On June 25th she declared war on Russia.

Finland's freedom of choice was as wide as the edge of a knife. That in those fateful days she made a tragic mistake few impartial observers would care to deny. But that the Soviet Union is free from responsibility in Finland's error no man with full knowledge of the facts can honestly maintain. Finland was and is a democratic country; and only her geographic situation forced her into the perilous and anomalous position in which she found herself. When, in November 1941, Major Quisling

(the prototype-quisling) in a speech tried to rope in the Finns into the pro-nazi, anti-democratic Scandinavian front, *Snomen Sosialdemokraati*, the socialist organ of Helsinki rapped him severely on the knuckles.

> The fact that Germany's army is fighting on the same front with us has not in the slightest degree changed the view of the Finnish nation on the nature of her political freedom and the sovereignty of her people. The speech alleging that we here are ready to adopt some kind of a new domestic system similar to what M. Quisling's party represents in Norway, does not correspond to the real conditions. Parliament, the President and the Government have time and again emphasized that our struggle aims at defending and securing our free democratic social order.

But the Finns were bound to weigh their experience of Russia against their feelings and those of their western friends; and when they turned down the suggestions for peace with Russia, made by the State Department on October 27th and 30th, 1941, what they emphasized was the lack of any guarantees as to the future. Death with Germany; death with Russia. The Finns chose the wrong kind of death. On December 7th Britain declared war on a nation now reduced to be an unwilling tool of Germany by fate rather than by choice. In 1942, many of her leaders had courageously insisted on this point. M. Tanner, at Viipuri, on May 12th, 1942, declared that Finland was waging a purely defensive war for her own freedom and democracy and that a separate peace with Russia was always possible. On November 16th, 1942, M. Fagerholm said: 'Finland is not fighting for the "New Order". The Finns are democratic, and no other regime suits us. We are compelled to fight as long as necessary.' And in the teeth of German ideas, he maintained the need of union with the Scandinavian nations, a theme on which President Ryti also insisted on Decem-

ber 6th, 1942. Papers and parties went on advocating a separate peace as soon as 'the country's liberty and independence were secured'.

The United States Government had never ceased to urge Finland to leave the war. On January 31st, 1944 she had presented a note to that effect. It caused a strong impression in Finland, and determined a peace-move which began on February 12th, 1944, when M. Paasikivi arrived in Stockholm where he saw the Russian Minister Madame Kollontay, and ended in a treaty of peace. The negotiations were laborious, owing mainly to the following reasons: (1) Russia naturally insisted on expulsion or disarmament of the Germans; and the Finns feared they could not achieve this by themselves and were afraid that, once they opened their gates to Russian troops, they would share the fate of the Baltic States; (2) the Russians asked an indemnity of 600 million dollars to be paid in six years, which the Finns had not the capacity to pay; and (3) the Finns were afraid of the intentions of Russia once they were disarmed.

An agreement, however, was reached on September 19th, 1944, the Russians having reduced by half the amount of the indemnity. The treaty has often been praised for its generosity. Russia is entitled to much praise on this account, for, at the time, Finland's military and political situation was so hopeless that her mighty adversary might have left her nothing but her eyes to weep with. But it was a terrible peace for all that. It meant, territorially, a return to the treaty of 1940, save that Hankö was returned to Finland and the Porkkala-Udd peninsula occupied instead (very much as if a victorious Germany, having secured the Isle of Wight, preferred the area of Chatham-Gravesend instead). Petsamo was also lost, and the indemnity to be paid, though cut down to a half, amounted to three-eighths of Finland's pre-war yearly exports.

This means, of course, a complete political and economic subjection to the Soviet Union. So far, Russia has used this power both moderately and discreetly. But she has used it, and with a characteristic disregard for truly democratic ways. The point is worth emphasizing if only because it illustrates Russia's style in European matters. The new leader, M. Paasikivi, tried his best to avoid direct Russian interference, and to this effect, forced eleven public men, including the socialist ex-Foreign Secretary, M. Tanner, to renounce their candidatures. These men all had chosen the wrong line, the German side, in the fateful days when the choice was between the German devil and the Russian deep sea; but it was for the electorate, not for M. Paasikivi nor for Russia to condemn them. We are to see similar facts in other countries in which the Soviet Union intervenes. But this policy is clothed in 'democratic' terms. The alliance of Finnish socialists and communists takes on the name of 'Democratic League' and Mme. Leino, wife of the communist member of the Cabinet (who is, of course, Minister of the Interior) and daughter of M. Kuusinen, the head of the puppet Government of Finland in 1940, now President of the Karelian Soviet Republic, expressed the view that the election promised to be 'the most democratic ever held in Finland'.[1]

III. POLAND

Unlike Finland, a country which always was a victim of Russia, Poland gave as many blows as it took in a history in which there is ample ammunition for both the Russian and the Polish sides. During a long period, Moscow and Warsaw acted as focal centres for future nationalities, attracting to themselves in various ways, at various times, the peoples lying between them. The partitions of Poland were at the time recognized as

[1] *The Times*, March 17th, 1945.

crimes against Europe by the best opinion of the west. Tooke, for instance, writes:

> The violent dismemberment and partition of Poland, without the pretence of war, or even the colour of right, is to be considered as the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe. It is not (said the politicians of the continent) sapping by degrees the constitution of our great western republic; it is laying the axe at once to the root, in such a manner as threatens the total overthrow of the whole . . . The idea of considering Europe as a vast commonwealth; of the several parts being distinct and separate, though politically and commercially united; of keeping them independent; though unequal in power; and of preventing anyone, by any means, from becoming too powerful for the rest, was great and liberal, and, though the result of barbarism, was founded upon the most enlarged principles of the wisest policy. It is owing to this system, that this small part of the western world has acquired so astonishing (and otherwise unaccountable) a superiority over the rest of the globe.[1]

In the first partition, Catherine's record was much less bad than that of her two partners; but the second was dishonoured by the savagery of Suvarov, who, on taking Praga, the eastern suburb of Warsaw, put to the sword the 20,000 human beings he found there, soldiers and civilians, without distinction of age or sex.[2] Nor was Russia altogether blameless for the political chaos of Poland which the three autocrats invoked to partition her: for Catherine, as well as her two compeers, took great care to insist that all the defects of the Polish con-

[1] Tooke, vol. IV, 124, 125.
Cf.: 'The King of Spain expressed his dissatisfaction at this injurious act of encroachment [the first partition] with more energy than appeared to accord with his sedate and reserved temper. "Ambition and usurpation", he said, "do not surprise me in the King of Prussia and the tzarina; but from the empress queen I did not expect such reserve and perfidy." Had other powers participated in these sentiments, Spain would doubtless have warmly espoused the cause of the Poles.'—COXE, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain*, vol. III, p. 358.

[2] TOOKE: *History of Russia*, vol. V, p. 344.

stitution should remain intact after the first partition, so as to make the second inevitable. Among these defects, one which Russia was careful to keep in being, was the *liberum veto*, whereby the vote of one magnate was enough to paralyse the decisions of the commonwealth.[1]

Of course, the Poles stood in no need of Russian help to cultivate political defects. Few peoples in Europe have had to pay for their brilliant gifts in other walks of life with a more disastrous lack of political sense. But, when reproaches are levelled at them on that account, they may ask whether any of the three nations which reduced them to political slavery for one hundred and fifty years have any right to speak on the matter. This is an argument to remember when recalling the antics of Poland's policy after her rebirth in 1919. The protagonist of this policy was a 'socialist' general of dictatorial tendencies: Pilsudski. Seizing the opportunity afforded by the civil war in which Lenin had plunged Russia, Pilsudski launched a war of his own, which, after wild oscillations between Kiev and Warsaw, led to a Polish victory and to the Treaty of Riga (1921). A most unwise treaty; for, whilst Poland was already surrounded with difficulties in the west, owing to the Polish corridor and to her claims in Upper Silesia, she secured in the east more territories than the Russians could grant her for good and all. But at the time she felt strong in herself as well as in the friendship of France, the chief military power on the continent.

Poland became then 'the chief customer of the League of Nations'. Problems raised by Upper Silesia (the partition of which was finally settled in Geneva); by Danzig, by minorities, brought her representatives constantly before the Council. But the totalitarian tendencies of her home regime clashed with the liberal-democratic spirit which was the very core of the League; so that Poland

[1] TOOKE: *History of Russia*, vol. IV, pp. 116-118.

was rarely an asset and often a liability at Geneva. The Polish-Lithuanian dispute became a hardy annual at the Council table, and Vilna was forcibly occupied by General Zeligovski, 'rebelling' in perfect agreement with Pilsudski (1920).

Her situation was bound to become worse as both her neighbours became stronger. Poland had to steer a dangerous course between Russia and Germany; the more dangerous in that any move of the ship towards Charybdis angered Scylla and vice versa. Her historical memories of Russia were terrible; but those she had of Germany were worse: Frederick II, beyond plundering her peasants with debased money, robbing, pillaging and murdering, had laid on each town and village a tribute of marriageable girls endowed each with a feather-bed, four pillows, one cow, two hogs and three gold ducats;[1] and while the life of the Poles under the tsars had been no better than that of the Russians, the Poles in Germany had been treated as an inferior race by the *Herrenvolk*. It is easier to lecture the Poles than to live their lives between Berlin and Moscow. In 1932, Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin; in 1934, another one with Hitler. The hell of war is strewn with non-aggression pacts. He will be bold who says for certain which, of the German or of the Russian dictator, the Polish dictator hated or distrusted more cordially. One thing is certain: whatever its secret springs, Pilsudski's policy and that of his political heirs was inept. It alienated western sympathies by its 'realist' and cynical attitude in Geneva; and it created suspicion both in Moscow and in the west by a series of moves disastrously synchronized with Hitler's aggressions. When Hitler seized Vienna, Poland chose to send an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the immediate opening of relations, broken off since Zeligowski's seizure of Vilna; and

[1] TOOKE: vol. IV, p. 122.

when Hitler dismembered Czechoslovakia, Poland seized the Teschen district (coveted by both nations since 1919, and divided, mostly in favour of the Czechs, by the League of Nations). Thus Poland herself supplied the model for the Soviet invasion of her territory during her own war against Hitler.

Geography, history and politics prove that the worst that can ever happen to Poland is that Germany and Russia should agree. When Ribbentrop signed on August 23rd, 1939 a so-called non-aggression pact with Russia which put the U.S.S.R. out of action as a potential adversary of Germany, Poland had reason to tremble. There were at the time in Moscow French and British missions laboriously negotiating a treaty with Russia. They left for home the next day; and Marshal Voroshilov explained to *Izvestia* that the negotiations with France and Britain had broken down because 'the Soviet Union argued that, to give assistance to Britain and France, Soviet troops would have to enter Polish territory. The Anglo-French mission did not agree, and the Polish Government had openly declared that they did not need and would not accept military assistance from the U.S.S.R.'

Russia was then secretly negotiating with the German Ambassador in Moscow another partition of Poland. This was, of course, an inevitable sequel to, if not the actual core of, the pact of non-aggression signed by the two totalitarian powers; for, since, under clause 2, the Soviet Union gave up all possibility of helping Poland, how could she remain passive while Germany swallowed her whole victim unmolested? This was confirmed in Hitler's address to the Reichstag on June 21st, 1941. But, before that, other events had established it as a fact. On September 17th, 1939, the Soviet troops invaded Poland. Warsaw made the first of

her two imperishable stands of this war against her German executioners, but had to surrender on September 28th. The line of demarcation between the two invaders was fixed on September 22nd, within a day of the arrival in Moscow of the German delegation come to discuss it. On September 27th, Ribbentrop went to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government. The next day the Soviet-German Treaty of partition of Poland was signed, and the Polish State abolished. The exact boundaries between Russia and Germany were fixed on October 4th; and a convention on the settlement of disputes which might arise on the new frontier was signed on June 10th, 1940.

The air of finality which these measures suggested was strengthened by a statement M. Molotov, then Prime Minister as well as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, made before the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on October 31st, 1939. M. Molotov mentioned 'the defeat of Poland in war and the collapse of the Polish State', and explained how, despite the boasts of her 'ruling circles', 'there was one swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty which had existed by oppressing non-Polish nationalities'. The Soviet Prime Minister went on to describe Germany 'striving for the earliest ending of the war and for peace', and Britain and France, 'who but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, in favour of the war and opposed to peace'; and, in the course of this argument, he said: 'The efforts of the British and French Governments to justify this new position on the ground of their undertakings to Poland are, of course, obviously unsound. Everybody realizes that there can be no question of restoring the old Poland. It is therefore absurd to continue the present war under the flag of restoration of the former Polish State.'

The territories occupied by Russia were divided into Western Ukraine and Western White Russia. On October 22nd, 1939 elections were held in both under the Russian system, one single list of candidates being offered to the electorate. The respective People's Assemblies met at Lvow (October 26th) and Bialystok (October 28th) and passed unanimous resolutions asking to join the Soviet Union. They were formally acccpted by the Supreme Soviet Council on November 1st and 2nd.

The dictatorial and incompetent government of colonels which had led Poland to such a disaster had sunk in the general chaos. But on October 7th, 1939, Britain, France and the United States recognized a Polish Government formed in France by General Sikorski, a man who had stood in opposition to Pilsudski's anti-liberal ways. Settled first in Angers, this government moved to London (June 22nd, 1940) after the collapse of France. Sikorski organized the army, navy and air force of exiled Poland without delay, and with so much success that, in spite of the loss of her national territory, Poland became by far the most important ally in the field after the unoccupied countries. Moreover, the Polish Government remained in touch with its nationals at home, who under a tyranny which blackens even Germany's black record, organized an admirable underground army against their Nazi oppressors.

Hitler attacked Russia without warning on June 21st, 1941. On June 23rd, Sikorski declared that the Polish Government did not exclude the possibility of an understanding with Russia on the basis of the Treaty of Riga, the return of the Poles deported into the U.S.S.R. after the occupation of Eastern Poland and the freeing of all Polish war prisoners to man the Free Polish Army. An agreement not far removed from this outline was signed

in London on July 24th, 1941 between Sikorski and M. Maisky. The U.S.S.R. declared that the treaties of 1939 between the Union and Germany had lost their validity; diplomatic relations were restored and mutual aid promised; the U.S.S.R. consented that a Polish Army under a Polish Commander should be formed in Russia to operate under Soviet Supreme Command, and that the Polish Army should be represented in this Supreme Command; and all Poles detained in the U.S.S.R., as prisoners of war or otherwise, were to be set free. In December, Sikorski went to Moscow and broadcast a generous address. The Polish Army in Russia was to comprise six divisions to be equipped by the western powers; 25,000 Polish soldiers would go to the Middle East and 2000 airmen were to fight in Western France. The U.S.S.R. would temporarily settle the 2,000,000 Poles, then in her territory, in a milder climate, and would grant a loan to Poland to help them. A treaty of mutual assistance was also signed.

With the recovery of Russian arms, the Soviet attitude to the Polish Government deteriorated, and matters became serious enough for the Polish Cabinet to declare on February 25th, 1943 that Poland had never agreed to any co-operation with Germany against the Union nor harboured any intentions of extending her eastern frontiers to the Dnieper and the Black Sea, for she stood by the Treaty of Riga. The reply made by the Soviet News Agency on March 2nd revealed that the trouble came from the fact that the two Governments attached a different interpretation to the London agreement of 1941. The U.S.S.R. declared no longer valid the treaties of 1939 partitioning Poland. The Polish Cabinet assumed that this restored the Treaty of Riga, i.e. the Polish frontiers before the Russian invasion. The U.S.S.R. claimed as final the annexation of Western White Russia and Western Ukraine. The Soviet News Agency argued

'the Atlantic Charter does not entitle anyone to encroach upon the national rights of the Ukrainians and White Russians', and accused the Polish Government of seeking to 'partition' Ukraine and White Russia. Whatever we may think of the rights and wrongs of this territorial dispute, the Soviet argument was as arbitrary as its attitude. The Poles were right in pointing out that the elections held by the Russians in the annexed territories had lost their validity when the Soviet-German treaties were declared no longer valid. It may well be that the most reasonable frontier between Poland and the Union should lie close to the Curzon line. But one is bound to regret that a cause on the whole well founded should have been upheld by the U.S.S.R. with such complete disregard for international obligations and forms.

This note of March 2nd, 1943 initiated the line of attack Russia was preparing to take against Poland. 'The declaration of the Polish Government bears witness to the fact that the present Polish ruling quarters do not reflect in this matter the genuine opinion of the Polish people whose interests . . . are indissolubly linked with . . . mutual confidence and friendship with the brotherly peoples of the Ukraine and White Russia . . . and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R.' The Soviet Union had made up its mind to see that Poland was governed by 'friendly' persons, i.e. by a communist-controlled Government.

The break came dramatically. On April 12th, 1943, the German News Agency announced that the German military authorities had discovered in Katyn, west of Smolensk, the graves of some 10,000 Polish officers murdered, they said, by the Soviet police after the occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939. The Polish Minister of National Defence issued a statement recalling that, from the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations on, the Polish Government had repeatedly but unsuccess-

fully tried to obtain from the Soviet Government data on the whereabouts of 8300 Polish officers and 7000 n.c.o.s, soldiers and civilians from Russian camps in the region of Smolensk, and concluded that an inquiry by the Red Cross was necessary.

As logic this was unanswerable; as diplomacy it was unfortunate. The Cabinet made it less unpalatable by recalling the same day the misdeeds and ill-intentions of the Germans in a statement in which it announced that the International Red Cross had been asked to conduct an investigation. The German Government, on whose shoulders the Russians laid all responsibility — for no one disputed the massacre of the 10,000 Poles — asked also for an inquiry by the Red Cross. The Soviet Union indignantly rejected it. There were more grounds for this than meet the eye at first. The German Gestapo had had time to tamper with the bodies; the International Red Cross, predominantly Swiss, was as such suspect — even if unjustly so — to the Soviet Union; and the inquiry would of necessity have to be carried out on German occupied territory, 'behind the back of the Soviet Government'. All this must be duly weighed, in fairness to the Soviet Union. But, in view of the fact that 8300 Polish officers had been missing before the Germans took Smolensk until the Germans spoke of the massacres, the Soviet Union was the most interested party in asking for an international inquiry. A commission composed of Soviet, Polish, American and British investigators should have given Russia complete satisfaction. The Soviet Union chose to break with the Polish Government instead — a serious step, since this Government was and remained the ally of its allies.[1]

[1] It is, unfortunately, characteristic of the way in which the Soviet Union carries on its polemics that the inquiry by the International Red Cross was rejected because it would have been carried out 'behind the back of the Soviet Government', while the exclusively Russian inquiry of July 1943-January 1944 was given to the world as final proof exonerating Russia, though it had been

It would be a waste of time to go into the details of the negotiations between Russia and her western allies to repair the breach. The aim of Russia was less to secure the Curzon line frontier (no power on earth could take that from her) than to secure a Russian-controlled Government in Poland. To argue that she must be guaranteed against future aggressions is beside the point; for Poland can no longer attack the strongest power in the old world; and as for Germany, nothing Russia has done or can do will ever make her as hateful to Poland as Germany is bound to remain; so that, if it comes to choosing, Poland will never hesitate and will seek her peace east rather than west. Moreover, Mr. Churchill has declared that Germany need worry no one in the future. Speaking in the House of Commons on February 27th, 1945, in defence of the Curzon line and of the compensations to be given Poland at the expense of Germany, the British Prime Minister said:

> We need not fear that the task of holding these new lines will be too heavy for Poland or that it will bring about another German revenge or that it will, to use a conventional phrase, become a seedling, or will lay the seeds, of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those which followed the last war because we know much more about this business so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly impossible for generations to come.[1]

The argument of security is therefore far from proved. The chief cause of Russia's intractability in her relations with the Polish Government was political. As soon as she felt strong enough to show her hand, Russia was deter-

[1] *The Times*, February 28th, 1945.

carried out behind the back of the Polish Government. Either no inquiry was needed or the inquiry should have been two-sided or neutral. In any case, according to the Russians, the Polish officers 'were working repairing railways in the western districts of the Smolensk sector' when the German invasion overtook them, a fact which the Polish Government's repeated requests between July 1941 till January 1943 had been unable to elicit from the Soviet authorities.

mined to oust the London Polish Government and to set up one of her own. To be sure, there were men and parties in the London Polish Government by no means friendly to Russia. But since when have all men and all parties of any one nation been to the taste of their neighbours? Are all Russian men and is the communist party to the taste of the Poles? And if not, why should Russia have privileges in Poland that Poland cannot have in Russia? All that a nation can demand of another is respect and loyalty — and both were given to Russia by Poland during the war, at times in the most trying circumstances. The London Polish Government, moreover, was in complete control of the magnificent underground movement, and Poland had this unique record: the country without a quisling.

The task of finding tame Poles, hopeless for the Germans, was nearly hopeless for the Russians. On May 6th, 1943, M. Vishinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared to the press that suggestions to the effect that the Soviet Government intended to set up a Polish Government on Russian territory were a 'pure invention'. This was nevertheless the plan of the Soviet Union, as events have proved. A week after M. Vishinsky had spoken, the *Wolna Polska*, a 'Polish' Moscow paper, published a declaration of aims and activities issued by the 'Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union'; and the *Red Star* gave details of the new Kosciusko Division, a military unit of Poles to fight under Russian command. Simultaneously (May 4th), in a letter to *The Times* correspondent, M. Stalin declared that he desired a 'strong, free and independent' Poland; and that the two nations should live 'on the basis of solid, good, neighbourly relations and mutual respect'. But to Mr. Churchill, M. Stalin explained that he must have: recognition of the Curzon line; an immediate call to the underground movement to co-operate with the Soviet

forces; and the dropping of 'outspoken anti-Soviet elements' in the Polish Government as well as changes in the leadership of the Polish forces. Evidently the letter to *The Times* was pure form and that to the British Prime Minister substance, of a different cast.

Much criticism has been levelled at the London Polish Government for their stubbornness. But even allowing without discussion that the Curzon line was the fair frontier, the Polish Government was on solid ground when it maintained:

— no change till the war is over;
— no change without a fair, public plebiscite of the peoples that are to change;
— no interference in their own internal affairs;
— freeing and good treatment of the two million Poles in Russian hands who ought to be put under a Polish or an international administration such as the Red Cross.

On all these points the London Poles were right. Russian policy was not even realist, since Russia's best security would have consisted in a happy and contented Poland. Finally, while some of the irresponsible organs of Polish opinion in London were indiscreet enough, Soviet Russia had never to complain of accusations and language such as the Moscow press heaped on the London Polish leaders.

The dispute was bound to grow worse. The offer of a temporary settlement of the frontier question made to Russia by Poland through the British Ambassador on February 27th, 1944 was rejected by Moscow on the same grounds M. Stalin had put forward in his letter to Mr. Churchill, namely: immediate acceptance of the Curzon line and eviction from the Polish Government of all persons unfriendly to Russia. Simultaneously, M. Vishinsky's 'pure invention' had taken a long stride towards reality. The Union of Polish Patriots had set

up a National Council which appointed a commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in Russia. This National Council was of course friendly to Russia and accepted the Curzon line. On July 25th, 1944, as the Russian armies crossed this line, the Soviet Government published a statement declaring that it would leave to the Poles themselves the administration of their land and would, to that effect, conclude an agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the second name, though not the last, which the National Council had so far taken. This agreement was signed the next day, and diplomatic representatives were mutually appointed. The Polish Government described the members of the Moscow Polish Committee as persons 'mostly completely unknown to the Polish people and [who] represent nobody except a small communist group without any influence'. Much later, when, bolstered up by Russia, it had become the Lublin Committee and 'the Polish Provisional Government', Mr. Eden said of it in the House of Commons:

> The British Government have in no sense recognized the Lublin Committee. They have no intention of recognizing it. They do not regard it as representative of Poland at all, and when Mr. Churchill and myself met representatives of this Committee in Moscow, the members of the Committee did not make at all a favourable impression on us.[1]

M. Mikolajczyk, who had become Prime Minister after General Sikorksi's death (July 4th, 1943), visited Moscow on August 1st-10th, 1944. This visit was due to the persistent efforts of the American and British Governments. Conversations were held with the Moscow Polish Committee with a view to forming a united provisional Government. M. Mikolajczyk returned to London to consult his Government, in hopes of going back east and continuing the talks, 'possibly at Warsaw'.

[1] March 1st, 1945, reported in *The Times*, March 2nd.

The chief cause of the failure of this effort was the rising of Warsaw. Marshal Rokossovsky's armies were rapidly advancing towards the city, and the Moscow radio was issuing appeals which the Poles were bound to interpret as calling on the capital to rise. The Germans were taking the men away to dig trenches. General Bor, who commanded the underground forces, decided to fight. Then the Russian Army stalled at Praga, and within shot of its guns, Warsaw fought against the ruthless Germans till it died. Help came by air from the western allies in most gallant flights hundreds of miles across Germany; but practically none from the Russians who were close by. There were recriminations on both sides. The Polish Committee accused General Bor of having acted without consulting the Soviet Command, and General Sosnkovski spoke of the many attempts made in vain to that effect and hinted at 'cold calculation'. No one who has read the documents can doubt that, while it would be grossly unfair to attribute to 'cold calculation' a natural, though unlucky, delay at the gates of Warsaw, the Polish authorities in Warsaw and in London were not to blame for the events which forced the city, left without help by the Russians for no reason that can be clearly explained, to surrender to the Germans after a heroic fight lasting over two months.

This was hardly the atmosphere in which to reach an agreement. Mr. Churchill, however, tried again, and during his visit to Moscow (October 9-18th, 1944) M. Mikolajczyk was invited for another meeting. Great hopes of an agreement were raised by Mr. Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on his return (October 27th, 1944) but, as he himself pointed out, serious difficulties remained. The political price to be paid by the London Polish Government rose as the Soviet Armies advanced westwards. A number of Poles, led by M. Mikolajczyk, were in favour of an agreement with

Russia even at the cost of the loss of the eastern lands and perhaps Lvow. But the old distrust of Russia's intentions worked against them; and having failed in his attempts to obtain a guarantee of the eventual agreement with Russia from the western powers, the Polish Prime Minister resigned. His successor, M. Arciszewski, a socialist. stood on a more uncompromising ground.

The Yalta Conference devoted much time to this deadlock. The difficulty came from the fact that Russia did not budge on the frontier question and became more exacting daily on political personnel. It was no longer a matter of getting rid of a few names from the London Government; but of adding a few names to the Lublin Committee. M. Molotov and the British and American Ambassadors in Moscow were to lead the negotiations to that effect. The results of the Conference were announced on February 11th; but Moscow was in no hurry, and while the Lublin Committee installed itself in Warsaw under the shadow of the Soviet tanks, its radio reviled every Pole, of Poland or of London, who did not sign on the dot. M. Mikolajczyk fared no better than M. Arciszewski. As the date of the San Francisco Conference approached, the Soviet Union, which had already induced the Czech and Yugoslav Governments to recognize the Lublin Committee, tried twice in vain to have this Committee admitted as the official representative of Poland in San Francisco. Later a number of Polish underground leaders came out into the open and accepted invitations from the Russian Government to go to Moscow. There the chairman of the committee of three, M. Molotov, behind the back of his two colleagues, the British and American Ambassadors, carried on negotiations for weeks without consenting to inform his two allies.

Such, at any rate, was the light in which the mysterious disappearance of the persons concerned was

interpreted in the west during the whole month of April, while the Russian Government left unanswered repeated requests for information from the American and British Governments. But in the first week of May, M. Molotov informed Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius that the sixteen missing Poles were in prison for acts of sabotage against the Red Army. Some of these men were the nominees of the western governments for the unified Polish Government to be formed on the strength of the Yalta agreement. The conversations on this subject, which had been transferred to San Francisco, were immediately suspended.

The cause of the difficulty was obvious. Russia wanted a communist-controlled Government in Warsaw; the Allies, whatever government the polls threw up. But the Yalta agreement formulated this disagreement in the form of an agreement, based on the use of ambiguous terms. 'The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.' The pivot here was the word 'democratic'. For the west, it meant free elections; for the Russians, it meant 'willing to merge into a political alliance controlled by the communists'. Each side, of course, held fast to its own interpretation of the word, and to all that hung from it.[1]

Both sets of events, the prosecution of the eighteen and the negotiations towards a government of national unity, came to a head simultaneously during the month

[1] I may be allowed to copy here a clause inserted in a treaty I was at liberty to draft between two powers of my own invention: 'The two contracting parties agree to consider the above text as the common frontier between their respective meanings, each of which lies on opposite sides of it, and declare that they will faithfully stand by what they mean each on its own side of the said text.—*The Sacred Giraffe*, London and New York, 1925.

of June in Moscow. The Polish prisoners were publicly arraigned before a Russian court martial for sabotage and espionage against the Red Army and unlawful possession of radio transmitters. General Okulicki, commander-in-chief of the Polish Home Army, was sentenced to ten years' 'deprivation of liberty'; M. Jankowski, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, i.e. head of the Government in the home territory, was sentenced to eight years; his colleagues, MM. Ben and Jasukowitz, to five; others to sentences ranging between eighteen and four months; three were found not guilty.

A number of points should be made clear:

1. The Russians had no standing whatever to bring the Poles to judgment, either in law or in equity. Poland was an ally of Russia, and had Russia stood by the treaty her Government had signed with the Polish Government under General Sikorski, the situation whereby a number of Polish leaders were arraigned before the courts of an allied nation could not have developed. In any case, even accepting the Russian contention that 'Poland' was the Lublin Committee, the accused should have been judged by a Polish court martial in Warsaw. The Moscow trial was a true measure of the contempt in which the Russians held the Warsaw Provisional Government which they themselves had set up.

2. General Okulicki had been recently parachuted in Poland from a British bomber. M. Jankowski and two others of the accused had been presented by the British Government to the Russian as suitable candidates for a Polish Unity Government. No Moscow trial will ever convince sensible men that the British Government would have been misinformed or irresponsible enough to come into so close a partnership with men guilty of sabotage and treason against their ally Russia.

3. The accused men were active underground, under

the protection of their own people. They came out into the open at the request of Colonel Pimenov, of the Russian secret police, who gave them a solemn promise of safety. This does not suggest that the Poles had any sense of guilt towards the Russians. And as for the Russians, how could they invite guilty persons and traitors to negotiate, and how could they solemnly promise them safety?

4. The sentenced men include members of the peasant and socialist parties, whom it is absurd to suspect of reactionary or pro-German tendencies.

5. The activities of the Russian Army in Poland, where neutral observers have had no access, has been so harsh not merely towards the Polish Home Army but towards civilians, even of the Left, wherever they showed coolness towards communism, that the spirit of resistance against Russian oppression is legitimate.

All these aspects of the Moscow trial were left in the shade, owing to the vehement desire of the west to reach an understanding with Russia about the Polish Government. The Russian tactics whereby the last act of the two tragedies were crowded into the same week could not have been more effective. The problem of the Polish United Government had made a great stride towards a solution when a group of London dissidents led by M. Mikolajczyk and M. Grabski, President of the exiled Parliament, had declared themselves ready to work with the Lublin-Warsaw Committee. This fact was, of course, cashed in by those who attacked the London Polish Government for their obduracy. But the truth is not so simple and far more tragic. All Poles, with the exception perhaps of a handful of communists, but including many of those who from the first had agreed to collaborate with Moscow, have to face the hard fact of Russian omnipotence. The Soviet Union demanded

that the Poles should bow before the annexation of Eastern Poland and that they should form a 'friendly', i.e. a communist-controlled Government, no matter the actual opinion of the country. Confronted with this situation, the Poles reacted in two ways; some preferred to fight it out and never to yield; others chose to run the risks of accepting work with — or under — Russia. The former believed it better to resist openly and from the first; the latter would rely rather on the natural resilience of an old western and Catholic culture. But in any case, the whole situation was dominated by an act of force and of oppression unequalled in the history of Europe since the partition of Poland.[1]

The Government thus constituted is controlled by the communists to such an extent that the London press evidently preferred not to provide data on the parties to which the ministers belonged. By label, there were six communists, six socialists, six peasants, one democrat and two independent. In fact, out of 21, 14 were members of the Lublin Committee; and of the seven new names only four belonged to real pre-Russian parties, two from northern Poland and two from London. The London Government was accused of being reactionary; but M. Arciszewski is a working-class socialist and in his Cabinet the Left was in the majority. Translated to British or American terms, it is as if a foreign power, having occupied Britain or the United States, had set up a Government under Mr. Gallacher or Mr. Browder with a few unknown communists and Soviet sympathizers around them, and, after long negotiations, had consented to receive into it Mr. Bevan and Mr. Shinwell or Mr. Lewis and Mr. Upton Sinclair, and thereupon had declared all men like Messrs. Attlee, Greenwood and

[1] The nazi cases were acts of war, hateful as such, but doomed to last but a short time. This case was an act of so-called peace and reconstruction. Hence its gravity.

Morrison, or Messrs. Philip Murray, Byrnes and Wallace to be rabid fascists.

But the future is enigmatic. Russia will, through her willing tools, try to bring about a 'democratic' block, her favourite method to reach the totalitarian State through the one-party system. But even Russia omnipotent and right on the frontier, with her immense resources, her communist fifth column, her army and her secret police, may well find the Polish nation a hard nut to crack.

Whatever the future, it behoves us to be clear about the past. The natural and free evolution of a great country has been deflected from its course by a blatant abuse of force.

IV. RUMANIA

Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania took a dramatic turn when on June 26th, 1940, under the aegis of the Soviet-German pact, the Soviet Government presented Rumania with an ultimatum demanding immediate cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On June 28th, the Rumanians officially accepted and the Russians crossed the old frontier the same day. By July 2nd the occupation of the ceded territories was complete. On June 27th the German radio announced that Germany was not interested in the Russian demands. But on June 30th the news was that King Carol had appealed to Hitler, who had advised him 'to accept anything for the time being'. On July 1st, 1940, M. Tatarescu, the Prime Minister, made known that Rumania renounced the Anglo-French guarantee and would henceforward carry on her foreign policy in agreement with 'the new orientation in Europe'.

Within three days he was replaced by his former foreign secretary, M. Gigurtu, who formed a Cabinet of pro-Germans and anti-Semites and set about to expel

British subjects from the oil fields. On September 14th, 1940, Marshal Antonescu took over and established a frankly fascist regime, decorating himself a few days later with the title of *Conducator*, as good a Rumanian translation as he could find of *Führer* and *Duce*. When Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., Rumania followed the lead and her armies took a not unimportant share in the war against Russia.

But their victorious march eastwards was followed by a less victorious march westward. On April 2nd, 1944, the Russian Army crossed the Pruth into Rumania. M. Molotov issued a statement declaring that it was not the aim of the Soviet Government 'to acquire any part of Rumanian territory, or to alter the social structure of Rumania as it exists at present'. This declaration gave great satisfaction in London and in Washington. Ten days later, armistice terms were proposed to Rumania, but Antonescu rejected them. The Soviet armies marched on. On August 23rd, 1944, King Michael stepped in. At 4 p.m. he received the Conducator, fresh from a visit to the front, and told him negotiations with the Allies were imperative. Upon Antonescu's protest, the King had him and all his ministers arrested, and a new Government formed under his aide-de-camp General Sanatescu. The new Cabinet included as ministers of State the leaders of the two historical parties, Dr. Maniu (national peasant) and Dr. Bratianu (national liberal). The leaders of the socialist and communist parties were also in the Government. On August 26th Moscow radio announced that the new Government had accepted the terms offered on April 12th to Antonescu. A Rumanian delegation arrived in Moscow on August 30th and the terms were announced in Moscow on September 13th: Rumania would carry on the war but changing sides; she would recover Transylvania 'or the greater part of it' from Hungary to whom

the German Vienna award had transferred it; she would pay an indemnity of $300,000,000.

On September 18th, 1944, the arrest of a number of Rumanian pro-German leaders, including Antonescu, was announced in Moscow. Meanwhile, a political move was afoot to evict the two non-Marxist parties from office. The first step was to form a 'National Democratic Front', composed of socialists and communists, with a sprinkling from two other Left-wing groups. The second step was a protest by the Allied Armistice Commission on the ground that the Government did not carry out the terms of the armistice. On December 2nd, 1944, a new cabinet was formed under General Radescu on the basis of the National Democratic Front. Dr. Maniu and Dr. Bratianu were eliminated, although their respective parties remained represented in the Government. Note the use of the word *Democratic* to cover communist-controlled alliances — a device already observed in Finland and in Poland.

But the evolution desired by Moscow was far from complete; and in February 1945 the usual artillery preparation began from the Moscow press and radio against the new Prime Minister: he was allowing disturbances which threatened the lines of communication of the Red Army, and the purge of collaborators and the 'democratization of Rumania' were not getting on. In Bucharest there were disturbances and some shooting, about which the diplomatic correspondent of *The Times* most diplomatically said: 'The origin and responsibility for these are not clear.'[1]

On February 27th M. Vishinsky flew to Bucharest. Within twenty-four hours General Radescu was dismissed. There were difficulties, and these were so great that King Michael contemplated abdication. Finally, a Government was formed under Dr. Groza, the nominal

[1] *The Times*, March 14th, 1945.

leader of the National Democratic Front and deputy Prime Minister of the outgoing Cabinet. The deputy Prime Minister was M. Tatarescu, who, as Prime Minister in July 1940, had renounced the Anglo-French guarantee, and handed over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Russians after a discreet consultation with Hitler.

General Radescu took refuge in the British Legation. No news came out of Rumania but that which passed the Soviet-controlled censorship, and *The Times* spoke of 'much disquiet at this absence of independent accounts'. The same newspaper expressed the hope that 'in Rumania as in all lands delivered from the enemy there will be the closest consultation among the three major allies as provided for under the Crimea declaration'.[1]

That does not seem to have been the opinion of M. Vishinsky, who took no trouble to hide the big stick. In urging the Rumanians to gather round the Groza ministry, composed as it was by 'the best sons of the people', M. Molotov's deputy said: 'Always remember that, on the side of your small nation of eighteen million, is a strong country of one hundred and ninety million.' As to the Soviet tactics in Rumanian internal affairs the same authority was clear:

> It would be a mistake to think that this [the formation of the Groza Government] occurred without certain forces hostile to democracy attempting an opposition. The main role in this opposition was played by the so-called historical parties, or it would be more to the point if we called them archaic parties, or even better, parties belonging to the archives. As was known, Premier Groza had invited representatives of these parties to enter the Government — not under the same conditions as those under which they have participated in the Radescu and Sanatescu Governments, when the historical parties held all the principal posts of

[1] *The Times*, March 14th, 1945; March 10th, 1945.

State leadership, but under more modest conditions equivalent to the modest place they occupied in society and the State. But they rejected this suggestion and retired into splendid isolation. Rumanian democracy was victorious . . . For the consolidation and solidarity of those democratic forces which led the country to this achievement, there is but one solution: not to be misled by discussions about democracy. Such discussions have now become very frequent. Pseudo-democrats are most dangerous, and they must be avoided.

So spoke M. Vishinsky in Bucharest on March 9th; and on March 13th he returned to the theme in his speech at Cluj, where he said that the Groza Government was 'justly called the Government of all the democratic forces, since only those who have no right to call themselves democrats have remained outside'.[1]

Thus the word *democrat* becomes a title meaning 'friendly to the Soviet Union' or subservient to communist policy.

V. BULGARIA

Bulgaria is almost a Russian creation. It was mostly to Russia she owed her separate existence after the collapse of the Turkish hold on the Balkans. There are strong links of language and religious tradition between the two peoples; and even when political circumstances are unfavourable, the Bulgarians remain pro-Russian to the core.

Bulgaria waged war against the Allies bullied by Germany. Following a visit of King Boris to Hitler (November 23rd, 1940) the country was occupied by German troops (March 1st, 1941). On December 12th, 1941, Bulgaria declared war on Great Britain and the United States, following the lead of the Reich.

[1] *Observer*, March 25th, 1945.

The U.S.S.R. had issued a statement on January 12th, 1941, denying knowledge of, or consent to, German troop infiltrations in Bulgaria; and on March 8th, 1941, another statement was issued in Moscow by M. Vishinsky rejecting Bulgaria's view that the admittance of German troops would help the cause of peace. These, however, were growlings of the Russian bear less because of Bulgaria's inimical actions against the west than at the sight of the Reich invading Russia's own preserves. The U.S.S.R. did not declare war on Bulgaria when the Axis and most of its satellites declared war on her. The western war was popular in Bulgaria, particularly as she gained territorial dividends at the expense of Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania, merely through the exertions of Germany. But the German invasion of Russia brought about a sharp reversion of feeling. The Bulgarian General Staff presented a memorandum to King Boris against any share in the eastern campaign. Changes in military commands and in the Cabinet were of no avail: not even King Boris and his pro-German Prime Minister, Professor Filof, were able to force Bulgaria into a war with Russia. In spite of oppressive measures against the opposition, arbitrarily described as 'communist', this attitude of public opinion grew through the winter of 1942-3, and was not in the least weakened by incidents, designed to provoke anti-Russian feeling, such as that of the Soviet Consulate in Varna, the staff of which was accused of spying (September 1942).

Events were hastened by Russian victories and by the sudden death of Boris (August 26th, 1943). A Council of Regency was formed on September 9th, composed of Prince Kyrill, uncle of the young King Simeon, Professor Filof and General Michof. The Bojilof ministry, formed subsequently, bore traces of the new situation created by the surrender of Italy: the chief standby of the nazis in

Bulgaria, Gabrovski, had been dropped. The new Government, however, kept intact its alliance with Germany. The Teheran and Cairo Conferences, American air raids on Sofia, and the Russian invasion of Rumania spurred the 'communist' opposition in spite of a barbarous repression. On March 25th, 1944, the Russian minister left for Moscow 'on leave'. On May 13th, a joint declaration by the three great powers, warning all German satellites of the fate that awaited them, caused a deep impression. On May 20th, the Soviet Government addressed a note to Bulgaria warning her of the dangers to which her collaboration with Germany exposed her, and demanding the right to open several consulates to control Bulgaria's fulfilment of her promise not to help Germany. The next day, the Cabinet resigned, and the new Government was formed under the double threat of Russia on the one hand and of Hitler on the other, for Filof the Regent had been summoned to the Führer on May 29th and made to promise more collaboration. The new Prime Minister, Bagrianof, went to see Hitler on June 4th, altered his Cabinet to suit the Führer, but began to talk with the Russians and to show signs of a change of policy. Political prisoners (15,000 of them) were released, hostages freed, nazis ousted out of their offices. On August 17th, 1944, M. Bagrianof declared before the Sobranje his intention to remove all obstacles to peace. On August 26th, the Sofia radio announced Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war; a decision imparted to Britain, the United States and Russia; while Germany was summoned to withdraw her troops. On August 30th, a Bulgarian mission arrived in Cairo to receive armistice terms from the commanders of the only two countries Bulgaria was at war with: Britain and the United States. But the Bulgarian Government fell on a push from Russia, and a new Premier with a first-class anti-Axis record, M. Muravief,

leader of the Agrarian Party, took office. Nevertheless, Russia became stiffer; her troops reached the frontier through Rumania. M. Muravief issued a pro-Ally manifesto on September 4th. It availed nothing. On September 5th, Russia declared war.

Why? Very simple. In order to make peace. The Bulgarian mission left Cairo and the Bulgarian Government asked the Soviet Union for an armistice five and a half hours after the beginning of the war. Marshal Tolbukhin took the matter up. The usual new government was appointed, comprising, in the usual 'front', this time styled 'Fatherland', the usual communists, Left-wing and socialists. The Prime Minister was Colonel Gheorghief, leader of the *Zveno* group, a militarist, totalitarian party, responsible for the *putsch* of May 21st, 1934, which had liquidated parliamentary government in Bulgaria. Negotiations began at once. An armistice commission met in Moscow on October 15th, 1944, and the armistice was signed on October 28th.

The new regime is under the complete control of the communists, who hold the portfolios of Interior and Justice. The Party controls arms — an important political instrument in Bulgaria — and is the chief instigator of the ferocious reprisals prevailing against their ferocious persecutors, the pro-nazis. The peasants are on the whole favourable to the Fatherland Front because they are pro-Russian, but as there is no land hunger in Bulgaria, they are contented and impervious to communism. Dimitrof is in control of the communists. Over a hundred leaders of the old system have been executed, including the Regents and the ex-Prime Minister Bagrianof who took the country out of the war; while the ex-Prime Minister Muravief has been imprisoned.

The regime is friendly to Russia.

VI OTHER COUNTRIES.

Czechoslovakia. The word 'neighbour' is apt to take an elastic meaning in politics, maps being like chameleons in the presence of big armies. Czechoslovakia is now a neighbour of the Soviet Union; and so Dr. Beneŝ had to form his new ministry in Moscow. Threats of disruption of the country, and even demands that it be split into three separate Soviet Republics were assiduously circulated, while the Kiev radio asked for the annexation of Ruthenia. This 'softening' of the Czechoslovak front once achieved, a government was formed bearing but little relation to the actual political facts in the nation. Only four political parties were recognized: Christian socialist, Czech socialist, social democrat and communist; and a swollen ministry of twenty-two members was formed, giving the key posts to the communists (Interior, Information, Agriculture, Labour and Social Welfare and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs). No less than five vice-premiers were appointed, forming with the Prime Minister an inner Cabinet; and of these five vice-premiers, two are communists. The army will be trained, organized and equipped on the Red Army model. In the interests of 'democracy' and for the extirpation of German influences, educational officers will be introduced into all units. Practical co-operation with the Soviet Union in the military, economic, political and cultural field is to be striven for, and in questions concerning the punishment of Germany, reparations, frontier settlements and the organization of peace, the Czechoslovak Government is to stand close to the Soviet Union.

Moscow took great care to broadcast to the Czechs on April 10th, 1945, a statement by Mr. Gottwald, communist vice-premier of the new Government, outlining a thorough-going plan of Slovak home rule, even in the military and constitutional field, as well as the fact that

it was all due to the Red Army. It is therefore clear that the separatist tendencies of the Slovaks are the fulcrum for Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslav Government was pro-German, M. Stalin did not budge. He took no particular interest in the efforts the pro-Ally Yugoslav leader M. Gabrilovitch made in Moscow to bring about a change in the regime of his country. When, suddenly, Yugoslavia overthrew the pro-German regency, M. Stalin made no move at first for fear of displeasing Germany; but later agreed to a treaty of non-aggression. 'What will you do if the Germans attack you?' — asked M. Gabrilovitch the night the treaty was signed. 'Let them come' — answered the Russian dictator. The Germans did 'come' but not to Moscow.[1] In a ruthless blitzkrieg, they overpowered Yugoslavia and razed Belgrade to the ground. M. Stalin signified to M. Gabrilovitch that he could no longer recognize a country which had ceased to exist and that his diplomatic mission in Moscow was at an end (May 9th, 1940).

Withal the links between Yugoslavia and Russia have always been deep and the people of Russia felt in sympathy with the Yugoslavs martyred by the Germans. The Kremlin was aware of it and the curt dismissal of M. Gabrilovitch was carefully concealed from the Russian people. In this as in so many other aspects of European life, Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R. dramatically altered the situation, and the heroic resistance of the Yugoslav people under Marshal Tito restored the independent position of Yugoslavia on the European chessboard. Russian interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia has been small or non-existent. The need thereof need

[1] The story is in M. Gafenco's informative book, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est. De l'Accord de Moscou (Août 21, 1939) aux hostilités en Russie (Juin 22, 1941).* GRÉGOIRE GAFENCO: *Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Roumanie, Ancien Ministre de Roumanie à Moscou.* (Fribourg, 1944.)

not arise, since Marshal Tito is a communist. It is enough to say that his ways are orthodox for the political conquest of a country in which communism never occupied a large place. A numerous cabinet, even more numerous than the Czech; communists in the key posts; a controlled alliance of all the 'willing' parties; the hounding out of political life of all the remaining parties and their leaders (such as Dr. Machek); and a single list of candidates offered to the electorate. Strict control of the press and of public opinion.

VII. CONCLUSION

This rapid survey of Russia's relations with her neighbours (even leaving out Turkey and Austria where the general lines of the system would be but confirmed) justifies the following conclusions:

There is a definite pattern in both the strategy and the tactics of the Soviet Union policy towards her neighbours.

This strategy comprises:

(1) Seizure of all territories the U.S.S.R. thinks due to her or necessary to her.

(2) The setting up of governments controlled by communists with the Ministry of the Interior always, and most other important Ministries often, in the hands of communists.

(3) Ousting of the Anglo-Saxons and of their political influence.

The tactics comprise:

(1) Total disregard of any element other than force.

(2) Complete opportunism in the use of texts from treaties, of arguments and of political attitudes.

(3) Adoption of the word 'democracy' to describe exclusively parties and political groupings willing to ally themselves with the communists and yield to their power.

(4) Complete indifference to the actual opinion of the nation concerned as expressed in existing political parties, and ostracism inflicted on all parties and leaders, whatever their record, if they disagree with the general strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union.

(5) Economic submission by means of war-indemnities inflicted on ex-enemies or special treaties inflicted on friends.

CHAPTER VIII

THE U.S.S.R. AND WORLD AFFAIRS

It was to be expected of the integrity and consistency of Soviet policy that her stand in the problem of how to organize world affairs should be determined by principles identical with those she had followed in her relations with neighbouring States, and indeed in her internal affairs as well. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, an authoritarian and anti-liberal State, has been expected for years to behave in world affairs as if its political philosophy were that of Gladstone or of Woodrow Wilson. Now, there are reasons why a State may have to be less, but none why it should be more, generous in its foreign than in its home policy. Many disappointments would have been spared to the west if this had been borne in mind. The principles of strategy and the rules of tactics followed by the U.S.S.R. in world affairs are identical with those which guided her policy towards her neighbours and towards her own people. The U.S.S.R. remained aloof, critical and even contemptuous towards Geneva while Germany was still too weak to be a danger. As Germany's power grew, Russia drew closer to the League of Nations, feeling that collective security might be a good insurance policy while she herself was not strong enough. But the Union realized that the League of Nations was in its core a liberal-democratic institution. It was necessary to adopt a policy which should conform with the democratic west and yet suit the autocratic east. This was the Trojan Horse policy, first formulated by Dimitrof in August 1935, in the course of the eighth congress of the Communist International. Russia joined the League of Nations.

The International Peace Campaign was organized as a League of Nations Union under communist control; and in most European nations movements known as *Popular Front* were started in order to give the local communist parties a footing on the ladder of political power.

It was then that the U.S.S.R. became interested in collective security, and, conversely, that collective security became a dogma of the extreme Left. Russia's behaviour in Geneva during the Abyssinian crisis, for instance, was exemplary. And during that year 1938 in which the disasters of Europe were already brewing, the U.S.S.R. proposed on March 17th that French, Soviet, American and British statesmen should meet together to see what could be done collectively to prevent further aggression. Neither Germany, Italy nor Japan were invited, for, as M. Litvinov put it: 'we do not wish to discuss aggression with the aggressors'.

But the western powers were not eager to join hands with the U.S.S.R.; while soon after the U.S.S.R. was feeling stronger, and less in need of them. At the opening of the eighteenth congress of the communist party in Moscow (March 10th, 1939), M. Stalin bluntly stated views which foreshadowed the startling changes soon to be seen in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. He defined the policy of the U.S.S.R. in no uncertain terms: 'Peace and the strengthening of businesslike relations with all countries' on the basis of existing political realities; peaceable relations with all neighbouring countries 'as long as these countries maintain identical relations with the Soviet Union'; support to nations which have fallen a prey to aggression; resistance to threats from aggressors and meeting of aggression against the U.S.S.R. with armed force. This done, the Soviet dictator, having declared that the anti-Comintern pact was aimed less at the U.S.S.R. than at the western democracies, strongly criticized Britain and France for their constant

retreats before the encroachments of the totalitarian aggressors, a policy which amounted to conniving with the aggressors. In short, 'realism' pure and simple. There was bluntness, in this frank and powerful utterance; but there was clarity as well, a warning of change, and of a change which the wavering empiricism of the west amply justified, but which was implicit in the permanent empiricism of Russia herself.

The U.S.S.R., however, did not give up her former policy all of a sudden. The round-table system was given another chance. According to an official statement published on March 21st, 1939 in Moscow:

> Poland and Rumania did not apply to the Soviet Government for help, nor did they inform that Government of any danger threatening them. What actually happened was that on March 18th the British Government informed the Soviet Government of the existence of weighty reasons to fear an act of violence over Rumania and inquired about the possible position of the Soviet Government in such an eventuality. In reply to this enquiry the Soviet Government put forward a proposal for the calling of a Conference of the States most closely interested — namely, Great Britain, France, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the Soviet Government such a Conference would give the maximum possibilities for the elucidation of the real situation and the position of all the participants at the Conference. The British Government, however, found this proposal premature.

Mr. Chamberlain's explanations to the House of Commons on March 23rd were not calculated to alter M. Stalin's new course.[1]

'Realism' it was to be; but the somewhat naive though sincere western critics who laid on Mr. Chamberlain and his Government the responsibility for this change in Russian policy, while right up to a point, were not quite

[1] 'There is no desire on the part of H.M.'s Government to stand in the way of any reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade.'

right; for they overlooked the fact that, for Russia, the policy of conferences and resistance to aggressors and the policy of no conference and alliance with aggressors were mere instruments to be taken or left according to the task of the day. Those Balkan and other conferences were Trojan horse tactics, of the kind we are seeing now in the internal affairs of all the nations which have become satellites of Moscow. When found ineffective, because the Trojan horse would not move, or unnecessary, because the Russian force need no longer be hidden, these tactics were dropped. And so it came to the Soviet-German treaty, the Soviet-German partitition of Poland and the attack on Finland, in which Russia threw to the winds all pretence of respect for the League Covenant or for her bilateral treaties with her neighbours, as well as of abhorrence for aggression.

This was opportunism with a vengeance. 'With this sword' — the story goes that General Boulanger said on receiving a sword of honour in Paris — 'I swear to defend the Republic, and if need be to attack her.' Russia ran the liberal-democratic idea of the League and its collective security against aggression and aggressors; and on seeing that the west was not energetic enough against aggressors, turned aggressor herself. The Soviet-German agreement of August 1939 is but incompletely described by its name of 'pact of non-aggression'. It really was an agreement on aggression against all and sundry except each other. This is now obvious and well ascertained, for it has been made clear both by M. Molotov (as hereafter quoted) and by Hitler, who, on July 17th, 1940, declared: that the 'non-aggression pact' had 'settled concretely and once for all their respective zones of interests, and what should be considered as German and as Russian interests'. And, lest this was not clear enough, the Führer, after Russia had garnered in the spoils from Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and

Rumania, explicitly declared: 'Neither Germany nor Russia has made one single step outside her zones of interests'.[1] The Moscow pact was therefore a pact of non-aggression on each other and of aggression on everybody else.

It is important to clear this point, for otherwise nothing of the present or of the future can be understood. Two lines of argument are often taken with regard to this period: 'Russia was fully justified'; and 'Russia was just fooling the Germans and gaining time'.

1. Russia was fully justified. This is true, only too true, but on condition that the conclusion is carefully defined and limited. She was justified in her disappointment at the impotence to which the League had been reduced by the western powers; in her resentment at the hardly disguised policy of letting the war rage towards the east provided the west was left safe — a policy never perhaps officially held or encouraged in the west, but undoubtedly active as a ferment in some sectors of western public opinion. The upshot of it all was that *Russia was fully justified in adopting a strictly Russian policy in the quarrels between the western and the central great powers.*

But no nation professing to be progressive could be justified in acting as Russia did towards Finland, the Baltic States and Poland (though in this last case, the complex history of the eastern frontiers and the exceptional circumstances created by the German aggression might be given special consideration). And, worst of all, Russia was not justified in riding rough-shod over covenants and solemn promises, thus inflicting a severe blow on the standards and mental habits of our civilization.

2. As for gaining time and fooling the Germans:

(*a*) Russia could not be blind to the fact that, in signing a pact with Hitler, she gave the German General Staff

[1] GAFENCO: p. 57.

the green light to start the war in the west. Russia knew the west was not ready. She gained time by sacrificing the west — a detail which communists all over the world, including England, forgot when later they clamoured for a second front. This policy was therefore as unintelligent from the Russian point of view as it was callous towards the west.

(*b*) The idea that the Russians looked upon their pact with Germany as a mere temporary makeshift may well be the outcome of the most frequent error in history — that of injecting into past days thoughts and experiences of later times. The stark, empirical realism of the Soviet leader made it imperative that he should scan with an equal eye a world ruled by Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill with Hitler and Mussolini hanged or shot, and a world ruled by Hitler and Mussolini with Britain down and out and a distant and sullen America; not to speak of other vaguer intermediate possibilities. As the second branch of the prospect Stalin had at the time before his mental eyes has disappeared, partly by the folly of Hitler in breaking his pact with Stalin, we tend to interpret the policy of the Soviets as if only one had ever been present in Stalin's mind when he made his pact with Hitler. It is therefore imperative to recall some texts. M. Molotov, most faithful mouthpiece of his chief, said to the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on October 31st, 1939.

> The ruling circles of Great Britain and France had been lately attempting to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against Hitlerism, and the British Government has announced that its aim in the war with Germany is nothing more nor less than the 'destruction of Hitlerism'. It amounts to this, that the British, and with them the French supporters of the war, have declared something in the nature of an 'ideological' war on Germany reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times. In fact, the religious wars against heretics and

> religious dissenters were once the fashion. As we know, they led to dire results for the masses, to economic ruin, and the cultural deterioration of nations. These wars could have no other outcome, but they were the wars of the Middle Ages. Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition, and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Great Britain and France want to drag us? In any case under the 'ideological' flag has now been started a war of even greater dimensions and fraught with even greater danger for the peoples of Europe and the whole world. But there is absolutely no justification for war of this kind. One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system — that is a matter of political views. But everybody should understand that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism', camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy'.

It may be argued that this was part of the hoodwinking of the Germans; and *up to a point*, so it was, since the Soviet Union is too realist ever to neglect a single possibility. But there is abundant proof of the fact that when M. Molotov uttered those words — in themselves far too deeply and forcibly expressed to be mere wind for a smoke screen — he was giving form to a policy the Soviet Union considered real, possible, immediate and permanent. For, were it not so, the unison of the communist orchestra throughout the world denouncing France and England for inflicting on Germany and the world a war no one wanted, would have been less impressive. In those days, particularly after Russia had taken all she wanted from her neighbours, no communist party or leader in the world, not even in France or Britain, failed to follow the instructions received from Moscow and condemn the war as futile, imperialist, ideological and what not. The Soviet Union, the force

behind this campaign, knew it was undermining the unanimity of the western powers at the moment when they were struggling for their very existence. France had to outlaw the communist party and to lock up all the communist leaders who did not succeed in fleeing to Moscow; Britain banned the *Daily Worker*.

All this thoroughness went much further than mere hoodwinking and winning of time would justify. Moreover we know that Hitler's ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, was convinced of Stalin's sincerity as an ally of Germany at the time — and Schulenburg was no fool. 'What Stalin wanted above all' — writes a man well placed to observe those events — 'and that for which he was ready to give every possible guarantee of security, was an assurance, confirmed by proofs, that he would not be elbowed out [by Hitler] from the final settlement of world problems, and that Germany remained ready to appeal to his collaboration, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Moscow agreement.'[1]

All this is confirmed by M. Molotov himself. As late as August 1st, 1940, he said: 'This agreement, which our Government carries out strictly, has set aside all possibility of friction in the application of Soviet security measures alongside our western frontiers [i.e. territorial seizures in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and Rumania] and at the same time, has guaranteed Germany full tranquillity in the east. The course of events in Europe, far from weakening the non-aggression pact between the Soviets and Germany, has, on the contrary, stressed the importance of its existence and of its later development.'[2]

[1] Ce que Staline désirait avant tout, et en échange de quoi, il était prêt à donner toutes les garanties de sécurité possibles, était une assurance, confirmée sur preuves, qu'on ne l'excluerait pas du réglement des problèmes mondiaux, et que l'on était toujours prêt à faire appel à sa collaboration, conformément au texte et à l'esprit de accord de Moscou.—GAFENCO: p. 211.

[2] GAFENCO: p. 58.

These last words, therefore, far from looking towards a more or less distant end of the agreement, asked for more of it. M. Molotov hinted in them at the situation in the Balkans, a part of Europe which had become more precious to Hitler since he had had to sacrifice his dreams of conquering the Ukraine in order to secure Soviet neutrality. Here, the Soviet Union was rebuffed several times by the Germans. The Vienna award (August 1940) gave Transylvania to Hungary and consoled Rumania by means of a German military guarantee. 'Against whom?' — asked M. Molotov aggrieved at this cavalier treatment inflicted by the Germans on their eastern allies. Again in the matter of the Danube Commissions in which Russia tried to get a footing without much success, and in a general way, by a German dog-in-the-manger policy, the Soviet Union found herself evicted by Germany from the Balkans. Vexed, the Union avoided giving offence. Even when the Tripartite pact was signed (September 1940) M. Stalin kept smiling through the ordeal. Earlier in the year (May) he had signified to the diplomatic missions of Belgium, Norway and Yugoslavia that they could no longer be recognized by the Soviet Union. He did in fact all he could to keep German friendship, and was aggrieved when he felt himself treated coolly or inconsiderately by Berlin. In November 1940 M. Molotov paid a visit to Berlin and stayed there three days. It was the last effort the Germans made to keep the pact going on the basis of Soviet Russia being reduced to the position of a German satellite.[1] This of course was not a role M. Stalin was ready to play. Things went from bad to worse. Even at the eleventh hour M. Stalin tried to avert the war by that curious communiqué in which all the German warlike

[1] A complete knowledge of this visit is much needed. Good observers put Russia's demands very high; the Straits, bases in the Skagerrak and Narvik are mentioned.

preparations on his own frontiers, which he knew for facts, were relegated to the realm of 'rumours' and as such attributed to Sir Stafford Cripps and other such unscrupulous warmongers! And, when in the night of June 21st-22nd, 1941, the German Ambassador came to announce that Hitler's troops had crossed the frontier, M. Molotov said: 'It is war. Your aircraft have bombed about ten open cities of ours. Do you believe we have deserved all that?'[1]

A good deal of realism is needed in order to understand Stalin's own realism. Stalin was a collaborationist from August 21st, 1939 to June 22nd, 1941. 'The agreements [of Moscow] which the Soviet Government carried out punctually guaranteed Germany the provisional food and raw materials and the possibility of victoriously resisting the British blockade.'[2]

Furthermore, painful though it may be for all of us, westerners directly or indirectly in a biological solidarity with Britain, M. Stalin, *from his point of view*, was right in being a collaborationist then. What was Britain to him or he to Britain? The hour of solidarity with Britain had not yet struck for the U.S.S.R.; nor, when it came, did it usher in an all round and steady solidarity, but only one limited in space and time and defined by the very dangers which the existence of the nazi empire revealed.

Our western would-be realists, who are too busy admiring Stalin's realism to develop a realism of their own, would do well to meditate on this fact: at no time has the U.S.S.R. acted as a nation for whom solidarity with the west was worth the sacrifice of any satisfaction of policy or of prestige. The campaign for a second

[1] GAFENCO: p. 247.

[2] Les accords que le Gouvernement Soviétique exécutait ponctuellement assuraient à l'Allemagne des vivres, des matières premières et la possibilité de résister victorieusement au blocus britannique.—GAFENCO: p. 212.

front, the appointment of an Ambassador to the Badoglio Government, the 'Lublin Committee' policy are outstanding examples of the total indifference of the Soviet Union to the feelings of the west. It would be erroneous and unfair to attribute it to ill will. It is due to a difference in political philosophy and in the way of understanding life. The hard-boiled communist leaders stand on the ground of mutually conjugated egoisms. Many British sailors were lost bringing convoys to Russia: that shows how much importance British egoism attached to keeping Russia well supplied. Are Britain or America going to slacken their efforts against Hitler because we, the U.S.S.R., recognize the Lublin Committee and do not care a rap that they back other Poles? Of course not, since Britain and America are fighting Hitler in *their* own defence and not for the *beaux yeux* of Russia. So thought the leaders of the U.S.S.R. And . . . were they wrong?

How does all that work in European and world affairs? In March 1943 it was still possible for the British Government to speak freely on the kind of world it wanted. Mr. Churchill went so far as to give a most illuminating and constructive forecast of a world organization in a speech broadcast in twenty-four languages on March 21st. He advocated a council of Europe and a council of Asia. He wanted 'to make the council of Europe into a really effective League, with all the strongest forces concerned woven to its texture'. 'Anyone can see that this council when created must eventually embrace the whole of Europe, and that all the main branches of the European family must some day be partners in it,' said the British Prime Minister; and he added that 'side by side with the great powers there should be a number of groupings of States or confederations, the whole making a council of States and groups of States.

There were already in this speech discreet warnings of future differences of opinion. But, at the time, the robust optimism of the Prime Minister made the deeper impression. Federation was in the air, and over a year before Mr. Churchill's speech, on January 15th, 1942, the Greek and Yugoslav governments exiled in London had signed a treaty of federation to be put into operation after the war. A political organ, an economic and financial organ and a military organ were created, as well as a co-ordinating permanent bureau and secretariat. On January 23rd, 1942 the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia signed a similar pact in London, covering the following points: the pact to be open to other States in the area; common policy in foreign affairs, defence, economics and finance, transport, posts and telegraphs; a common general staff and a unified command in time of war; co-ordination of foreign trade and tariff towards a customs union; an agreed monetary policy; co-ordination of financial policy; common administration of all transport and tele-communications; co-ordination in social policy and education; freedom of conscience and thought; common institutions to carry out the whole programme.

It may safely be asserted that no more hopeful sign had been seen in Europe for a long time than this treaty between the two Slav Governments exiled in London. Nor was the treaty left dormant on the diplomatic tables. Work on it began in June 1942. On the 9th, the two Governments announced that the Polish-Czechoslovak committee of co-ordination had been instructed to convoke four mixed commissions to study post-war collaboration between the two nations on economic, military, social and cultural affairs. This hopeful treaty was killed by the opposition of the U.S.S.R., not merely to it, but to the Polish Government. True, in his speech before the Czechoslovak State Council (May 17th, 1943), Dr.

Ripka, Minister of State, said that the Polish-Soviet dispute was not the only reason why the relations between his country and Poland had not taken the course desired by Czechoslovakia; and he referred to the fact that Poland had not declared war on Hungary; but even this speech frankly reveals that the chief cause of the trouble came from the Polish-Soviet tension; and the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to other plans of partial or general European federation confirmed this conclusion.

There are three reasons for this. The first and most generally given is the weakest — *security*. A distrust of European intentions lingers in the U.S.S.R. since the days of the Cordon Sanitaire. But Russia is to-day one of the most powerful nations in the world, and by far the most powerful in Europe. No combination of European nations, even with Britain thrown in, could ever beat her. Moreover, Russia could, at her wish, join whatever general or eastern federation was formed in Europe, and by her unmatched weight in its councils, determine its policy and prevent any danger to her safety. The argument of security is therefore irrelevant.

The second motive which induces Russia to oppose European federations is that Russia has a faith. A European federation would be founded on liberal principles. Would Philip II have joined a Protestant League? Would he have liked one to be formed? Stalin must look askance at any liberal federations of the kind the Poles and the Czechs were contemplating. For the U.S.S.R. there is only one kind of federation — the U.S.S.R. itself.

Finally, by taking a stand against federation, the U.S.S.R. gained another advantage: she isolated the European States,. and put herself in a position to deal with each of them separately. Bilateral agreements are

to-day extolled by Stalin as they were extolled by Hitler before the war, and for the same reason.

This is the true picture. It flows from the totalitarian nature of the Russian State and faith. Autocratic at home, it cannot be democratic abroad. Forbidding free discussion at home, Russia cannot willingly accept membership of liberal-parliamentary bodies, in which her own policy might be discussed and possibly condemned by 'the mob' of small nations, as it happened in Geneva in 1940. Russia keeps shy of institutions such as the Red Cross or the International Labour Office which would force her to tender information on her own household. Her policy remains consistently autocratic abroad as at home.

It is now possible to attempt a comparison between the spirit and actual effects of the foreign policies of the U.S.S.R. and of the United States, at any rate in what concerns their respective Monroe Doctrines. The spirit behind these policies is curiously inverse from that which might be expected of each of the two States. The State with a political tradition, the United States, bases its power on economic forces; the State with an economic tradition, the U.S.S.R., spreads its power by political means. The United States, through business, ensures a modicum of political subservience — just enough to carry on and improve its business. The U.S.S.R. makes sure that the Ministry of the Interior, centre of all political forces, is in the hands of a communist in every one of the countries of the zone; and so, by purely political means, it forces its economic conceptions down the throats of its satellite nations.

This leads to an interesting result, as shown in the Conference of San Francisco. The political hold of the Marxist power over its neighbours is far more efficient and authoritarian than the economic hold of the political

State. Thus, the Spanish American countries, by sheer numbers, publicity and lobbying, succeeded in winning over the United States to their own view on the admission of Argentina to the Conference; while in the case of Poland, the U.S.S.R. forced its satellite States to adopt the Soviet view although it could hardly recommend itself to any of them. This contrast confirms the opinion of those who think that political forces control economics more efficiently than do economic forces political life.

CHAPTER IX

THE U.S.S.R. AND DUMBARTON OAKS

Now the problem is: how are the western liberal democracies and the eastern communist autocracy going to organize the world for peace?

In order to answer this question, we must first outline the world organization which world peace requires of itself; and then ask ourselves how far this organization is possible given our present day reality.

The world has suffered so much from wars that it is, not unnaturally, inclined to approach this question mainly, if not exclusively, from the point of view of aggression and how to repress or prevent it. We have already shown that this is the wrong approach, for aggression is either unimportant and easily put down without much fuss (i.e. when coming from a small power) or too strong for any world machinery to resist its strain (i.e. when the aggressor is a big power).

But reality being but one, all roads, even winding ones, must lead to it. And, since this is the prevailing line of thought, there is no harm in entering into it, provided we do so determined not to be deflected by fallacies.

Let us then examine the best way for repressing or preventing aggression. In view of what has been pointed out above, we at once decide to drop all hope of repressing and we concentrate on preventing. Where are we to draw the line? Most conflicts leading to war will be found to have followed a line of evolution which could be compared to a road going up hill first, passing a top, and then rushing downwards headlong into hostilities. It may often be a little less simple than that; there may be two or three crests and downhill rushes,

leading to the brink and yet not quite to the abyss of war; but, in the end, there is always a final crest, and a rush down to hostilities.

Evidently, the wise way consists in putting the brake on to the war chariot while it is still going up hill; i.e. while the forces which are working against hostilities are still stronger than those working for it. That line, that crest, is the frontier between prevention and repression of aggression.

The world organization must therefore get busy before aggression is born; indeed, before there is any intention thereof. But how is anyone to know that a situation has arisen which requires that the world organization should get busy in order to forestall an aggression?

There are only two ways wars may occur: in virtue of the general policy of a particular nation; or because a conflict on a concrete question suddenly becomes acute. The two may of course be combined, particularly as, when a nation is seeking for trouble, she can always create an incident. The first case requires a world organization which follows trends and events in the policy of all its members, notes their armaments and keeps its hand on the pulse of their public opinions. Evidently, if the League had taken these duties in earnest when Mussolini or Hitler began to use warlike language, in the teeth of his obligations as a loyal signatory of the Covenant, and if action had been taken on it, this war would have been avoided. It follows that the world organization must, first and foremost, be endowed with organs enabling it to keep in daily touch with the public opinion of its chief members and to acquire full and frank information on the state of their armaments and their policy.

The second case of possible war leads to similar, but even wider, conclusions. Let us consider this sequence: a war is due to a conflict due to a problem due to a ques-

tion due to a difference over a normal transaction. It is plain that the further away from war, i.e. the earlier in this process, the matter is brought before the world organization, the stronger are the chances of finding a solution for it. But at this early stage there is nothing to show which of the normal transactions between two States might lead to a war. Anything may, if neglected, lead to war. It follows that the world organization can only be reasonably sure of forestalling war if it possesses organs allowing it to co-ordinate and keep a bird's-eye view on all international affairs whatsoever.

These conclusions are of course confirmed when the matter is examined from any other angle.

For instance: a so-called security organization calls on all States to apply 'sanctions' against the aggressor. This is a most serious demand on any State at any time: and a nearly deadly demand in some cases. (Denmark asked to take sanctions against Germany, for instance.) What in all this is the position of State A asked to help repel an aggression made against State B by an aggressor State C? A has a perfect right to say to B: 'I should be ready to help you, but what do I know of the policy you have been pursuing for years towards C and towards some of C's friends?' And this question is unanswerable.

Therefore, in order to wield the right and the moral authority to claim help in applying sanctions, the world organization must be not merely a general staff for sanctions, but a clearing house for policy. Or, in other words: *no collective security without collective policy.*

What are the organs the world organization should possess to fulfil this task?

1. A council to handle all international affairs and not merely security ones. There are no questions which can specifically be described as 'security

questions'. It is as if doctors limited the notion of disease to states above 100° of temperature. A so-called 'security' council must deal with all matters whatsoever of international importance, or risk to be as unable to prevent war as a doctor who would never be called till the patient was very ill, would be to prevent death.

This council would, of course, repress aggression if it occurred, but its chief aim should be to forestall aggression by a long length. To that effect it would devote a special interest to trends of policy and opinion in all its member-States, and to statistics of armaments and organization of war establishments; but no less to economic, financial and psychological symptoms of the designs of its members.

2. An assembly, as democratic as possible, to meet with full and unrestricted rights of criticism and publicity.
3. A civil service carefully trained till it achieved a consciousness of supra-national loyalty.
4. A world court of justice equally trained and developed.

Of the four, the most important is the assembly. For the real problem is how to prevent aggression by a great power. When such a power has come to the very brink of war, nothing on earth can stop her. But if she is just moving towards it, the best deterrent is a thorough-going debate in the world parliament; for big powers are proud and sensitive about their good name. This would be particularly the case if the aggression contemplated was aimed at a small nation. Nor does the matter rest there. For what is aggression? Suppose Spain, having caught Portugal napping, confronted her sister-nation with a conspiracy nicely organized on Spanish soil, with Spanish weapons, with Spaniards calling themselves

Portuguese revolutionists, under a number of genuine Portuguese, well-paid quislings, and overnight Portugal found herself occupied by Spanish troops so disguised, and submitted to a bogus plebiscite which enthusiastically voted her into an Iberian Union. Is that aggression? When does the security council come in?

Nowadays, an aggression may take so many forms that the only reasonable guarantees a small nation can have of living free from fear are publicity and a *very* early ventilation of the policy of her doubtful friends.

This outline of what a world organization should be has been established by starting from the premisses that the chief aim of such an organization should be to guard against aggression. It is due to no dogmatic principle, no theoretic idealism. It expects nothing out of the common. And it is moreover the conclusion of premisses everyone accepts. But it lends itself to some observations:

1. By removing the centre of activity from repression to prevention of aggression, and from punishment of misdeeds to co-operation in deeds, this plan removes the activity of the council from a period when no one can stop a wrong-headed big power to a period when a big power can be stopped from becoming wrong-headed.

   For instance: Persia has oil deposits. The three great powers are after them. Russia gets angry, sends one of her big commissars, shakes the Cabinet, makes it resign, raises a dust in her press; the other two look on. As Hitler is still in the offing, things do not get worse. But Persia as a small power has undergone some rough treatment.

   Now, the world organization being in existence, the problem of Persian oil would be taken up by the council, *before* it became acute; and if the

council did not behave, the assembly would debate the matter in public.

2. The *special* responsibility of the three big powers to keep the peace vanishes. In order to administer the affairs of the commonwealth wisely, all you want is a dozen good men. Let us by all means have one each from the big powers, but their nationality will not, as such, add to their wisdom; while it may detract from their freedom to judge true.
3. No peace can really be assured without a free exchange of opinions among its members and with the world authorities. Military establishments, in particular, must be known to all. News, broadcasts, books and human beings, particularly journalists, publicists, statesmen and authors, must travel freely from one part to another.
4. No limit must be put to the freedom of debate in the assembly and to its own arrangements to disseminate its views.

It is clear that such a programme meant no revolutionary change for the western powers. British opinion would have approved it almost without opposition; and, in the United States, while opposition would have been much more considerable, no one would doubt President Roosevelt's power or that of his successors to win it over. But how about the U.S.S.R.?

No hypothesis is needed. The history of the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, together with the evolution of the Polish situation are enough to form an objective opinion on the matter. The overwhelming mass of Russia's political influence has weighed down the evolution of world affairs forcing it to recede from a liberal-democratic League of Nations, working in open debate, back to an unholy alliance of big powers which assume for themselves the privileges of the stronger

and rely on force and very little else. There are, no doubt, a number of acceptable features in the San Francisco Charter, as we shall see presently. But the plain fact is that in the Conference of San Francisco Russia, with her usual vigour and tenacity, has manifested a number of tendencies which it is important to note; for they confirm our observations made on a recent past, and enable us to forecast Russian policy in the near future.

The first of these tendencies is that which many people are pleased to describe as *realism*: i.e. the policy of might is right, put forward without the slightest respect for the rights, ideas, wishes or needs of any but the strongest.

The second is a fascist, i.e. authoritarian sense of what the international organization must be.

The third is a hardly veiled fear of criticism, i.e. of the weight of the moral forces which manifest themselves in free debate, whether in international assemblies or in the press and other organs of world opinion.

The fourth is an extremely tight rein on Russian delegates abroad, which leads to constant delays during which the world debate is held up pending the arrival of instructions from Moscow; and as was more than once observed in San Francisco, can even go as far as to reopen questions already closed and decided upon, because the Government in Moscow has either changed its mind or rejected a decision arrived at with the free assent of its own delegate.

All these features are of course bound to flow from the authoritarian and totalitarian character of the Russian system. All are to leave a deep trace in the Charter of San Francisco.

Had there been in Russia a liberal-democratic or a social-democratic rule, it is absolutely certain that at the end of this war we should have seen a rebirth of the

League of Nations, possibly with a slightly altered Covenant. Little of what has been written in criticism of the Covenant is of value. It is a document quite adequate to rule world affairs, provided the big powers wish it to work; and if they do not, neither Covenant nor Charter will avail anything.

If therefore the Covenant was sentenced to death and another document drafted, the reason was certainly not its failure, for there was no such failure: the reason was that Russia refused to have anything to do with it. This attitude of Russia is due to two causes: one moral and the other one political. The moral opposition springs from the expulsion of Russia from the League of Nations as a result of her aggression upon Finland. It will be remembered that Russia had argued at the time that the mere fact of summoning her to answer for her actions before the council was incompatible with the respect due to the Soviet Union. To my knowledge there is only one other case in which a great power arrogantly claimed the right to sit above the law of nations: when during the Corfu incident, on Lord Cecil mentioning Article 16 which meets any break of the Covenant with the measures known as 'sanctions', the Italian delegate argued that such measures were not meant to be applied to big powers. Humiliated by her expulsion, Russia made it a point of honour to destroy the League of Nations. The emotional character of this opposition reveals itself even in the matter of words. Russia has succeeded in striking out of the new organization most of the words used by the old. Instead of League of Nations, United Nations. Instead of Covenant, Charter. Instead of mandate, trusteeship. Instead of intellectual co-operation, education and culture. For the same emotional motive, Russia refuses to let the new organization be settled in Geneva, where the best accommodation for it exists already.

The second cause of Russian opposition to the League of Nations is political. The League of Nations was in world affairs an expression of the same spirit which in home affairs had given forth liberal democracies. In the whole Covenant hardly any trace of authoritarianism can be found other than the permanent seats granted in the council to the big powers. In its spirit, it was a parliamentary institution. All these features of the League were therefore out of tune with the spirit of the Soviet Union, which is authoritarian and admits no discussion; a system in which all assemblies and councils are mere soundboards for the voice of authority.

The first of these two causes of Russian opposition to the League made the creation of another organization inevitable; the second determined the method to create it. The new organization would no longer be studied by a committee of delegates of nations big and small, as had been the case with the League, for the mixing of big nations with small runs counter to the prestige of the big, and the whole idea was far too liberal and bourgeois for Russia. The big powers would meet first and would prepare a draft to their own satisfaction, a draft which the small powers would later adopt with as much enthusiasm as the Supreme Council of the Soviets adopts the ukases of M. Stalin. Hence Dumbarton Oaks and what San Francisco was intended to be — though not quite what it was.

It is hardly necessary to analyse the Dumbarton Oaks proposals since they are already superseded by the Charter. But two points should be put on record: the first is that both in Dumbarton Oaks and in San Francisco Russia held the anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary tendency for which she stands, backing always the rights of the big powers against the small, of the council against the assembly and of punitive and military measures as against preventive policy; and second,

that the progress which in all these aspects can be noticed between the Dumbarton Oaks draft and the Charter, is due mostly to the public spirit of the small and medium nations free from Russian influence, such as Australia, Belgium and Holland.

A study of the Charter confirms all these conclusions. It is a document which stands as a compromise between the liberal-democratic-parliamentary-political spirit of the Covenant and the totalitarian-authoritarian-militaristic spirit of Russia. We are often told that the San Francisco Charter is a far better document than the League Covenant, in that it is far more effective and realistic. Is that so? By no means. With few outstanding exceptions, the Charter lags behind the Covenant precisely in the qualities which are claimed for it.

Let us begin with the exceptions, i.e. the features in which the Charter is an improvement on the Covenant. First of all, its name. *Charter* is a better name than *Covenant* and particularly, than *Pacte*; for it suggests a Constitution rather than a combine or 'League'. It suits better the sense of constitutional union which the name of the new organization conveys: *United Nations*. Nor should these matters be dismissed as trivial, for there is a strange magic in words, and, in particular, in the names of living things.

The second advantage is that the Charter starts with all the great powers within its precincts, and not merely in its political institutions, but in its world court as well. When the tenacious opposition of the United States to ratify the statute of the Hague court is called to mind, the progress made since then is vividly realized — especially if it be remembered that American reluctance was mainly due to the power of the League council to ask the court for advisory opinions: now the Charter grants this power not only to the security council but to the assembly as well.

There is a third point, on which the Charter is to be preferred to the Covenant: its provisions with regard to the general secretariat, and, in particular, Article 100, which provides that: 'in the performance of their duties the secretary-general and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization . . . Each member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the secretary-general and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.' True, the League of Nations, on the initiative of the Spanish delegation, had gone further, since it had laid it down that the secretary-general and his staff were to swear an oath of allegiance to the League council and assembly. But the Covenant, as such, contains no provisions of the kind; and therefore this is a point on which the Charter is the better document of the two. The Dumbarton Oaks draft, however, was also silent on this all-important subject. Indeed information is not lacking to the effect that the first idea had been to set up a secretariat composed of members of the diplomatic services of the powers, to serve for three years only — i.e. to guarantee the powers against any growth of the spirit of world citizenship in the United Civil Service.

With this, the chapter of improvements is at an end; for though there are other minor aspects in which the Charter is in advance of the Covenant they occur within wider changes which are definitely for the worse or at least of doubtful advantage.

One of the points in which the Charter compares worst with the Covenant is that of length. It runs to no less than 111 articles as against 26. The Covenant is, moreover, with few exceptions, very well drafted; while the style of the Charter is frankly bad and often lacks

both brevity and clarity. The drafting of the Charter suffers from three serious defects: far too often, the binding or executive provisions are mixed up with or immediately preceded by moral or political motivations, which should have been set aside in a preamble; there is too much stipulation by reference from one article to another; and it goes far too much into details for a constitutional text. The upshot of it all is a forest of provisions, sentiments and counter-stipulations which promises to be a paradise for jurists, a seedground for paper-disputes and a mine of subterfuges.

The whole Charter rests on the arch-heresy of political life in both national and international affairs, i.e. the belief that military force is the basis of the State. This aspect of the Charter has been acclaimed as a model of *realism*. Let us see.

Contrary to a widespread belief, it is not the State that rests on military force, but military force that rests on the State. Without a State there is no military force — there are only bandits. There are, of course, cases in which the State does not comprise the whole nation, but only one particular sector of it, perhaps a minority, which, for some set of circumstances, happens to enjoy inner vigour and cohesion enough to monopolize the authority of the State. In such cases, this inner State supports a military force which holds the nation in obedience. The examples of this system are the present-day regimes of Spain and of Russia.

This will stand out more clearly if we compare the cases of Russia and the United States. In the United States, the nation and the State cover the same political area. It follows that the military force is the arm of the State, which is the body of the nation. Military force flows therefore from the spirit of the nation itself. Had the workers gone through an epidemic of strikes, no military force would have been possible, for there would

have been no arms and no ammunition. Nor would the army have been able to put down the strikes, unless the nation as a whole willed it so. The force of the United States, therefore, flows from the very heart of the country, and, for all its material, massive manifestations, is spiritual. So is, of course, the force of Russia also. But the spirit which sustains it is not that of the nation as a whole: it is that of a communist minority which controls, organizes and runs the State, and imparts its driving impulse on the army and on the nation in general by means of a complicated system of propaganda and mental isolation. Were a workman to go on strike, he would be shot — and that would be all; for the State is above the nation and need not depend on it. In Russia, therefore, military force rests on the moral force of the communist State, in its turn secure in its power over the nation by means of a mixed system including military force and propaganda.

The Charter is, in the main, a translation of this Russian system into an international idiom and its adaptation to an international community. Hence its three chief features: *militarism*, as shown in the stress on security, repression and military provisions; *authoritarianism*, as shown in the strong tendency to limit the influence and indeed the sovereignty of all but the big powers; and *anti-parliamentarism*, as shown in its careful curtailment of the powers of the Assembly.

1. *Militarism.* The central feature of the whole Charter is the *security council*, which in itself, and above all, in its name manifests the war-obsession of the draftsmen. This council is to sit permanently and all social, economic and colonial matters are left outside its competence; as if social, economic and colonial affairs had nothing to do with peace. In short, the chief organ of the new international system is to be purely concerned with police affairs.

Nothing could be less realistic. For it is impossible to separate political from social, economic and colonial affairs. The Geneva system, whereby the council and the assembly had a universal jurisdiction and could draw on the competent advice of specialized bodies, was much more practical. True Article 65 of the Charter provides that the economic and social council 'may furnish information to the security council and shall assist the security council upon its request'. But this separation of powers is truly absurd and betrays the force-complex under which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had to be drafted. By its constitution and specialized activities, the security council will have to tackle conflicts at their most dangerous phase, that moreover in which they have become incurable — the phase of military repression.

The only hope here is Article 34, possibly the best and most useful in the whole Charter, whereby 'the security council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'. Verbose it is no doubt, and unnecessarily complicated, and even vague. But granted goodwill, this Article could be most useful for the preservation of peace.

Much more useful, at any rate, than the military staff committee, a feature of the Charter which makes one stare in wonder at the lack of realism of so-called realist people. For how, when and against whom is this committee to prepare plans? Is the would-be aggressor to withdraw its own military men just in time to oblige the other members of the committee? Is the military committee to wait till aggression is well on its way and the aggressor is expelled? The thing is preposterous.

This plan has no sense unless it means a concerted

military dictatorship of the five big powers — what, to borrow from Mr. Churchill's vocabulary, we should call a world police state. The many denials which have been forthcoming of this intention merely show that it is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the scheme, for if it is not meant for that purpose, it certainly can serve no other, as has repeatedly been shown in these pages:

2. *Authoritarianism.* The Charter evinces a strong tendency to limit the powers of the small and medium nations. Non-permanent members of the League of Nations were elected for three years; under the Charter only for two. This means that they will have hardly the time to acquire a sufficient mastery over men and things to be of much use as a check and balance to the big powers, permanent members all. And yet, the Charter forces the small nations to delegate their powers in the hands of the security council in matters of peace and security (Art. 24) and to accept and carry out the council's decisions (Art. 25), and to hold immediately available air-force contingents (Art. 45) and other armed forces assistance and facilities, under agreements to be negotiated on the initiative of the council (Art. 43). All these provisions are grave and delicate. Admirable in a general scheme of real and democratic world unity, they must be considered as dangerous under the authoritarian spirit of a Charter with little or no provision for submitting its working to the watch of public opinion.

3. *Anti-parliamentarism.* In the Covenant the assembly and the council were granted identical faculties (except the assembly privilege of dealing with the budget and the, less clear, privilege of the Council with regard to disarmament). In the Charter, it would seem (for the texts are not clear) that the assembly is to be reduced to a merely advisory capacity. We read only about 'recommendations' to be made to the security council

or to the member States. As a typical example of this tendency to curtail the initiative of the assembly, Article 12 prevents it from intervening, even by way of 'recommendation', on any matter of security or peace actually under consideration by the council. This article stands in striking contrast with Article 13 of the Covenant, paragraph 9 of which provides that the council will always be able to transfer any conflict to the assembly, and shall do so whenever either party so requests within the first fourteen days. This and other similar clauses of the Covenant are due to the democratic spirit of the League of Nations, in the light of which the assembly was looked upon as a kind of higher instance, to which the council or a party to a conflict could always appeal, in order to set in motion moral forces — *the only forces the big powers dread.* Whenever a big Power stood accused as an aggressor at the bar of the League, its delegates moved heaven and earth to prevent the conflict from passing out of the discreet penumbra of the council (where the other big powers were sure to bark but not to bite) on to the limelight of the assembly. Thus it was with Japan, and with Italy. All that has been said or written to present this feature of the Charter as an improvement on the Covenant runs counter to both sense and experience. It is merely one more of the many reactionary aspects of the Charter.

One of the worst results of this reactionary spirit is that the Charter does not rely at all on the moral force of public opinion. It bristles with guns and aircraft, but the moral weapons, truth and publicity, access of the opinions of the council to the public of the aggressor State, control of broadcasting during a crisis in the interest of truth and peace, in one word, mobilization of public opinion — about all this, nothing.

Yet another result is that the real realism, that which realizes the part which financial forces, oil and aviation

play in world affairs, is quite absent from this 'realistic' Charter. We are to organize the nations with terrible efficiency to *repress* aggression; but the oil wells of the world are to remain exposed to the turmoil and the anarchy of that zone of business-cum-nationalism to which we owe already General Gómez' tyranny of Venezuela, the repeated and ever-changing interventions of the United States in Mexico, the Franco-British squabbles in Asia Minor and the Anglo-Russian rivalries in Persia and Rumania. A shame on the Charter — it contains neither an international oil service nor an international civil air-traffic service.

And yet, the San Francisco Charter does add up to a workable system, the results of which may be good, middling or bad according to the spirit which with it is carried out. Possibly its less realistic provisions — which are those more generally praised for their realism — may fall into decay through sheer uselessness; while the seeds of useful co-operation which it contains may grow in peace, if peace be actually maintained by the sheer fear of war between the mighty. For peace is a matter of real solidarity and not of documents.

CHAPTER X

WHAT THEN?

THE two chief problems are: what to do with Germany; and how to provide a solid basis for an alliance between Russia and the west. These two problems are closely inter-related.

I. GERMANY

It is wise not to over-estimate the capacity of the Allies to control the evolution of Germany. True, her own folly has reduced her to such ruin that her recovery this time will take much longer than after the first world war — apart from any action by her adversaries — yet it is well to remember that, as Adam Smith said, nations take a good deal of ruining; while coalitions are apt to break away or get loose at the joints.

For all these reasons, it is imperative that no trust should be put on measures other than those which go to the root of the trouble, and in particular those which can be set going during the next few years.

Economic, territorial and educational measures may be useful up to a point; but they do not go to the source of the trouble; and they take an unlimited amount of time to apply and maintain. They are not safe. Germany may lose for ever Upper Silesia and East Prussia — but she may not. We do not know. Control of the Ruhr may or may not be efficient and lasting.

The trouble comes from the character of the Germans and from the atmosphere of world imperialism and power politics which prevails in the world.

We must therefore concentrate on these two points: How to change the German character in general, their

amorality, their sheepishness, their inept way with human beings in contrast with their mastery over inanimate things, their brutality as masters and their servility as subjects? How to alter the German belief in force as the only rule and *justification* of foreign policy, and, to that effect, what measures must be taken by the great powers to avoid giving them a model precisely for the policy which is natural for them to take?

(1) *Character*

We have already stated why we do not believe in the so-called re-education of Germany. There is only one sure way to alter the soul of a nation: by altering its stock. What is wrong with the German is that he is a German. He must be made less of a German. All those already born are past praying for. The new masters of the world must see to it that the forthcoming 'German' generation is no longer quite German. There is only one way of securing this: mixing the German with other European stocks.

No violence is implied. The normal and civilized methods must be observed whereby peoples mix. All that is needed is an intelligent and persevering policy to bring about millions of mixed marriages in Germany in the next five to ten years. The moment is propitious. The victors are to hold Germany for five to ten years; and on the other hand, Germany is going to remain short of males for some time to come. Her land will need labourers, her women husbands. Foreign men must be attracted to Germany on the understanding that they come to stay and to found a family. Special inducements must be given to these as well as to any other mixed-stock marriages in Germany to have a high number of children.

The stocks to be attracted must not be left to chance. The chief trouble with the German is his gregarious spirit. It must be counterbalanced with its opposite, an extreme

individualism. The German cannot disobey, even when orders are bad. He must be mixed with peoples who cannot obey even when orders are good. Chief candidates would appear to be Ukrainians and Poles in the east, Greeks and Spaniards in the south, Irishmen in the north. In this way, Europe might look forward to a nation better balanced in its political and human tendencies, more akin to the French, the Flemings and Dutchmen, or the British. A long-term solution, but one which presents the following advantages: (1) it goes to the core of the problem; (2) it can be put into operation while the going is good; (3) it gives fruit when the hold of the victors over Germany will be coming to an end.

(2) *Atmosphere of world power*

It is neither fair nor sensible to expect Germany, whether re-stocked or not, to give up imperial ambition in a world in which force is the tool and empire the prize for every other great power. All that can be said here, therefore, is that the nobler and the more rational and sincere the world after the war, the less difficult will it be to win Germany over from her worship of force to a human and decent behaviour. The issue is of course closely intertwined with the second point of our inquiry: how to provide a solid basis for an alliance between Russia and the west.

Let us first be quite clear on one point: our discussion of the Soviet reality and our criticism of the lack of realism with which it is too often described and accepted in the west stop short of any censure of the two great western governments. Few, if any, are the cases in history when a more difficult situation has been handled with a deeper wisdom and a more dexterous day-to-day mastery than those that shine in the Anglo-Saxon diplomacy towards Russia during this war. If the west

has never yet lived through a worse danger than that of this war, it has never had the benefit of such leadership. Mr. Churchill had already given the world the size of his magnanimity in his speech on the fall of France — great as a piece of oratory, greater still as the expression of all that went to its making and conceiving in the silent halls of meditation. When the Soviet Union was attacked, he spoke, as was expected of him, the right words at the right time. And whenever he returned from meetings with M. Stalin he showed again and again the power of a true statesman in his restraint and generosity. This was so particularly on his return from Yalta. By a happy coincidence, seldom granted by Fate, his colleague in the leadership of the west, President Roosevelt, was a man of similar metal and calibre. But precisely because the two great westerners were two leaders of liberal democracy, it was inevitable that they should have to make the heavier sacrifices in the common task of maintaining the Triple Alliance. For M. Stalin, confined within a dogma, a faith, a tradition, a language and a milieu he has shown so much reluctance to leave even for a few days, was bound to be the least tractable of the three. It would be grossly unfair to accuse him of ill will. The chances are that he brought as much goodwill to the common task as his two partners. But he had a much longer distance to travel.

There is no need, therefore, to condemn or accuse any government. They did what they could, and the two western governments admirably and generously, to keep intact an alliance which was indispensable to win the war and remains indispensable to watch over the peace.

But if the western governments are not to blame, a similar conclusion would not apply to their public opinions; indeed, the British and the American Governments might well complain that they have not always

been well served by their press and other organs of opinion. For the fact is that, from the moment the Russian armies began to show their magnificent spirit on the battlefield, the bulk of western public opinion lost all balance on Soviet affairs and, thinking with their hearts, every man and woman became an honorary Russian when not an honorary Bolshevik. British and American Left-wingers discovered that realism, which they had found odious in Bismarck and criminal in Hitler, turned crystal-clear and luminous in the eyes of M. Stalin. It became evident for many western idealists turned realists that, in order to prevent Hitler from grabbing Antwerp and Rotterdam, it was good and sound that Stalin should take Viipuri and Riga; and that nothing could save Europe from the *Realpolitik* which had carved Czechoslovakia but the realism which had carved Finland, Poland and Rumania, and swallowed, uncarved, the Baltic States.

As to democracy, why, here is the definition given *ex cathedra* by one of the chief theologians of the Church of St. Marx:

> Democrats are those who give their efforts to the service of the people, who are ready to sacrifice even their lives, who work for the people — for peasants, workers and intellectuals for all who with their labour and toil create the things which they have the first right to use.[1]

This definition of democracy could hardly be acceptable to the free west. The trouble is that the west is growing less free. The strict censorship of the Russian State oozes into the west in curious ways, the more difficult to detect and to describe for their being spontaneous and subconscious. One gets into the habit of publishing only things which might have been passed by the Russian censor. A kind of voluntary or subconscious

[1] M. Vishinsky. *Cluj*, March 13th, 1945. *Observer*, March 25th.

adaptation to the Russian official truth thus sets in; and a discreet silence is maintained on a number of facts and on news which do not fit in with the popularly accepted image of Russia, as if the secretive ways of the east spread over the west on all eastern affairs.

It is submitted that, while discretion, tolerance, good humour and a certain generosity are gifts the west is entitled to offer Russia both for the sake of co-operation and as a token of admiration for the achievements of her wonderful army, a clearer analysis of the facts, more discrimination in the use of such words as 'democracy' and 'realism' and more frankness and outspokenness in the discussion of Russian affairs would have saved the world much suffering and confusion. And perhaps it is not too late to try.

The west should not submit to describing Russia as a democracy; for this word does not mean the same in Russia as in the west. The west should make it clear that freedom of opinion, publicity of budgets and a willingness to submit differences with other nations, even neighbouring nations, to the good offices of third parties are essential conditions of peace.

For, if on these two points, we are not clear with Russia, how can Russia respect us? It is as clear to the Russian leaders as it is to us that, in her dealings with her neighbours from August 1939 to June 1941, Russia has committed a number of aggressions. If we feign not to see them, and calmly organize a system to repel aggression without paying the slightest notice to these facts, Russia can only conclude that we are as ready as she is to use any popular phrase that is going in any sense which suits our 'realism'.

Here again we observe the evil effects of the combination of Anglo-Saxon empiricism as to aims dovetailing with Russian empiricism as to means. The Anglo-Saxons would not use Russian shifty ways: but as their aims

seem shifty to the Russians, their scruples as to means are lost and wasted on Moscow.

The leaders of the Soviet Union are heavily handicapped by their very omnipotence in home affairs. They hold the levers of Russian public opinion so firmly in their hands, they can so easily alter and even reverse course, burn what they had adored and adore what they had burnt, that they are apt to underestimate the importance of logic and verisimilitude in their arguments and explanations. Hence the awkwardness of some of their changes, and worse still, of their explanations of their changes. This situation has made the Soviet Government somewhat insensitive to home opinion. But as to foreign opinion, despite many a mistake of tone and tune, it remains sensitive to what is thought of it abroad. That is why it is important that the leaders of non-Russian opinion should remain objective and independent; for they have not merely the right, but the duty to keep the Kremlin wise as to standards of truth and action outside the bounds of its omnipotence. The Soviet leaders are entitled to draw hopelessly wrong conclusions from the ready acquiescence of the west in their tactics and vocabulary. How could the realist Stalin believe in a western idealism which accepted and even admired his realism? This lack of criticism of Russia in the west was therefore a poor service to Russia, and must bear a share of responsibility in some of the mistakes committed by the Soviet Government, such as that of denouncing Switzerland, of all nations, as undemocratic. In a spirit of true friendship for Russia the truth about what a western liberal democracy can think of her home and foreign affairs should be more frankly stated.

Frankness and clearness are moreover needed from the point of view of the west. First in order to strengthen the two great western powers in their dealings with the

Soviet Union; for the lack of an objective opposition to the ways of Russia, based on realities and facts, not on selfish capitalistic fears of communism, must have been a heavy handicap for the western leaders. Furthermore, the west needs truth as a defensive measure, for it is in danger of contagion from the totalitarianism which seeks to rule all life by sheer material force. We have all come across the budding Metternichs and Castlereaghs of the State Department and the Foreign Office, who with an eye deep with experience let fall: 'We are learning much from the Russians. Facts, not words, must rule our policy.' We have all come across the once liberal lady who forcibly lays it down that 'small nations must be *told* what they are to do'. The west is fast losing its humanism, its liberalism, indeed its Christianity, under the influence of sheer worship of force. 'Nations' — wrote Jacob Burckhardt — 'start a war to put down some evil, and in the course of it, acquire that very evil they had set out to put down.' It is imperative that the west should state its faith again, lest it acquire the other faith by keeping silent.

For, after all, the enemy is within the fortress. The west, precisely because it is liberal, carries on board a host of anti-liberal spirits whom it ever hopes to conjure precisely through liberty. Militarists ever ready to impose the authority of force, capitalists ever ready to cast a thick veil between their activities and public opinion, and even big trade unions not altogether proof against the temptations of a well-being founded on the exploitation of distant and less vocal brethren, may make up a formidable combination against true peace, which is the peace of justice.

All this should be born in mind if the situation is to be understood with a realism more real than that of the choristers of San Francisco. Three great powers have

climbed to the top of power — the highest known of history. There are four possibilities: rupture; tension; sinister agreement; enlightened agreement.

1. *Rupture.* Of the four, rupture would be the worst for humanity. A third European war in our generation would have at least two disastrous results; more devastation in a Europe already nearly dead; and a premature rebirth of Germany, i.e. a reorganization of German military power, before time and men had been able to change her spirit.

Nevertheless, we are not in a position to dismiss this disastrous possibility; by no means because it is consciously contemplated by either Russia or the west; but certainly because it forms an unavoidable part of the system of forces which confronts us. When three fast cars running at top speed collide with loss of limb and life, neither of the three drivers had the slightest intention of ending the trip in hospital or in the churchyard, but all ran the risk open-eyed. Let us then record that the first possibility, a rupture, cannot be discarded while the second — tension — remains in being.

2. *Tension.* Now, tension is inevitable. Russia and the west are two different worlds which try in vain to gloss over their differences. There are still naive people in the west who frown at what they describe as 'suspicions' of Russia's intentions. Having seen so many European nations deprived of their internal and external freedom and of their wealth merely for the crime of being within the Russian zone of influence, being as they are surrounded by the most blatant realities, these people still go on complaining of 'suspicions'.

So far, Russia has kept up the tension at its utmost. Free movement is the rule between the American and the British zones of occupation in Germany. The Russian zone is closed. The line between the Russian and the Anglo-Saxon zones is the border between two worlds.

Contact between the two has been difficult, slow to develop, and hedged in with precautions. Thus the first of them all, when the advanced American patrols were already within speaking (loudspeaker) distance from the Russians in the vicinity of Leipzig, whole days elapsed before the Russians were ready to accept a parley with their western comrades in arms. The admission of western diplomatic and military missions into territories occupied by Russia has always been most laborious; that of the press, impossible or difficult. The tension is there.

It comes from the radical difference between the western and Russian views as to their respective relations with occupied countries. The two western powers think that, once the military situation is assured, there is no reason why they should meddle with internal politics in any of the countries they occupy; hence their objective attitude in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and even Italy.[1] Though not without errors and vacillations, bound to occur under a liberal system, this policy of respect towards the internal policy of nations has been the rule in the west. On the other hand, Russia has forced every country under her arms to accept either a communist government — as in the Baltic States — or a government under the control of the communists. We know that this policy is both communist and imperialist, and that it is idle to try to separate the two motives.

The tension thus created between east and west has at times risen very high. There were moments, in Yalta for instance, when it remained high in long and awkward silence for many minutes. M. Stalin, to put it the French way, does not feel cold in his eyes. To corral, lock up, prosecute and condemn to prison the very men the British Government had suggested to govern Poland,

[1] Greece is no exception, though complicated by the tendency to violence evinced by both sides.

required a coolness out of the common. He is not likely to evince lesser calm and daring in the future when he has drawn such handsome profit from them in the past. In this tension, daring and the aggressive spirit are always likely to come from Russia, for a number of reasons. Russia seeks to create a new situation, while the west is content with carrying on the present one. Russia knows what she wants, while the west oscillates between power and principles. The Russian State controls a plastic, semi-oriental people, ready to obey and die for whatever it is told, and rigidly set within a totalitarian framework; while the western peoples are two, made up of differentiated persons, free, used to good living and only ready to die for an ideal after they have thoroughly scrutinized it. The Russian State controls all means of information, so much so that while it floods the air with Russian propaganda in English, neither the United States nor Great Britain broadcast in Russian. The west hears therefore all Russia wants it to hear; Russia only what the Kremlin dictates. Thanks to the communist party, moreover, Russia has at its disposal a faithful and well-trained fifth column in the west; while the opposition in Russia could not raise an eyelash, let alone a finger or a word, without being crushed by the steely hand of the State.[1] As, moreover, thanks to the usual class-war slogans, Russia still possesses a considerable prestige among what is known as 'the Left', many western intellectuals fall short of the mental vigour or of the moral courage to stand up to her for fear of cutting a reactionary figure.

All these reasons explain that in the tension between east and west, Russia is the positive, or offensive, the west the negative, or defensive, pole. If the tension continues, the world will have to live under the constant threat of worse events, and this uncertainty will heavily

[1] *Stalin: man of steel.*

tell against reconstruction. The mechanism of the Charter may help to keep things bumping along — not indeed because of its military articles, which can be of no use whatever to set right trouble between big powers; but owing to those in the rest of the structure which tend to foster world co-operation in other than political fields. But in all probability, an agreement will be sought. And the question arises: an agreement for what?

3. *Sinister agreement.* 'When head-shepherds meet, there dies a ewe-lamb', says a Spanish proverb. Agreement by all means, but we can hardly applaud before knowing its aims. 'Peace' is not enough. We have heard about 'peace reigns in Warsaw', and we are not referring to recent events. We have also heard about 'the peace of the dead'. The three big powers might reach a state of peace, agreed *between* them and imposed *on* the others, through an agreement to exploit the world to their exclusive benefit. The Charter is lavish in fine words, promise-crammed, Hamlet would say, but, with all respect for Hamlet, it is only mental capons who would consent to be fed so.

Let us look at the facts. First: a strong tendency to debar all nations but the big from criticism or action in world affairs, which become 'big power affairs', as observed in Dumbarton Oaks, and in San Francisco, particularly on the part of Russia. Then, total lack of really practical measures to check the economic, financial and military imperialism of the big powers. Civil and military flying are to thrive on in a full nationalistic atmosphere. A policy of naval and air bases spreads throughout the planet with complete disregard for any but the big powers. Russia and the United States set foot on Tangier; Russia on the Dardanelles and the Skagerrak, the United States dot with their bases the Caribbean Sea, occupy the Galápagos Islands, take positions in Natal and prepare a network of bases in the

Pacific. We are witnessing a game of strategic chess which might 'come in useful' for war, if war there must be, but would also be handy to put down any resistance to the dictatorship of the big powers.

Meanwhile the three big powers take economic and financial positions by means of similar, though not identical, systems. Russia promises her people a rise in well-being which is very much overdue. But how is this miracle to be performed after such a devastating war? Evidently at the expense of the nations 'liberated' by Russia. From Finland to Turkey, friends and ex-enemies will have to meet the needs of Russia directly or indirectly. The Russians strip every land of machinery, cattle, even private telephones[1]. The whole merchant fleet of Finland has passed into Russian hands as 'reparations'.

The standard of living of Central Europe will have to fall so that the Russian rises. To the east, we are therefore seeing already the outlines of a big-scale exploitation of the satellite nations by the dominant powers.

Meanwhile, what do we see in the west? Here is an example. A fascist Government, a declared friend of the nazis, detested by its own nation, basks in the hardly veiled favour of powerful friends within the two western powers. Of course, the responsibility for the situation of Spain is first and foremost Spanish. But had the western powers made it clear that they could not accept the regime, Spain would by now have recovered her liberty. This is a mere matter of political mechanics. General Franco's system rests on little if any national assent. He must rely on foreign help. His regime is not unlike that of the U.S.S.R. a State which sets up a force which in its turn keeps the nation in check. (Not in vain are Stalin and Franco both styled Generalissimos.) The State, of course, rests on the moral force of the minority which constitutes it. Without such a moral force, it would fall.

[1] See article on Austria in *The Times*, July 17th, 1945.

Now, one of the two most important factors among those which have kept the moral vigour of the Franco-State is that *General Franco has always been able to convince the army that the Anglo-Saxons were by no means displeased with his rule.* (The other factor is fear of a second civil war.) Had, therefore, the powers made it public and patent, by word and deed, that they considered the Falange and the Caudillo as incompatible with a post-war peaceful Europe, Spanish Fascists would almost certainly have fallen with their Italian and German brethren.

Now, the great powers have done nothing of the kind. True they have not given General Franco showpiece automobiles, as Hitler did. But they have at least allowed a number of moves which General Franco can only interpret as meaning that he is not *persona non grata.* The motion presented in San Francisco by Sr. Quintanilla, the Mexican delegate, declaring that Spain was not qualified to join the United Nations while governed by General Franco, was undoubtedly a hard blow for the Falangist rule; but, even then, General Franco could point out that the big powers had not taken the initiative — which in the circumstances, was a hint of favour. True the French and the American delegates spoke for the motion; but both the silence of the British delegate and the speech of the Soviet delegate in favour of the motion helped General Franco. Later the three great powers issued a kind of excommunication of Franquist Spain in Potsdam. This is the most important step taken by them with regard to Spain, and must be much appreciated. But there remain three reservations: the wording was unfortunate, for it speaks of the 'Spanish Government' instead of 'the Spanish regime'; it is far less strong in its effects on the actual situation in Spain than it would have been had the two western powers issued a similar statement without the concurrence of the Soviet Union; and it will carry but little weight while other transactions

which can hardly be reconciled with it are continued or even initiated by the western powers with the Spanish Government they say they do not want in the United Nations. Deeds must tally with words if words are to be believed.

It is well known that the city of London and similar circles in New York vie in the cordiality which they lavish on Falangist high officials, all pro-German to the marrow, when these gentlemen, sometimes invited from across the sea, come to visit them. Here, in Oxford, showpiece of the British free monarchy, we have seen at times heads of Franco's administration taken round in sumptuous array by the business community interested in their 'particular tap', in conditions of ease, plenty and motion which, in time of war, were beyond reach of mere private citizens albeit powerful, without State approval, backing and co-operation.

There is a sinister side to this situation; in order to remain in office, General Franco must give away national assets to the foreign powers which tolerate him. Hardly a day passes without some more or less veiled revelation about deals with some American (or at times, English) business agency; and there are more of them which do not get into the newspapers at all. It seems that two great democratic powers, just victorious in a war for liberty, might veto negotiations of such capital importance — some of which impinge on national sovereignty — with a country temporarily deprived of its political freedom. All this refers particularly to the period between the end of the German war and the advent of the British Labour Party. At the time of writing, it is too soon to report any changes due to the new British political situation.

But the case of Spain has been mentioned merely as an example. All nations, weakened by the war, are undergoing the impact of an economic imperialism which lays hands on their production and exchange systems, and

reduces them to the status of economic colonies, up to a point, of Great Britain, but mostly of the United States. Whither are we going that way?

The recent history of these capitalist States warrants no rosy hopes. The ex-Spanish Antilles, Cuba and Puerto Rico, have been shorn of their wealth and economic freedom, and, in the case of Puerto Rico, her people, once rich and happy, has become one of the most destitute of the earth, owing to the pumping out of its wealth by absentee sugar companies. The state of the British Antilles is much better, yet by no means to be quoted as a model of colonial statesmanship. Nor can Ceylon or Mauritius add to the glory of English colonial administration. And as for the Dominions, their record is no better.[1]

The world will live on mere rhetoric unless these facts and problems are squarely faced — for such is the duty of real realism. If the selfish and sinister forces which work in the dark in the western nations come to some sort of compact with the no less sinister forces which

[1] 'Canberra, July 4th.—The Minister for External Territories, Mr. Ward, explaining in the House of Representatives to-day the Bill for the restoration of the civil administration of Papua and that part of the mandated territory of New Guinea south of the Markham river, said that Papua would be made an example of the principle of trusteeship for dependent peoples that Australia had proposed at the San Francisco Conference.

'Explaining plans for the advancement of the natives, Mr. Ward said that the indenture system of labour would be abolished within five years. Professional recruiters would be eliminated, and the natives would henceforth be engaged by employers under licence. The Administration would determine the numbers employed and the priority of the industry. Pending the investigation of remuneration, a minimum rate of 15s. a month, plus rations, housing, and medical care, would be fixed, instead of the former monthly minimum of 5s. in New Guinea and 10s. in Papua. Weekly hours of labour would be reduced from 55 in New Guinea and 50 in Papua to 44, and the minimum age of employment would be 16. The period of employment would be a maximum of 12 months, and re-engagement would not be permitted until the native had returned home for 3 months.

'The native population of the territories was estimated at about 1,000,000, and the largest number employed at any one time had not exceeded 60,000. The plans provided for a vigorous programme of education, which would not exclude the missions, for they had given valuable service.'—*The Times*, July 5th, 1945.

All this is revealing both in what concerns the system in operation and in what it announces as desirable and as standards of reform.

are at work in the Soviet Union, we might still see both Europe and Spanish America proletarized, under the political action of Moscow in conjunction with the economic and financial action of New York. This would of course spell disaster for the political, moral and intellectual culture of the west. The toughest adversary of tyrannical regimes is always that middle zone of society made conscious and wise by the liberal professions, the small, independent employers and the skilled workers. This is the layer of society which dictators attack first and most savagely, that which their armies exterminate to absorb the headless nation afterwards. Economic absorption by a foreign power tends also to destroy it by a process of general impoverishment and proletarization — or to prevent its creation, by depriving it of universities and other centres of liberal education. All this world, the staunchest pillar of liberty, the world from which come all inventions, all ideas, all variety of forms of life, all conscious values of our civilization, is in Europe under threat of death, crushed between the political totalitarianism of Russia and the economic totalitarianism of the west.

We have seen the Governments of the United States and Great Britain accept without demur that a Soviet court should sentence to imprisonment men they had officially proposed as candidates for a Polish Cabinet of national union; and consider the Yalta agreement as fulfilled when the committee of Lublin made room round *its* table to two Polish leaders from London and two from Poland. This singular forbearance, on the part of two such powerful nations, on a matter in which were at stake not merely their prestige but the most elementary justice towards their ally Poland, was displayed before an astonished world immediately after a discreet visit paid by a representative of President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin. What was the substance of this agreement? Was it a sinister partition of the world between the three victors?

Has the Potsdam Conference revealed anything to dispel the doubts implicit in such a question?

4. *Enlightened agreement.* There remains one hope, and one guarantee: the moral sense of the two Anglo-Saxon powers. This moral sense is both profound and sincere. We have seen it struggle earnestly for all the causes it thought worthy of its help, set up in some British African colonies admirable and generous institutions, and tenaciously fight for the independence and freedom of Poland. Rooted in the tradition of free religious and political thought so dear to both Britain and the United States, this moral sense of the Anglo-Saxon is a creative force in which we have a right to set our hopes. Its weak side is that it often falls into naivety and allows itself to be led astray or befogged by sharper wits. International life is singularly complex, and everything, even most unwelcome and objectionable facts, can be clothed in candour and made acceptable for unsuspecting people of good faith.

The San Francisco Charter allows everything: a sinister agreement, based on the political, economic and military coercion of the smaller powers; but also a true world commonwealth for which an enlightened agreement between the big powers is indispensable. In order to bring about such an agreement and make it effective, a mutual influence between east and west must first be at work, so as to secure political liberty for Russia and to foster world socialism in the west. Unless Russia becomes accessible to western ideas and information, a vigorous world commonwealth is out of the question; but unless a number of great world services, such as air transport and liquid fuel, is socialized, such a world commonwealth would be precarious and in the end would fail.

Our conclusion is therefore: that a closer connection between Russia and the west is necessary so that the permanent tension implicit in the facts does not lead to a break; but that this closer connection may bring about

two opposite effects: one, if Russia and the west contaminate each other with their shortcomings, which would lead to a political and economic totalitarianism for the exclusive benefit of the three great powers; another one, if Russia and the west learn from each other achievements, which would lead to a prosperous and free commonwealth within the framework of world socialism.

Which of the four possibilities is more likely to materialize? All four together. Life will flow on carrying all possibilities and turning them all into mixed facts. There is going to be a constant tension; an enlightened and sincere agreement to organize world life in the best possible way; a sinister agreement to exploit smaller nations, absorbing their means of production, and drawing fat dividends out of their underpaid labour; and finally, a constant risk of a break with Russia, constantly dodged by concessions in which the west will nearly always have to be the more generous partner.

Therefore, statesmen in the immediate future will have to watch for two dangers: a break with Russia; a possible corruption of the agreement with Russia. These two are the dangers we must guard against. The first condition of our success in this task is clarity. Let us pass no ambiguous deeds, no equivocal words. The world is entering an unstable, delicate and dangerous phase. We shall have to be guided by immediate needs in our day-to-day movements, but this makes it the more imperative to be guided by steady, if far off, principles in our general course. Whatever the needs of action, let thought be clear and pure. Let the men at the helm of our ship take for the time being whatever course they think they must. They have steered the ship with so much mastery through the storm that we are not going to dispute their wisdom. But we who are not on the bridge, let us not pretend that east is west, for the stars will call us liars.

A POSTSCRIPT ON THE ATOMIC BOMB

THE two explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have raised a storm in the conscience of the world. No day goes by without some utterance from statesmen or men of science as to what is to be done about it. Most of them seek refuge in the idea of submitting the new weapon to international control. But before we decide whether we are going to put something under international control, we must be clear as to what this something is. It is not the actual model of the atomic bomb dropped over the two Japanese towns; for that model is already obsolete. It is not the scientific principle on which the atomic bomb rests; for that principle can be read in the scientific annals of any university. The proposal can only mean one thing: that what is to be put 'under international control' is nothing less than all technical progress and invention of detail in this new field of armaments. If the phrase does not mean that, it does not mean anything.

But what is control? This word has two meanings in English and only one in French (a fact, by the way, which used to cause no end of trouble in Geneva). In French it means to check or verify the accounts or, more generally, the doings of other persons or entities. In English it means that; but also to rule, or to exercise an effective amount of power, over the 'controlled' object. The phrase 'international control', therefore, tends to create a different impression in English-speaking countries from that it causes in countries more familiar with French.

This confusion grows worse confounded because of the incurable vagueness of the word 'international'. The phrases 'international trade' 'international war', or even 'international pandemonium' are perfectly clear; they mean war, trade, pandemonium *between* (inter) nations. But what does 'international control' really mean? Control *between* nations does not mean anything at all. Control (whether of the French or of the

English kind) implies a controlled object and a controlling agency. In this case, we have found that the controlled object would be all the human activities bearing on progress and invention, as well as on use and production of atomic energy for war. But where would the controlling agency be?

The first answer that occurs is a commission or Council, which would be described as 'international' because it would be composed of representatives of several nations. The proper epithet for such a body is *plurinational*, and not international. What does it matter? — might be asked. A good deal. For vague words lead to vague thoughts and vague thoughts lead to vague deeds. A 'Plurinational Commission' and 'Plurinational Control' would put the right stress on the plurality of concrete, rock-like sovereignties grouped round the table; while 'international' leads the mind gently away from the rocky nations towards that vapid 'inter' a prefix void of sense, of substance and, worst of all, of power.

The proposal then means 'to put under plurinational control the production of, and the progress and invention in, armaments based on the principle of the atomic energy'. This restatement shows that whatever 'advantages' of a military order the possession of the bag of tricks might entail would only be accessible to the powers represented in the Commission. Thus, the measure would, at most, extend to ten or eleven nations the privilege to-day enjoyed by three or possibly by one.

The principle once accepted for all weapons based on the atomic energy, there is no reason why it should not be adopted also for all other armaments. There is in fact every reason, both of logic and of practice, why it should be so extended. Logically, aircraft, explosive bombs, tanks, mines and guns differ in degree but not in kind from atomic-energy weapons, and should therefore be included in the plurinational control. Practically, weapons based on atomic energy cannot be isolated from other weapons in actual warfare. For instance, the possession by nation A of a secret type of aircraft may be a more decisive advantage in the use of an atomic weapon than the

'secrets' about that atomic weapon itself communicated *ex hypothesi* to the other powers of the Plurinational Commission.

It follows that the original proposal: 'Put the atomic bomb under international control' really means: 'Put all your military secrets under plurinational control'. Or, in other words, the original proposal leads fatally to a permanent military solidarity between a number of nations.

Such a thing has never been known in the past. Two nations — let alone ten — cannot be expected to pool their military secrets for good and all until they have decided in their hearts and minds that their fate is but one fate. The nations of the British Commonwealth are the only example known in History — and even so, only when the group is restricted to those of British stock. Two countries so obviously linked together by historical fate as Britain and the United States, have, it is plain now, found it impossible to remain permanently allied after the war. When the deep differences in policy between Russia and the West are borne in mind, the conclusion becomes inevitable therefore that the political conditions for an alliance between the big powers do not exist; and that, *a fortiori*, the sharing of military fate is out of the question.

What then? Let there be no illusions about the answer: all or nothing. There is no middle course. Either we remain separate, each within his nationality, inside a magic circle of military secrets which none but fools would dare classify into 'defensive' and 'offensive', or we merge our nations into one only nation and our policy into one only policy. The atomic bomb has made three imposing ruins: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the San Francisco Charter. Nothing less than a new faith, common to all of us, can save us from the havoc which the next war will let loose. This new faith requires:

(1) That the Western powers purge their liberalism from imperialism and profiteering; (2) that the Soviet Union drop their addiction to force and oppression both with regard to their own and to other peoples, and sincerely enter the community of

liberal nations; (3) that both East and West openly and sincerely adopt the doctrine of the total subordination of national policies to the policy or the World Commonwealth; (4) that measures are adopted at once to make this change patent.

Anything short of that is just talk.

APPENDIX

THE name to be given to the world organization is not a mere matter of words, as a parable will illustrate. A Spanish humorist, Julio Camba, once observed that the United States is a nation without a name. 'To call yourself "United States of America" ' — he pointed out — 'is as if a girl called herself "the fair-haired young lady of the second floor": it is a description; not a name.' True. Yet, by a strange caprice of fate, this description has endowed the United States with a most effective name: US. American soldiers display those two forcible letters on their uniforms: US. 'We' — they seem to say — 'come from the land of US. We are *Ussians*; that is a people who feel that deep unity which is in US.'

Nations with a strong collective sense feel that 'US' in them and express it always forcibly, if at times, oddly. '*We* bombed Berlin last night' — says the tottering, toothless old woman; and by the magic-mystic force of that US the feeble creature shares in the exploit and flies over the angry, flak-torn skies of Berlin more really and effectively than a witch riding a broom.

No such US has developed in the collective soul slowly groping towards world-citizenship. *Until it does there can be between nations neither widespread justice nor lasting peace.* The task of world statesmanship is therefore not 'to stop aggression and all that' but to develop an US common to all developed men and nations throughout the world.

It is for this purpose that a symbolic, unitarian word is needed instead of that plural United Nations. Following the clue given by the find of the United States, we might do worse than adopt the initials UN, which give a fine sense of oneness, and are short and universal in their appeal; for UN suggests unity at least to all the world which remembers Rome and its language. But a new word such as COWORLD might do equally well or better. For the phrase world-commonwealth does not lend itself to a good rendering in the Latin language; while Coworld would give Comonde, Comondo and Comundo, with a happy suggestion of commonwealth, due to sheer verbal luck.

The use of such a word would help in developing the spirit of union. But a more active effort would be needed. This might consist in the universal and official adoption of a simple decalogue of beliefs to be taught in all schools, exhibited on the walls of all official buildings, bitten into all memories and consciences. The following is offered as a rough draft:

A POLITICAL DECALOGUE

1. I believe that my life and that of my family depend on the life of my town; the life of my town, on the life of my country; the life of my country, on the life of all the countries forming the world community.
2. I believe true peace to be the health of all these lives, forming together one single life.
3. I believe that, since this single life is a world community, it must be governed as one and become a world commonwealth.
4. I believe that peace is only attainable when common aims are sought by common means.
5. I believe collective security is the outcome of collective policy and not of collective repression.

6. I believe nations must submit to general rules of behaviour towards each other and towards the world community as the community may dictate.
7. I believe that, in the world of men and nations, who wrongs one wrongs all.
8. I believe that, just as a nation is a limb of the world commonwealth, so must national patriotism be a living part of world patriotism.
9. I believe that all disputes between nations can and must be settled by reason, in the name and interests of the world commonwealth and by its institutions.
10. I believe all wars are civil wars.

INDEX

ABYSSINIA, 21, 124, 128, 130, 244
African Survey, 189
Albermarle, 147
Alfred the Great, 70
America, 20, 137, 145, 181, 186, 188
America, Discovery of, 161
Ankara, 197
Antilles, British, 290
Antonescu, Marshal, 232
Antwerp, 279
Arciszewski, 226, 230
Argentina, 138, 187, 257
Asia, 161, 253, 274
Atlantic Charter, 165, 219, 286
Attlee, 230
Australia, 129, 186, 290
Austria, 185, 241
Azores, 122

BABYLON, 78
Badajoz, 147
Badoglio, 253
Bagrianof, 237, 238
Bakunin, 55
B.B.C., 28, 91, 177, 192
Beaumarchais, 97
Beethoven, 51
Belgium, 27, 46, 122, 136, 156, 251 284
Ben, 228
Benes, Dr., 9, 133, 239
Berdiaev, 9
Berlin, 208, 214, 251, 294
Bessarabia, 231, 234
Bevan, 103, 230
Beveridge, 77, 110, 111
Bevin, 103, 187
Bialystock, 217
Bible in Spain, The, 193
Bismarck, 279
Black Sea, 218
Bligh, 147
Bojilof, 238
Bolívar, 160
Bolivia, 187
Boncour, Paul, 204
Bor, General, 225
Boris, King, 235, 236
Borrow, George, 193
Boulanger, General, 246
Bratianu, Dr., 232, 233
Brazil, 125

INDEX

Britain, *see also* Great Britain, 7, 13, 32, 46, 47, 48, 73, 102, 108, 136, 180, 181, 185, 187, 208, 209, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 228, 230, 237, 244, 245, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 263, 277, 278, 280, 292
British Africa, 292
British Museum, 57
Brouckère, de, 53
Browder, 230
Bucharest, 233, 235
Buck, Pearl, 188
Bukovina, 231, 234
Bulgaria, 63, 235-238
Burckhardt, 282
Burgundy, 141
Burma, 189
Butler, R. A., 204
Byrnes, 231

Cairo Conference, 237, 238
California, 146
Camba, Julio, 294
Canada, 46, 185
Canberra, 290
Caribbean Sea, 180, 181, 286
Carol, King, 231
Carolina, 68
Catherine II, 190
Cecil, Lord, 265
Ceylon, 290
Chamberlain, Austin, 21
Chamberlain, Neville, 21, 205, 245
Charles I, 64, 65
Chatham, 210
Cherbourg, 147
Chicago Conference of, 45, 185, 186
China, 130, 136, 154
Churchill, Winston, 13, 33, 37, 70, 121, 126, 149, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 248, 253, 254, 272, 278
Clausewitz, 146
Cluj, 235, 279
Code Napoleon, 80
Columbus, 161
Congo, 148
Conquest of the Philippines, The, 148
Contrat Social, 191
Cordon Sanitaire, 255
Corfu, 133
Covenant, 207, 259, 265, 266, 267, 268, 272, 273
Coworld, 298
Coxe, 212
Crimea, 234
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 252
Cromwell, 65, 70, 100
Cuba, 290
Curzon Line, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224
Czechoslovakia, 183, 215, 226, 239, 241, 254, 255, 256, 279

Daily Worker, 250
Daladier, 206
Dangeau, 37
Danton, 67
Danube, 251
Danzig, 131, 213
Dardanelles, 286
Davies, Lord, 126
Da Vinci, 51
Denmark, 20, 46, 129, 139, 141, 260
Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz, 206
Diderot, 160
Dimitrof, 243
Dnieper, 218
Dostoievsky, 9
Drake, 70
Duce, *see* Mussolini
Dumbarton Oaks, 128, 258-274, 286

Eden, Anthony, 49, 187, 224, 227
Eire, 27, 277
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 145
Engels, 102
England, 12, 13, 18, 28, 29, 39, 70, 74, 124, 129, 140, 141, 147, 152, 155, 191
Erasmus, 8
Estonia, 198, 199, 207, 247, 250, 284
Europe, 7, 9, 10, 12, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 46, 47, 55, 65, 92, 97, 117, 122, 123, 129, 130, 137, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 175, 176, 189, 207, 212, 213, 230, 231, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 277, 283, 291

Fagerholm, 209
Ferdinand of Aragon, 47
Filof, Professor, 236, 237
Finland, 20, 129, 188, 197, 199, 200-211, 233, 246, 247, 250, 265, 279, 287

France, 12, 13, 27, 28, 38, 64, 66, 73, 80, 102, 124, 136, 141, 152, 155, 156, 191, 199, 204, 206, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 231, 244, 245, 249, 277, 278, 284
Franco, General, 35, 41, 61, 287, 288, 289
Frederick II, 212, 214

Gabrilovitch, 240
Gabrovski, 237
Gafenco, Grégoire, 240, 247, 250, 252
Galapagos Islands, 286
Gallacher, 230
Gambetta, 66
Garibaldi, 59
Geneva, 9, 21, 134, 153, 213, 214, 244, 256, 265, 271
Germany, 89, 12, 13, 14, 15, 36, 37, 38, 47, 71, 72, 80, 124, 125, 129, 130, 131, 136, 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 156, 157, 158, 175, 176, 177, 178, 185, 201, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 231, 232, 236, 237, 239, 240, 244, 247, 248, 275-7, 283
Gestapo, 36, 41
Gheorgief, Colonel, 63, 238
Gide, 148
Gigurtu, 231
Gladstone, 243
Glasgow, 79
Glinka, 9
Goebbels, Dr., 36, 206
Gogol, 9
Gómez, General, 46, 274
Gordon, 147
Gottwald, 239
Grabski, 229
Granada, 82
Gravesend, 210
Great Britain, *see* Britain, 12, 27, 38, 39, 47, 56, 62, 111, 121, 122, 123, 129, 131, 154, 179, 180, 181, 187, 194, 199, 204, 205, 235, 285, 290, 291
Greece, 20, 30, 39, 122, 236, 254, 277, 284
Greenwood, 230
Grotius, 137
Groza, Dr., 233, 234
Gunther, J., 188

Hailey, Lord, 189
Hankö, 202, 203, 207, 210
Havana, 147
Hawaii, 180
Helsinki, 202 203, 209
Henry VIII, 71
Himmler, 36
Hindenburg, 36, 37
History of Russia, 191
Hitler, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 37, 62, 95, 123, 135, 136, 152, 180, 182, 199, 208, 214, 215, 217, 231, 234, 235, 237, 240, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 259, 262, 279, 288
Hohenzollern, 146
Holland, 27, 46, 122, 136, 277, 284
Holsti, 204
Hungary. 232, 251

I.L.O., 256
India, 189
Indo-China, 148, 189
Inside America, 188
Ireland, 138, 141
Isabel of Castille, 47
Italy, 21, 30, 39, 55, 58, 59, 63, 73, 124, 125, 128, 130, 139, 236, 244, 284
Izvestia, 215

James II, 65
Jankowski, 228
Japan, 14, 125, 130, 135, 136, 244
Jasukowitz, 228
Jefferson, 66, 160
Journey of a Cavalry Officer in the Corunna Campaign, 147
Julius Caesar, 58
Junkers, 157, 158

Kaiser, The, 40
Kalinin, President, 201
Karelia, Isthmus of, 201, 202, 203, 207
Katyn, 219
Kerensky, 195
Kiev, 213, 239
Kollontay, Madame, 210
Komorowski, General, *see* Bor
Kosciusko Division, 222

Kremlin, 240, 281, 285
Kuusinen, Otto, 203, 211
Kyrill, Prince, 236

LAPPVIK, 202
Latvia, 198, 199, 207, 247, 250, 284
Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, 65
Laval, 124
League of Nations, 3, 21, 22, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 132, 133, 139, 152, 169, 170, 171, 174, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 213, 215, 243, 246, 247, 253, 259, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 272, 273
Lebanon, 39
Leino, Madame, 211
Leipzig, 284
Lenin, 18, 47, 55, 57, 58, 59, 66, 71, 75, 191, 193, 195, 196, 213
Leningrad, 201
Lewis, 230
Lichauco, Marcial P., 148
Lincoln, 66
Lippmann, Walter, 180, 188
Lithuania, 198, 199, 207, 214, 247, 250, 284
Litvinov, 9, 244
Liverpool, 74
Lloyd George, 32, 70
Locarno, 21
London, 73, 74, 79, 122, 131, 174, 218, 224, 225, 226, 230, 232, 254, 256, 289, 291
Louisiana, 146
Lublin, 194, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 253, 291
Luther, 161
Lvow, 66, 217, 226

MACCHIAVELLI, 60
Machek, Dr., 241
Madrid, 62
Maisky, 218
Manchester, 74
Manchuria, 21, 124
Maniu, Dr., 232, 233
Marat, 67
Maria Theresa, 212
Marianas, 180
Markham river, 290
Marlborough, Duchess of, 105
Marshals, 180
Martins Oliveira, 191
Marx, 18, 19, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 75, 102, 193
Mauritius, 290
Memoirs of Louis XIV, 37
Message, 10
Mexico, 274
Michael, King, 232, 233
Michof, General, 236
Middle East, 218
Mikolajczyk, 224, 225, 226, 220
Mirabeau, 66
Molotov, 199, 201, 202, 205, 208, 216, 226, 227, 232, 234, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252
Monroe Doctrine, 187, 188, 256
Montaigne, 10, 77
Montesquieu, 191
Morrison, 231
Moscow, 22, 57, 62, 174, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 211, 214, 215, 216, 218, 222, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 291
Munich, 12, 21
Muravief, 237, 238
Murray, Philip, 231
Mussolini, 21, 58, 60, 124, 133, 171, 248, 259
Mussorgsky, 9

NAPOLEON, 13, 57, 58, 66
Napoleon III, 66
Narcisse, 96
Narvik, 251
Natal, 286
Negrin, Dr., 32
Netherlands, 191
New Guinea, 290
New Mexico, 146
New York, 10, 174, 289, 291
New Zealand, 185, 186
News Chronicle, 124
Nicaragua, 131
Nietzsche, 60
Norway, 46, 122, 136, 141, 207, 208, 209, 251, 284

Observer, The, 235, 279
Okulicki, General, 228
Orzel, 198
Oxford, 289

PAASAKIVI, 200, 201, 210, 211
Pacific, 287

INDEX

Panama, 194
Papua, 290
Paris, 246
Payne, 160
Pearl Harbour, 131, 135
Pekin, 147
Persia, 197, 262, 274
Pétain, 124
Petsamo, 207, 210
Philip II, 191, 192, 195, 255
Philippines, 148
Pilsudski, General, 46, 213, 214, 217
Pimenov, 229
Pitt, Thomas, 70, 100
Pitt, William, Lord Chatham, 70, 100, 105
Pitt, William, 100
Pocock, 147
Poland, 11, 12, 21, 46, 122, 136, 188, 198, 201, 211-231, 233, 245, 246, 247, 250, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 263, 277, 279, 284, 291, 292
Porkkala-Udd, 210
Portugal, 129, 138, 261, 262
Potsdam, 288, 292
Praga, 212, 225
Prague, 11
Pravda, 208
Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est, *see* Gafenco
Prieto Indalecio, 32
Primo de Rivera, 42, 89
Prussia, 275
Pruth, 232
Puerto Rico, 180, 188, 290

QUINTANILLA, 288
Quisling, Major, 208, 209

RADESCU, General, 233, 234
Red Cross, International, 220, 223, 256
Red Star, 222
Reformation, 156, 161
Reichstag, 215
Rhine, 124
Ribbentrop, 215, 216
Riga, 213, 217, 218, 279
Ríos, Fernando de los, 82
Ripka, Dr., 255
Robespierre, 66, 67
Rokossovsky, Marshal, 225
Rome, 63, 124
Roosevelt, F. D., 187, 194, 201, 205, 248, 263, 278
Roosevelt Theodore, 194
Rotterdam, 279
Rousseau, 95, 96, 191
Ruhr, 175, 176, 275
Rumania, 188, 231-35, 245, 247, 251, 274, 279
Russia, 9, 10, 11, 14, 18, 19, 46, 47, 57, 62, 66, 70, 71, 72, 75, 80, 90, 92, 96, 122, 129, 135, 179, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211-31, 231-35, 235-40, 246, 247, 248, 256, 262, 264, 265, 266, 269, 270, 275, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 291, 292, 293
Ruthenia, 239
Rybachi, Peninsula, 203, 207
Ryti Dr., 203, 209

Sacred Giraffe, The, 227
Sanatescu, General, 232, 234
San Francisco, 187, 226, 227, 256, 263, 264, 266, 267, 274, 282, 286, 288, 290, 292
San Sebastián, 147
Schulenburg, 250, 252
Scotland, 140, 141
Seiskari island, 202
Shinwell, 230
Sikorski, General, 217, 218, 224, 228
Simeon, King, 236
Sinclair, Upton, 230
Skagerrak, 286
Smith, Adam, 275
Smolensk, 219, 220
Snomen Sosialdemokraati, 209
Sobranje, 237
Sofia, 63, 237
Sonskovski, General, 225
Sorel, 60
Soviet Union: *see* U.S.S.R., 8, 9, 22, 75, 101, 121, 134, 135, 169, 179, 188, 190, 192, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 211, 243, 249, 251, 277, 278, 288, 291
Spain, 9, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 39, 47, 48, 61, 68, 81, 89, 96, 98, 102, 110, 125 138, 147, 152, 155, 156, 191, 192 212, 261, 262, 268, 269, 277, 287, 288, 289
Spectator, The, 10
Sredni peninsula, 203
St. Cloud, 57

St. Thomas Aquinas, 160
Stalin, 17, 18 31, 46, 191, 193, 195, 196, 214, 222, 223, 240, 244, 248, 250, 251, 252, 278, 279, 284, 287, 291
Stambulisky, 63
Stettinius, 227
Stockholm, 210
Storey, Moorfield 148
Stresemann, 12
Suvarov, 212
Sweden, 46, 56, 138, 201, 207, 208
Switzerland, 27, 138, 139, 156, 220

TALLINN, 198
Tangier, 286
Tanner, 205, 209, 211
Tass Agency, 197
Tatarescu, 231, 234
Teheran Conference, 237
Terijoki, 203
Teschen, 215
Thiers, 66
Third International, 17
This Month, 188
Thomas, Albert, 155
Time and Tide, 10
Times, The, 63, 124, 180, 197, 221, 222, 224, 233, 234
Tito, Marshal, 240, 241
Tolbukhin, Marshal, 238
To-morrow, 10
Tooke, 191, 212, 213, 214
Transylvania, 232, 251
Tripartite Pact, 208
Truman, President, 291
Tunstall, Brian, 147
Turkey, 92, 138, 235, 241, 287

UKRAINE, 136, 217, 218, 219, 251, 277
Unden, Professor, 204
United Nations,
United States of America, 13, 18, 21, 28, 38, 45, 66, 91, 102, 108, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 135, 169, 179, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 194, 205, 209, 210, 220, 224, 226, 227, 230, 235, 237, 244, 248, 253, 256, 257, 263, 267, 269, 270, 277, 278, 279, 280, 285, 286, 290, 291, 292, 294
U.S.S.R., 123, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 203, 244, 245, 252, 253, 255, 257, 258-74, 263
Upper Silesia, 213, 275

VARNA, 236
Vatican 22,
Velchev, Colonel, 63
Venezuela, 46, 274
Venizelos, 31, 32
Versailles, 216
Vienna, 11, 214, 233, 251
Viipuri, 207, 209, 279
Vilna, 198, 214
Viollis, 148
Vishinsky, 222, 223, 233, 235, 236, 279
Völkischer Beobachter, 206
Voltaire, 45, 77
Voroshilov, Marshal, 215
Voyage au Congo, 148

WALLACE, 51, 231
Ward, 290
Warsaw, 193, 211, 212, 213, 215, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 286
Washington, 49, 66, 82, 188, 232
Wavell, Field Marshal, 110
Welles, Sumner 200
White Russia, 217, 218, 219
Wight, Isle of, 210
William III, 65
Wilson, 187, 243
Wolna Polska, 222

YALTA, Conference of, 126, 149, 226, 227, 278, 284, 291
Yorkshire, 7
Yugoslavia, 226, 236, 240, 251, 254

ZELIGOVSKI, General, 214
Zveno, 238